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THE ESSENCE OF ITALIAN CULTURE AND THE CHALLENGE OF A GLOBAL AGE

edited by

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INTRODUCTION

The Heritage

The Western World looks with gratitude and pride to its roots in the Mediterranean. The development of philosophy and democracy in Greece was translated by the Romans into a system of law which acted as a broadly civilizing force; this enabled peoples to live together throughout the Mediterranean basin in the *pax romana*. With the emergence of Christianity these elements provided the Church with structure for its work, and in turn were transformed in a deeply humanizing manner. Augustine, Benedict, Aquinas and others elaborated structures of spirit and of life which transformed persons from within and reached out to the peoples of Northern, Central and Eastern Europe. This constituted the first ecumenical era and the initial weaning of a multi-ethnic tradition within the Holy Roman Empire, East and West.

A fresh elan of cultural creativity emerged in the Italian Renaissance. Its new zest for life and nature expressed first by Francis of Assisi, provided new ways to look at the cultural creations of the ancients. It generated intensive, creative interest in geography and astronomy, political structures and art. Today we still live out the impetus which this "re-birth" gave to the socio-political and the cultural life of the West.

In all these dimensions of time--ancient and medieval, renaissance and modern--the Italian experience contains essential keys for understanding the progress of humankind. For the emerging nations in Eastern Europe and other parts of the world in search of ways to reconstitute social life in terms of their distinctive cultural identities, the Italian success in fashioning a nation from many regions, each with its own rich tradition, provides striking lessons. For the peoples of other regions of the world who look to the West for models to guide their own development, the Italian genius takes on ever greater importance.

It is the purpose of "Globus et Locus" to work out this content of the heritage of Italy as part of the heritage of humanity and to determine how this can be communicated and lived in the many different world contexts. This transnational spirit of Italy, termed "Italicity" is the central topic of this volume.

The Collaboration

With the realignment of the bipolar geo-political world into a new global order, the humanizing presence of the Italian peoples must be highly visible and active. This is true above all of Washington as a focal point where persons and institutes intersect for policy decisions which effect profoundly the shape of international cooperation and the direction of human progress in our times. An Italian presence in this context is not a matter of military or economic power; it is rather that of providing a source of experience and a legacy of wisdom and creativity for shaping modern culture. More than ever, this cultural endowment needs to be engaged in the process of opening fundamental human aspirations, inspiring social dynamics and generating the creativity through which humankind responds to the challenges of our times.

The point of contact with this process of shaping our culture is the university, where literary and artistic criticism is thought through, where social and political structures are modeled and tested in debate, where new dimensions of human sensibility and insight are evolved and translated into methods of social analysis and response. For this reason, as we proceed into an ever more ominous XXIst century, it is particularly important that the resources of the Italian experience be made visible and active in Washington through a university structure.

The Catholic University of America (CUA) was particularly suited for this task.

- Its identity has made it especially attentive to the classical and cultural traditions of Italy, ancient and modern, with its literature, philosophy and the arts.

- Its foundation as a graduate school has given CUA a long tradition of advanced scholarship with a full range of doctoral programs, not only in the arts and humanities, but also in the social and natural sciences and in the professions.

- Its relation to the Catholic community gives it special access to the Italian heritage and to the experience of the Italian-America community in adapting this cultural heritage to the pluralistic North American socio-political setting.

- Its location in Washington was chosen for presence to the ongoing process of shaping the cultural life of this nation--this has become increasingly central as the role of Washington in world affairs develops exponentially.

- It is the home of units deeply involved in issues of culture and change on a national and global basis, viz., a number of Catholic learned societies, The National Center for Urban Ethnic Affairs (NCUEA) and The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy (RVP). This recently has published three volumes of the Edmund D. Pellegrino Lecture Series on the transformations in Italian life edited by Paolo Janni. These have now joined together in the CUA Center for the Study of Culture and Values (CSCV).

For these reasons and circumstances – cultural, political and creative -- The CUA Center for the Study of Culture and Values provides a special place where the Italian heritage can be visible and active in the construction of yet another stage of ecumenical interaction, which at this dawn of a new world order is now fully global in character.

The Context

The initiation of this joint effort was dramatic. Originally the program had been envisaged for the Fall of 2001 as a celebration of Italian culture. But that plan was swept aside by the events of Sept. 11. suddenly it became clear that cultural heritages in the global interchange of the new millennia were not unambiguous and could even be supremely dangerous.

Was it time to abandon the distinctive cultures as expressive of the unique creativity of each people in order to envisage the passive peace of an homogeneous and undifferentiated humanity? If such a prospective half life – or "march of the clones" – strikes one with horror and revulsion, then the work of elaborating an alternative future must be correspondingly urgent. For if the distinct heritages are to continue to play their essential humanizing role, then it is crucial to understand their nature and interrelations at a much deeper level and in a more sensitive manner.

Providentially, the two partners in the original plan seemed to constitute a uniquely complementary team to undertake just that work. Globus et Locus was concerned with practical ways in which the essence of Italian life might transcend the confines of the state of Italy. This led inevitably to the issue of how one culture could play a creative role in the new global interchange of peoples. The Center for the Study of Culture and Values, for its part, had encouraged and published 100 book-length studies of how people could draw on their cultures in facing present problems. The new events pushed it inevitably into the heart of the new crisis; how are culturally awakened peoples to live peacefully and productively one with another? In view of this new situation the joint program was rescheduled and recast to read "The Essence of Italian Culture and the Challenge of a Global Age."

When the two teams met their complementarity was immediately evident. Neither was able or interested in doing the work of the other, but each was vitally interested in the challenge being faced by the other. Session by session over the days of the meeting the discussions grew in depth and intensity.

The Task

It quickly became evident that as we move from a national to a global age a new set of challenges, possibilities and opportunities opens. Whereas in the past nations defined themselves in terms of borders that cut them off and distinguished them from one another, now their uniqueness lies rather in their ability to relate to other peoples. And whereas tradition had been directed toward repeating the past, it is seen now as a process of creative transformation in the face of a challenging, even threatening, future.

It is then no longer possible merely to repeat or revel in the glories of the past; we are challenged rather to reinterpret our heritages in ways that unveil their healing competencies for life in a changing world. This is a matter of taking the initiative and playing an active role in the global forum now opening for life in the new millennium

Hence this volume explores the Italian cultural identity, its evolution in America and across the world, and the role it can play in the new, and at times troubled, global interchange of peoples at the many levels of business and politics, migration and religion.

More concretely it seeks:

- To define the challenges and sketch the range and the depth of the distinctive place of Italian culture, values and life style;

- To introduce to Washington scholars and policy makers some outstanding representatives of the Italian cultural heritage;

- To look for ways in which the Italian spirit can contribute to the resolution of international problems; and

- To lay the ground work for a structure to continue and deepen this work through joint research and informed discussion.

The Structure

Not all of this could, of course, be accomplished in any one set of studies. But the project could be launched and, with careful follow up, there is already promise of true progress along this road. The present volume is testimony of that.

Part I, "Italicity and the Emergence of Culture in Our Time," introduces the characteristics of Italicity and the hermeneutic issues it entails. It begins with Chapter I "Italicity: Global and Local," an introductory and thematic chapter by Piero Bassetti. This initiates the work of teasing out the specific character of Italicity. If we were still in an international stage built block by block by the different nations as sovereign states than one could speak simply of Italian, Italian America, etc. But that night connote a process of self-affirmation and empire building. This is Italy's glorious heritage from ancient times, but would not be the proper focus in our times. Indeed other authors make much of the diminishing sense of sovereignty in the context of the

European Union and the broader emergent global context.

Instead P. Bassetti capitalizes on the endemic weakness of the modern Italian state in order to free up a rich cultural content that is communicable across borders and able to be drawn upon, lived and developed not only by the Italian diaspora but by many who would engage and be engaged by it. This, of course, includes such specific cultural products such as Italian opera, but it includes as well the particular stylish flair on which a company such as "Italco" can be built, and on which an institute such as St. Egidio can play a unique role in mediating the most difficult and dangerous conflicts in the far flung corners of the world.

But Bassetti carries this even further specifying as characteristics of Italicity: compliance with difference, rather than hegemonic; aesthetic, creative and affective; universalist and cosmopolitan; with a sense of belonging that is essentially cultural and existential. This launches the project of Italicity and opens the way for further analysis.

Chapter II by George F. McLean, "Hermeneutics of Culture: Local and Global," begins to lay a philosophical foundation for this notion wedding two planes: vertical and horizontal. Vertically, it notes the long project of objective reason from the days of Aristotle, and how this was radicalized in the rationalism that characterized the modern mind from the time of Descartes. The very success of this development when pushed unilaterally has opened by contrast new awareness of human subjectivity. The result is to add to the search for abstract universal science a new awareness of the work of creative human freedom. This shapes our attention and confirms the hierarchies of values and virtues which constitute cultures – and over time, cultural traditions.

For this new dimension of human consciousness there is need to develop appropriate modes for its interpretation, both as a process of entering within one's own culture and engaging peoples who proceed in terms of their own different cultures. Hence Chapter II continues with a study of the contribution which can and must be made by hermeneutics in the development of any one culture as well as in relating to other cultures in the increasingly pluralistic life within and between peoples.

Chapter II suggests, moreover, that hermeneutics itself may be at the brink of a dramatic new breakthrough. For its fusion of cultural horizons is no longer between two or more cultures, but between any regional set of particular horizons and the new global whole. At this point the multiple horizons are not only externally related and compared, but internally constituted by each other. This is done not only in the context of the whole but in terms of the whole as the ontological foundation of all reality and meaning. This may well be the major task to be taken up in the century or even the millennium upon which we are entering.

Chapter III by Robert Royal, "Globalization and Italian Culture," begins the process of linking together the project of Italicity introduced in Chapter I and that of globalization from Chapter II. It identifies the genius of the peoples of the Italian boot for governing, whether in empire or in Church. It is indicative of the global character of our age and of the ability of Italicity to transcend boundaries that he would look for new ecclesiastical leadership from beyond Italy thereby implicitly affirming the emergence in importance of Italicity over Italian.

Part II, "Italians in America," begins to fill in the broader concepts of Part I with greater detail on the actual history of the cultural resources of Italy as they spread to North America in the great diaspora. Chapter IV "Italian Cultural Identity and Migration Italian Communities Abroad and Italian Cultural Identity through Time," by Maddalena Tirabassi studies the experience of the Italian diaspora as it faned out across the world, especially in America. What she describes is not a simple transplantation of the old country in the New World but the human struggle with its ruptures and creativity as it evolves the old heritage in new and in some ways richer modes. The family remains strong and Italian, yet mothers see their daughters become really new women. Italian foods are transformed. Yet while remaining distinctively Italian, they become the favorite choice of the ultimately diversified population of America. What emerges is not a replication of the old country, but a new culture clearly impressed by the old and shared by all peoples.

Chapter V, "Identical Difference: Notes on Italian and Italian American Identities," by Fred Gardaphe follows this lead while providing new insights. Chapter VI by Michael Barone, "The Essence of Italian

Culture and the Challenge of the Global Age: Italian Cultural Identity and Migration," analyses this experience in terms of migration. Chapter VII by Consuelo Corradi, "The Making of Identity in a Globalizing World: An Overview of the Italian American Business Community," shows how this has worked out in the close interpersonal relations of the Italian American business community.

Part III, "America and Its Italians," reviews the field to examine how America and its predominant culture reacted to the Italian migration.

Chapter VIII by John Kromkowski, "Italian Americans in a Pluralistic America," is interested in how this can work out politically. To the degree that it is refined into Italicity, of course, it moves easily across borders and is quietly interiorized. But Kromkowski tells of a somewhat different experience, namely, of the loss of culture and values in the inerxorably homogenizing process called "the melting pot" and of the effort of Msgr. Geno Baroni and of his National Urban-Ethnic to retrieve these elements in the context of a devolving neighborhoods and communities. He follows this in the political order in terms of national efforts to outlaw prejudice in terms of political origin, along with that of religion, age, sex, etc. His report shows these efforts fading as regards Southern and Eastern Europeans as they are overshadowed negatively by the salient issue of racial prejudices against blacks, though inequality of opportunity at higher job levels was long as notable for Southern and Eastern Europeans. It may well be that the subtle ministries of Italicity on the cultural level could prove more effective than political and legal action.

Chapter IX, "The Religious Challenge of a Globalizing World for Italian Cultural Identity: Lessons from the American Experience in Public Education," by Robert Destro follows cultural identities to their roots in religion. Hence he suggests that the ability of a nation to allow for cultural diversity is most manifested in the way it makes room for religious diversity. The claim that education can be separated from religion is itself a specific cultural and theological position which becomes less tenable all the time. Yet it feels much of the intercultural tension that has generated fundamentalist reactions. Destro sees the resolution of this issue as a major challenge for the future.

Part IV, "Italicity in a Global Age," suggests how the importance of Italicity and its analogs in other cultures promises to become more, rather than less, important for life in a global age. What it brings to light is something suggested earlier in Part I, namely, that the very nature of political sovereignty is changing. Thus Chapter X, "Locality, Nationality, Globality: The Possible Contribution of Italianness in the Age of Globalization," by Mauro Magatti sees globalization as a double disconnect. One is structural as the economic order transcends control by individual nations or even regional blocks or trading zones. But this is not all, for with the transfer of the economic powers to transnational and even global forces there comes the need to adjust the laws in ways that put a primacy on property, a characteristic rather of common law cultures and medieval systems. The other disconnect is subjective. This enables a new affirmation of local cultural sensitivities as well as of the global. In these terms the global becomes precisely not a leveling homogenization, but an evocation of new creative diversification. This may help the effort at cultural retrieve begun by Barone in terms of ethnicity in the more conflictual period of the 60s. In the end Magatti would use the continuing role of the state as an essential mediator between these local and global dynamics.

In Chapter XI, "Civic Identity without National Identity? Political Identity in a New and Changing Global Context," by Vittorio Emanuel Parsi focuses more directly upon the state and its sovereignty. This at first seems counter factual as it might be interpreted as a reaffirmation of an outmoded nationalism, but carefully and with profound effect. Professor Parsi analyses what is happening to sovereignty. Without ever letting go of its importance he shows its progressive transformation in terms of globalization. Rather than seeing the global process as an external extension of economic, political and informational networks beyond the nation, he examines the profound changes that this works upon national sovereignty in a process which he rightly terms "globalization from within."

The contribution of this pair of Italian scholars is decisive in showing how Italicity is not an esoteric

phenomenon relating to Italian culture, though Italy may have special abilities in this transformation of sovereignty. What begins to emerge is much more dramatic, namely, that the development of Italicity may be a broader phenomenon inherent in globalization and hence a harbinger of a major evolution of all peoples in our times. This provides the volume with heightened importance as being not simply about Italicity, but about the inner workings of globalization as it deeply transforms the life of all peoples.

Chapter XII by Maryann Cusimano Love, "Globalization, Religion and Culture: Beyond Conflict, beyond Sovereignty," opens to what had only been briefly noted in previous chapters, namely, that "states cannot solve pressing global problems alone. Can Italian and Italian-American institutions, such as the Roman Catholic church in the United States, play a constructive role in helping to address global problems? Greater attention to the role and resources of adaptive religious and cultural institutions may help to create effective public-private partnerships for managing global problems. In *ad hoc* attempts to manage global problems and bridge globalization's gaps, however, alternate ideas of authority and identity may evolve which over time challenge and change Westphalian sovereign norms. The state is not going away, but it is increasingly contracting out. As states downsize and decentralize in response to the pressures of globalization, and as states innovate in response to global problems, nonstate actors such as religious and cultural organizations perform functions previously performed by states and promote ideas with unintended consequences for sovereignty.

Italian as an ancient culture and the Italian-American experience as an adaptive immigrant population reconciling old and new world values, now bring important contributions to bridging the gaps in globalization. Not the least of these factors which is only now is emerging can best be called: 'Italicity.'"

In sum, this volume has taken us on a marvelous journey. It began in Part I with the amazing reality of the expansive attractiveness of culture, specifically that of the Italian tradition. But to understand this we needed to look deeply into subjectivity and into the hermeneutics which enables insight into each cultural tradition as well as communication between them.

Part II examined concretely how this is seen in the dyanamic life of the Italian community as many migrated to the "new world". There they suffered prejudice from without and painful changes between generations. But what has emerged is not only a successful life in the broader American community, but a conscious reaffirmation and reanimation of Italicity. This is shared not only by those of Italian descent, but by a broad section of the populace precisely to the extent that they are sensitive to beauty and to spiritual and cultural values.

Part III, in reverse, looks at how America has striven – not too successfully – to cope with the great Italian migration through legislation and regulation, as well as through the education in the public schools.

Part IV examines the implications of this for the global age. Finding that this entailed both a structural and subjective disconnect it began to appear that globalization was not only a matter of extension to more peoples or even of inclusion in the world system, but perhaps more fundamentally a transformation of national sovereignty – globalization from within. In this light Italicity may well be not only a phenomenon for which Italy is especially apt, but its analogs may be a destiny which all peoples are called to live.

Just as sailing to America Columbus opened a "New World," continued analysis of the concrete theme of Italicity could open an important route for understanding the new global order presently emerging. This will require navigating the shoals of terrorism, which calls, not for gunboats, but for uncovering how cultures find their fruition. That is not in closure, but in the openness of universal engagement. This, of course, will be more than "Italicity," but along the sea routes that these initial explorations of the notion of Italicity have striven to open.

George F. McLean

CHAPTER I

ITALICITY: GLOBAL AND LOCAL

PIERO BASSETTI

"ITALICITY"

The first question is: why speak of "Italic peoples" rather than in the more usual and traditional term "Italians"; what distinguishes the concept of "Italic peoples" from that of "Italians"?

By way of introduction a concise answer is provided here, but it will be developed, expanded and analyzed below.

First and foremost it must be made clear that this is not a "literary" reply, something originating from discoveries made "in books", but rather an existential one, originating from long experience in different institutional roles of throughout the world, in meetings and contact with communities, institutions, and people, in relationships and shared (planning) experiences with the preeminent "Italic" business communities everywhere (but especially here in the Americas).

In short, by "Italic peoples", and so by "Italicity", what is meant is a belonging in the widest "cultural" sense: not as ethnic or linguistic belonging as with those of Italian origin or who speak the Italian language or as the legal or institutional belonging of Italian citizens.

In this sense, the concept is similar to that described by George McLean, when he speaks of the "Re-emergence of Cultural Awareness" and stresses the centrality of the conscience and of cultural values in building identities.

IT is a transnational community found, to varying extents, on all continents, and not only here in the Americas and characterized by shared values and interests. Historically, its roots lie in Italian emigration throughout the world, but it has since undergone many changes and now extends well beyond those roots.

It is a community many tens of millions of people. It is estimated that there are at least 60 million people of Italian origin throughout the world; if this estimate is extended to include "Italophiles", it may rise to 200 million. It comprises many different human or social groups:

- Emigrant Italians and their second, or third generation descendants, many of whom no longer speak the Italian language and have not retained Italian citizenship.

- The family members of these emigrants, born in the "new" countries of residence, and who,

though differing in origin and language, at least share a good measure of values and interests.

-   The ~~largest and also the~~ most problematic part of this concept of "Italicity" -- all those who, setting aside ethnic or linguistic belonging and citizenship, in some way "feel" Italic, precisely because they like and share the group's values and interests, which they have come to learn through their encounters with people, things (*Made in Italy*) and "tokens" of the "Italic world": information, art, the cinema, and all the technological instruments that feed our "collective image bank". In this connection, it should be pointed out that the mobility of people, things and tokens increasingly characterizes the globalization process, for which reason opportunities for these "encounters" everywhere intensify and multiply.

Truly to understand who the Italic peoples are, the focus must be on the concept of diaspora, rather than of migration. The diaspora is a transnational and for many centuries has been crossing and re-crossing the world, nourishing its interconnections and networks.

It is not the only diaspora in the global world, but it has interesting and peculiarly distinctive identities and for this reason may make an original and significant contribution to building a more humane and peaceful global world. This is the more so after the tragic and highly disturbing events of September 11th, which have thrown all Western certainty and security into crisis.

THE HISTORIC ROOTS OF "ITALICITY": ITALIANS IN THE WORLD OVER THE CENTURIES

The Italians are, in effect, the Genoans, the Venetians, the Florentines, the Milanese, the Lombards and so on, that is, all the numerous different regional and local "identities" into which Italian history is subdivided. Since the early years of the second millennium, they have traveled the world's highways and high seas. Beginning in the Middle Ages, colonies of Italian merchants could be found in London or Constantinople, Antwerp, Seville or Aleppo.

In 1271 the Venetian Marco Polo, at the age of 17, undertook his famous journey to the Far East with his father Niccolò and his uncle Matteo. His travels throughout Asia were to last 24 years, including a long stay at the Imperial Mongol Court. Marco Polo returned to Venice only in 1295. In 1283, there were 14 Italian banks in London's *Lombard Street*; in Paris, the *Rue des Lombards* had 20 Italian banks by 1292.

But not only merchants and bankers moved throughout the known "pre-Colombian" world. There were also artists, university teachers, architects, artisans, churchmen, and political exiles. A popular 15th-century proverb bears witness to the great mobility of the inhabitants of Florence: "Sparrows and Florentines may be found throughout the world". When Vasco de Gama reached India, after a long, adventurous circumnavigation of Africa, he found that some Venetian merchants were already there. A citizen of Chioggia – Nicolò de' Conti – lived and traveled in India and Indonesia between 1415 and 1459.

With the "discovery of America" and the birth of the new world, the horizons of the Italian diaspora were extended. Navigators and merchants, monks and churchmen, artists and intellectuals began to travel not only in Europe, Asia and Africa, but also in the Americas. Under Spanish rule, though emigration to the Americas was prohibited to foreigners, between 1535 and 1538 (thanks to exceptions granted to Italian states that were subjects of Spain or its allies) there were already 6

people originating from the Kingdom of Naples, 2 from the State of Milan, 3 from the Kingdom of Sicily, 1 from Lucca, 1 Florentine, 14 Genoese, 1 from Turin, 1 from Piedmont and1 from Cremona in the new world.

Clearly then long before the Unification of Italy and the great mass migrations of the late 19th century, the numbers of Italians were steadily increasing in both American hemispheres.

As may be seen from studies carried out in recent years in the United States, in an area like Philadelphia, an initial community of Italian origin formed and consolidated in the period between the eve of American independence and the 1870s. During that period, leadership made up of tradesmen, businessmen and entrepreneurs emerged as the first "ethnic" intermediaries between the Italian community and the United States society. At the same time, significant community institutions were created, such as the first parish for Catholics of Italian origin (1852). The first Italo-American Provident Society, the Italian Association of Union and Brotherhood, was formed in 1857, by Italians who first and foremost were Ligurians.

Italian emigration to America, it should be recalled, was not only an economic emigration. As the historian Ruggiero Romano has written, "there were more than a few Carbonari, and in general Italian patriots who, after the failure of the various revolts, uprisings and revolutions of 1821, 1831, 1840 found refuge in America". Political exiles, too, were part of the panorama of Italian "mobility" before Unification, anticipating a significant dimension of the mobility of people in our global world.

In the year of the Italian Unification – 1861 – many Italians, though they considered themselves Piedmontese, Lombards, Venetians, Tuscans, Sicilians and so on, had already settled throughout the world.

According to data from the General Census of 1861, 77,000 were living in France, 14,000 in Germany, 14,000 in Switzerland, 12,000 in Alexandria, 6,000 in Tunisia, and above all – for the purposes of this study – 500,000 in the United States, and the same number in the rest of the Americas.

The key point, then, of this short and partial historical breakdown is that the Italian diaspora in the world has old roots. In some ways it belongs to the essential characteristics of Italian identity even before the country achieved national unity, before the first unified state and citizenship were born, before the Italian language truly became a spoken language used by the great majority of the inhabitants on the peninsula. All this occurred only gradually over a long process destined to be completed only with the birth of television after the Second World War.

Running the risk of the "anachronism" inherent in such opinions and language, in essence it may be said that over the centuries the Italian diaspora has been a precursor to the "glocal" community.

It is a diaspora of "localisms" (Venetians, Genoese, Florentines, Milanese and so on) typical of the many urban and regional identities that are interwoven into the country. At the same time it is a "global" and cosmopolitan diaspora, traveling the world in the name of values. For example, the Roman Catholic faith, the thirst for knowledge, the spirit of adventure. It also sougth interests: money which spurs merchants and bankers to travel and profit which derives from production and business. All were by characterized a "universal" vocation.

Behind the "imagined community" of Italic peoples, there are centuries of trans-territorial mobility of the peninsula's inhabitants, their cities, and their various constituent political bodies. This preceded transnational mobility, that is, even before the modern "nation" was born.

This mobility was not only migration; there were many different reasons behind it. It took

place in different ways, involving not only leaving, but also returning. It is significant, in this sense, that of the 14 million Italians who left the country between 1876 and 1914, there was a high repatriation rate. More than half of them returned to Italy; many were to emigrate more than once during their working lives.

 In connection with "returning", it should be noted that recently, there has been a massive return to Italy by Argentineans of Italian origin: another significant and current example of mobility.

To conclude this point, the "Italic peoples" are the descendents of this centuries-long process of mobility and of diaspora. They did not have behind them – unlike other great transnational diasporas – the long history of a strong and unified nation state, an exclusive and "protected" identity politically and militarily. Rather, their roots lie in a history divided into different smaller identities, which only recently have come together into a joint identity. For this reason, it maintains an unusual and significant "acceptance of differences".

GLOBALIZATION AND THE DIASPORA: THE ITALIC PEOPLES AND THEIR VALUES

Over the last few decades, the world has gone from the age of internationalization to that of globalization. The first age, which began in the late 19th century, was one of great mass migrations originating primarily from Europe. It was stimulated by need and, at the same time, attracted by the "American dream".

During this period, the United States absorbed and assimilated peoples. It gave rise to an original "nation of nations", and created the extraordinary *melting pot* so widely known today.

In the second period – today's globalization -- the glocal, founded on the global interlinking made possible by the technological revolution, has thrown the *melting pot* into crisis. This has been transformed it into a new, more complex, more divided reality, in which belonging, loyalties and identities tend increasingly to be multiple.

Today's globalized world is increasingly one of transnational diasporas: from the "historic" Jewish, Spanish and Anglo-Saxon diasporas to the Chinese, Indian, Arab and, last but not least, Italic diaspora.

As has been said, it is, inevitably, a world of multiple belonging, where "transidiom" is used. This linguistic phenomenon is the post-modern offspring of people's mobility and the triumph of electronic communications. "Diasporic public spaces" are formed and cultivated, made up of a growing set of transnational relationships. These are physical, but also virtual via the web which today is available at least potentially to everyone.

One of the consequences of this phenomenon is the transformation of the traditional concept of "identity". It should be noted that the United States at the center and "heart" of the world increasingly is seen not in the traditional image of the *melting pot,* but rather - in the words of anthropologist Arjun Appadurai, an Indian who lives and works in the United States – as "a node of a post-national network of diasporas. . . . They are no longer a closed space where the magic of the *melting pot* may operate, but one of the many diasporic points of exchange, in which people come to seek their fortune, but without any longer resigning themselves to leaving their country of origin behind."

In our glocal world, identity is increasingly less a "given"; increasingly it is more a

"process," built up through social practices that take place in increasingly numerous and extensive "spaces." These extend from territorial and local spaces where the communities of the different diasporas live together and interweave, to the virtual-global spaces of the web. In these the imagination is nourished by encountering people, things, and tokens. It plays a new and decisive role, not comparable with any experiences of the past.

In this way, throughout the world human groups are formed that we could define as "communities of feeling". These begin to imagine and feel things in common. For the first time they have the opportunity to know and choose existential possibilities and life models that are different and are practiced by "others" and "elsewhere". In other words, communities whose identity is not so much, and not only, ethnic, linguistic or political-institutional, based on citizenship, but rather are culture- and value- based.

In this context, identities appear to be increasingly "fluctuating." They are constructed, transformed, interwoven, and subjected to constant and completely new challenges and tensions. Loyalties and belonging differ and multiply. In some cases they enter into conflict; in others they give rise to new and original cultural and value-based "cross-breeds".

In the light of these considerations and in this frame of reference, it may be possible better to understand "Italicity" and how Italicity can differ from, and go beyond, "being Italian". Undoubtedly it has strong historical roots in terms of identity, linked to centuries of Italians' trans-territorial and trans-national mobility. But it is not limited to these roots, although it continues to nourish itself through them.

In the age of globalization and post-national and trans-national diasporas, the Italic peoples have become, in substantive terms, a diaspora interlinked internally by a "common feeling" more than by a common ethnic-linguistic and national belonging. What is this "common feeling"; what are the essential values – and the shared values of Italicity that are being described, the "essence of Italian culture"?

On the basis of experience and reflection, the author can try to outline a general picture, an initial, partial and provisional "repertory" of shared values and connected interests.

These are values that to some degree have a particular glocal configuration. They originate from long experience in many particular "places" (small villages, towns, the regions of the "Boot"). But over time people have been forced by the need to emigrate in search of work or have chosen for exploration, business, or religious vocation to travel and encounter the "globe".

In brief, these great values are:

-   Multiple belonging and the acceptance of differences. The values are linked to the history of multiple local identity traditions, and at the same time to the short, late and "weak" experience of a nation state. They long coexisted and in some respects still coexist with other pre-existing identities. Today increasingly the coexist also with the new-born European identity.

-   A conception of belonging that is essentially cultural and existential, rather than ethnic-linguistic or legal-institutional. Thus, at least potentially, they are more "malleable" and open to dialogue with those who have a "different" belonging, as well as to contributions from other identities. It may not be by chance that after the Second World War Italian public opinion was one of the most favorable in Europe towards European integration which entailed an attenuation and dislocation of national sovereignty at a new European Community

level.

- The central role of the family and of family relationships in the fabric of social relations. This pre-eminent value runs transversely through state and national belonging. It contributes to "attenuating" and to "softening" the traditional harshness of power and force incarnating in the modern, Hobbesian "Leviathan-state". Even when Italy took the path of the ethical, totalitarian, militarized state, fascism had to come to terms with this historical, anthropological background, and it is clear, in the end, who were the winners and losers.

- Christian, and more precisely Roman Catholic values, that have contributed and still contribute to forming in many respects the identity of Italians and of Italic peoples. Here values of the person and family are pre-eminent over those of state and nation; values of universalism and cosmopolitanism, linked to feelings of humanity; values of a "non-economistic" conception of economy which cannot be separated from an ethical view of life.

- The aesthetic sense and the values of good taste and beauty. These have played a large part in Italian history, and are embodied not only in the extraordinary heritage of art and culture that distinguishes the country, but also in lifestyles. These are universally known today thanks to the triumph of *Made in Italy* and more recently have been discovered and loved by millions of people throughout the world.

- The values of enjoyable and creative work, whose roots run deep in Italian history, from the centuries-long artisan traditions often bordering on art, to the more recent experience of design and Italian style built into ones – including technological products – of the Italic genius.

It should be made clear that this repertory of values does not take the form of a claim to a superiority or exceptionality of the "Italic peoples" compared to other peoples and diaspora in the world. That would be some sort of "masked chauvinism". Two considerations bear witness to this warning and to this sense of the limits Italians have and must preserve.

First, it is known full well that each of these values has "another face" in the form of potential negative values, oft-experienced in history. Pluralism and tolerance always risk becoming relativism and indifference; love for the family can turn into "amoral familism" with little respect for institutions and public ethics; Roman Catholic values *became* the Inquisition, and more recently *have been* tempted towards closure and fundamentalism; creativity in life and work risks becoming disorder and lack of organizational purpose. Clearly, all of these are traditional and well-known negative Italian "stereotypes" that the first generations of emigrants had to pay for.

Second, Italian history contains not only peaceful religious, intellectual or mercantile experiences of traveling around the world, but also colonial conquests, fascism, and forms of organized violent crime exported to other countries.

But what is to be stressed is that today's Italicity – as a "community of feeling" arises from a selection and a synthesis of positive values. It comes also from what is now a consolidated defeat of totalitarian and imperial experiences. Finally it comes from the more recent, but equally consolidated fading of the "stereotypes" that have long given a negative image to Italian emigrants throughout the world.

What is open to "reconciliation" is the Italy of art, science and culture; of religiousness of transnational humanitarian volunteer work, both religious and secular; of cultured, welcoming tourism; of beautiful, functional *Made in Italy* products; of small-scale yet dynamic and courageous

entrepreneurship; of the organized creativity of the famous "industrial districts"; and of a greatly admired and sometimes envied ability to "know how to live" and "live well". In this sense, Italicity is a great resource to be used to tackle the challenges of the global world. This is clearly a theme that merits reflection.

"ITALICITY" AND THE CHALLENGES OF THE GLOBAL WORLD WHEN CERTAINTY IS IN CRISIS

The tragedy of September 11th 2001 for the first time struck the world's greatest power "at home." It placed the "variable" of unpredictable planetary and technological terrorism squarely on the world stage so that the global world now shows all of its ambivalence.

On one hand, there is the extraordinary potential for development offered by scientific and technological innovation, by the increased production of goods and services, by the opening of countries and markets. On the other hand, there is the increased inequality and level of conflict (among states, ethnic groups, social groups), the consequently increased disorder and insecurity, and the increasingly evident inadequacy of the global system's capacity for governance.

It is increasingly clear that no "empire", no great power – not even the greatest in human history – can alone guarantee order and security. Above all, no power can do this only or chiefly using the tools of military might, without an overall strategy for the intelligent use of all resources – human, cultural, technological, institutional, and others. Enemies who "network" (international terrorism first and foremost) with "other networks" must be countered using the same acentric and *bottom-up* rationale that characterizes the enemy networks.

The great post-national and trans-national diasporas – and, in particular, that of the Italic peoples – are among these resources. They criss-cross the planet and interconnect it; they have a *glocal* nature that enables them to "act locally and think globally"; they know what it is to live as the "different" people; they are thus potentially able to act as "intermediaries" among different cultures and peoples. <u>The Italic peoples, in particular know and practice this multiplicity of belonging and loyalties.</u>

For the United States seen now not as a *melting pot,* but as a "node of a post-national network of diasporas" awareness of the positive potential of the great diasporas which run through it is becoming an urgent necessity.

The diasporas, too, can have something of an ambivalent nature. Diasporas such as, fro example, the Islamic cultural matrix, which is possibly the most "dissonant" with regard to Western society, may bring connections and resources, as well as conflicts, to the countries they move through. Multicultural societies, as is known, always oscillate between the "royal road" of integration and risks of conflict and separatism. In Italy, too, people have begun to discuss these concerns, since migratory processes towards the country have become notable.

The strategic question for countries that are "nodes of diasporas" is therefore: how to enhance the positive potential of their diasporas in order to face the challenges of the global world -- peace, development and social unity? In other words, how to "take the best" from each of the diasporas; how to "metabolize" their best universalist, cosmopolitan, non-fundamentalist aspects?

It can be said in this general framework that the diaspora of Italic peoples stands as an original resource, and is among the least ambivalent ones.

The values of this diaspora already outlined above are:

- a "compliant" identity with no hegemonic claims deriving from strong colonial and imperial traditions;

- "unresentful" as is often the case of peoples who have undergone, or are still undergoing, domination and oppression, and who therefore feel "humiliated";

- "aesthetic," sensitive to the universal value of beauty;

- "affective," aware of the deep and non-rational dimensions of human life; of the value of feelings expressed in the experience of family life; of the value of "sympathy", understood etymologically as an instinctive "feeling close";

- "universalist," based on the search for universal and shared values;

- "cosmopolitan," which expresses itself in the desire to deal with the "other," in an intellectual and aesthetic attitude that is open to different cultural experiences, and in a personal capability to succeed in other cultures and populations by listening, asking, looking, touching, intuiting and reflecting.

The Italic peoples may make a contribution to dealing with the challenges of the global world with identities and values of this type. Perhaps, from this standpoint, it is neither naive nor Utopian to think that "another world may be possible".

We fully realize the dramatic nature of the challenges with which the United States is faced today. We know full well that, as the leader of the global world, most of the burdens and responsibilities for the future of this world lie on its shoulders.

But that is exactly why we are interested and willing -- as "Italic peoples" -- to open a dialogue on our possible role and on our possible contribution to a strategy that will be able to meet these challenges, aware that we can win only by working together.

CHAPTER II

HERMENEUTICS OF CULTURES IN A GLOBAL AGE

GEORGE F. McLEAN

THE EMERGENCE OF SUBJECTIVITY

In the context of the many crises with which we have been greeted in entering upon the new millennia it is dangerous to raise the question of the role of philosophy. For if, with Aristotle, philosophy is something to be taken up when the basic needs of the times are cared for then philosophy is in danger of being shelved for many generations to come. On the other hand, philosophy may have to do with our nature and dignity -- with what we are, and with what we are after -- and hence with the terms in which we live as person and peoples. If so then philosophy may be not the last, but the first consideration or at least the most determinative for life in our trying circumstances.

During the last century human knowledge of the physical universe was totally transformed by breaking into the atom and discovering its structure. The effect was not only scientific advance but the joint threat of the atomic bomb and the great promise of atomic energy.   It is the contention here that similarly philosophical understanding today has shifted from being a work of deduction by specialists working in abstraction from the process of human life, to deep engagement at the center of human concerns under the pressures of life's challenges. From external objective observation life is now lived in terms also of internal self-awareness where human freedom with its cultural creativity and responsibility become central. The playing field has shifted, the challenges have risen geometrically and with them the potential not only for death but of life. To understand this we need to review the steps, negative and positive, by which this breakthrough from mere objectivity to subjectivity has occurred.

The Crisis of Objective Reason

These pressures force us to cross a new divide as we enter into the new millennium. To see this we need to review the history of reason in this epoch. The first millennium is justly seen as one in which human attention was focused upon God. It was the time of Christ and the Prophet; much of humanity was fully absorbed in the assimilation of their messages.

The second millennium is generally seen as shifting to human beings. The first 500 years focused upon the reintegration of Aristotelian reason by such figures as Ibn Sina, al-Ghazali, Ibn Rushd and Thomas Aquinas.

The second half of the millennium, from 1500, was marked by a radicalization of reason.

Whereas from its beginning human reason always had attempted to draw upon the fullness of human experience, to reflect the highest human and religious aspirations, and to build upon the accomplishments of the predecessors -- philosophers sensed themselves as standing on the shoulders of earlier philosophers -- a certain Promethean hope now emerged. As with Milton's *Paradise Lost*, it was claimed that humankind would save itself, indeed that each person would do so by his or her power of reason.

For this, Francis Bacon[i] directed that the idols which bore the content of the cultural tradition be smashed; John Locke[ii] would erase all prior content of the mind in order to reduce it to a blank tablet; René Descartes[iii] would put all under doubt. What was sought was a body of clear and distinct ideas, strictly united on a mathematical model.

It was true that Descartes intended later to reintroduce the various levels of human knowledge on a more certain basis. But what he restored was not the rich content of the breadth of human experience, but only what could be had with the requisite clarity and distinctness. Thus, of the content of the senses which had been bracketed by doubt in the first *Meditation*, in the sixth *Meditation* only the quantitative or measurable was allowed back into his system. All the rest was considered simply provisory and employed pragmatically and only to the degree that it proved useful in so navigating as to avoid physical harm in the world.

In this light the goal of knowledge and of properly human life was radically curtailed. For Aristotle,[iv] and no less for Christianity and Islam in the first 1500 years of this era, this had been contemplation of the magnificence and munificence of the highest being, God. By the Enlightenment this was reduced to control over nature in the utilitarian service of humankind. And as the goals of human life were reduced to the material order, the service of humankind really became the service of machines in the exploitation of physical nature. This was the real enslavement of human freedom.

Subjectivity: the New Agenda

To read this history negatively, as we have been doing, is, however, only part of the truth. It depicts a simple and total collapse of technical reason acting alone and as self sufficient. But there may be more to human consciousness and hence to philosophy. If so in analogy to the replacement of a tooth in childhood, the more important phenomenon is not the weakness of the old tooth that is falling out, but the strength of the new tooth that is replacing it. A few philosophers did point to this other dimension of human awareness. Shortly after Descartes Pascal's assertion "Que la raison a des raisons, que la raison ne comprend pas" would remain famous if unheeded, as would Vico's prediction that the new reason would give birth to a generation of brutes -- intellectual brutes, but brutes nonetheless. Later Kiekegard would follow Hegel with a similar warning. None of these voice would have strong impact while the race was on to "conquer" the world by a supposed omni-sufficient scientific reason. But as human problems mounted the adequacy of reason to handle the deepest problems of human dignity and transcendent purpose came under sustained questioning and more attention was given to additional dimensions of human capabilities.

One might well ask which comes first, the public sense of human challenge or the corresponding philosophical reflection. My own sense is that they are in fact one, with philosophical insight providing the reflective dimension of the human concern. In any case, one finds a striking parallel between social experience and philosophy in this century. To the extreme totalitarian repression by the ideologies of the 1930s there followed the progressive liberation from fascism in World War II, from colonial exploitation in the 1950s and 60s, of minorities in the 1970s and from closed societies in the 1980s. Throughout, like the new tooth the emergence of the person has been

consistent and persistent.

Thus, Wittgenstein began by writing his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*[v] on the Lockean supposition that significant knowledge consisted in constructing a mental map corresponding point to point to the external world as perceived by sense experience. In such a project the spiritual element of understanding, i.e., the grasp of the relations between the points on this mental map and the external world was relegated to the margin as simply "unutterable". Later experience in teaching children, however, led Wittgenstein to the conclusion that this empirical mental mapping was simply not what was going on in human knowledge. In his *Blue and Brown Books*[vi] and in his subsequent *Philosophical Investigations*[vii] Wittgenstein shifted the human consciousness or intentionality, which previously he had relegated to the periphery, to the very the center of concern. The focus of his philosophy was no longer the supposedly objective replication of the external world, but the human construction of language and of worlds of meaning.[viii]

A similar process was underway on the continent in the Kantian camp. There Husserl's attempt to bracket all elements, in order to isolate pure essences for scientific knowledge, forced attention to intentionality and to the limitations of a pure essentialism. This opened the way for his understudy, Martin Heidegger, to rediscover the existential and historical dimensions of reality in his *Being and Time*.[ix] The religious implications of this new sensitivity would be articulated by Karl Rahner in his work, *Spirit in the World*, and by the Second Vatican Council in its Constitution, *The Church in the World*.[x]

For Heidegger the meaning of being and of life was unveiled and emerged -- the two processes were identical -- in conscious human life (*dasein*) lived through time and therefore through history. Thus human consciousness became the new focus of attention. The uncovering or bringing into light (the etymology of the term "phe-nomen-ology") of the unfolding patterns and interrelations of subjectivity would open a new era of human awareness. Epistemology and metaphysics would develop -- and merge -- in the very work of tracking the nature and direction of this process.

For Heidegger's successor, Hans-Georg Gadamer,[xi] the task becomes the uncovering of how human persons, emerging as family, neighborhood and people, by exercising their creative freedom weave their cultural tradition. This is not history as a mere compilation of whatever humankind does or makes, but culture as the fabric of the human consciousness and symbols by which a human group unveils being in its time.

The result is a dramatic inversion: where before all began from above and flowed downward -- whether in structures of political power or of abstract reasoning -- at the turn of the new millennium attention focuses rather upon the emerging upward exercise of the creative freedom of people in and as civil society as a new and responsible partner with government and business in the continuing effort toward the realization of the common good.

CULTURAL TRADITIONS AND CIVILIZATIONS

This achievement of modern hermeneutics in enabling the interpretation of human consciousness from within has made it newly possible to comprehend the nature of culture as constituted progressively of the development of values and virtues.

Values and Virtues

The drama of free self-determination, and hence the development of persons and of civil society, is most fundamentally a matter of being as the affirmation or definitive stance against non-being elaborate it the very beginning of Western philosophy in the work of Parmenides, the first Greek metaphysician. This is identically the relation to the good in search of which we live, survive and thrive. The good is manifest in experience as the object of desire, namely, as that which is sought when absent. Basically, it is what completes life; it is the "per-fect", understood in its etymological sense as that which is completed or realized through and through. Hence, once achieved, it is no longer desired or sought, but enjoyed. This is reflected in the manner in which each thing, even a stone, retains the being or reality it has and resists reduction to non-being or nothing. The most that we can do is to change or transform a thing into something else; we cannot annihilate it. Similarly, a plant or tree, given the right conditions, grows to full stature and fruition. Finally, an animal protects its life -- fiercely, if necessary -- and seeks out the food needed for its strength. Food, in turn, as capable of contributing to an animal's sustenance and perfection, is for the animal an auxiliary good or means.

In this manner, things as good, that is, as actually realizing some degree of perfection and able to contribute to the well-being of others, are the bases for an interlocking set of relations. As these relations are based upon both the actual perfection things possess and the potential perfection to which they are thereby directed, the good is perfection both as attracting when it has not yet been attained and as constituting one's fulfillment upon its achievement. Hence, goods are not arbitrary or simply a matter of wishful thinking; they are rather the full development of things and all that contributes thereto. In this ontological or objective sense, all beings are good to the extent that they exist and can contribute to the perfection of others.[xii]

The moral good is a more narrow field, for it concerns only one's free and responsible actions. This has the objective reality of the ontological good noted above, for it concerns real actions which stand in distinctive relation to one's own perfection and to that of others -- and, indeed, to the physical universe and to God as well. Hence, many possible patterns of actions could be objectively right because they promote the good of those involved, while others, precisely as inconsistent with the real good of persons or things, are objectively disordered or misordered. This constitutes the objective basis for what is ethically good or bad.

Nevertheless, because the realm of objective relations is almost numberless, whereas our actions are single, it is necessary not only to choose in general between the good and the bad, but in each case to choose which of the often innumerable possibilities one will render concrete.

However broad or limited the options, as responsible and moral an act is essentially dependent upon its being willed by a subject. Therefore, in order to follow the emergence of the field of concrete moral action, it is not sufficient to examine only the objective aspect, namely, the nature of the things involved. In addition, one must consider the action in relation to the subject, namely, to the person who, in the context of his/her society and culture, appreciates and values the good of this action, chooses it over its alternatives, and eventually wills its actualization.

The term `value' here is of special note. It was derived from the economic sphere where it meant the amount of a commodity sufficient to attain a certain worth. This is reflected also in the term `axiology' whose root means "weighing as much" or "worth as much." It requires an objective content -- the good must truly "weigh in" and make a real difference; but the term `value' expresses this good especially as related to wills which actually acknowledge it as a good and as desirable. [xiii] Thus, different individuals or groups of persons and at different periods have distinct sets of values. A people or community is sensitive to, and prizes, a distinct set of goods or, more likely, it

establishes a distinctive ranking in the degree to which it prizes various goods. By so doing, it delineates among limitless objective goods a certain pattern of values which in a more stable fashion mirrors the corporate free choices of that people.

When this is exercised or lived, patterns of action develop which are habitual in the sense of being repeated. These are the modes of activity with which one is familiar; in their exercise, along with the coordinated natural dynamisms they require, one is practiced; and with practice comes facility and spontaneity. Such patterns constitute the basic, continuing and pervasive shaping influence of one's life. For this reason, they have been considered classically to be the basic indicators of what one's life as a whole will add up to, or, as is often said, "amount to". Since Socrates, the technical term for these especially developed capabilities has been `virtues' or special strengths.

Cultural Traditions

Together, these values and virtues of a people set the pattern of social life through which freedom is developed and exercised. This is called a "culture". On the one hand, the term is derived from the Latin word for tilling or cultivating the land. Cic ero and other Latin authors used it for the cultivation of the soul or mind (*cul tura animi*), for just as good land, when left without cultivation, will produce only disordered vegetation of little value, so the human spirit will not achieve its proper results unless trained or educated.[xiv] This sense of culture corresponds most closely to the Greek term for education (*paideia*) as the development of character, taste and judgment, and to the German term "formation" (*Bildung*).[xv]

Here, the focus is upon the creative capacity of the spirit of a people and their ability to work as artists, not only in the restricted sense of producing purely aesthetic objects, but in the more involved sense of shaping all dimensions of life, material and spiritual, economic and political into a fulfilling. The result is a whole life, characterized by unity and truth, goodness and beauty, and, thereby, sharing deeply in meaning and value. The capacity for this cannot be taught, although it may be enhanced by education; more recent phenomenological and hermeneutic inquiries suggest that, at its base, culture is a renewal, a reliving of origins in an attitude of profound appreciation.[xvi] This leads us beyond se lf and other, beyond ide ntity and diversity, in order to comprehend both.

This constitutes the basic topology of a culture; as repeatedly reaffirmed through time, it builds a tradition or heritage about which we shall speak below. It constitutes, as well, the prime pattern and gradation of goods or values which persons experience from their earliest years and in terms of which they interpret their developing relations. Young persons peer out at the world through lenses formed, as it were, by their family and culture and configured according to the pattern of choices made by that community throughout its history -- often in its most trying circumstances. Like a pair of glasses values do not create the object; but focus attention upon certain goods rather than upon others. This becomes the basic orienting factor for the affective and emotional life described by the Scotts, Adam Ferguson and Adam Smith, as the heart of civil society. In time, it encourages and reinforces certain patterns of action which, in turn, reinforce the pattern of values.

Through this process a group constitutes the concerns in terms of which it struggles to advance or at least to perdure, mourns its failures, and celebrates its successes. This is a person's or people's world of hopes and fears in terms of which, as Plato wrote in the *Laches*, their lives have moral meaning.[xvii] It is varied according to the many concerns and the groups which coalesce around them. As these are interlocking and interdependent a pattern of social goals and concerns develops which guides action. In turn, corresponding capacities for action or virtues are developed.

This sense of tradition is vivid in premodern and village communities, but would appear to be much less so in modern urban centers. Undoubtedly this is in part due to the difficulty in forming active community life in large urban centers. However, the cumulative process of transmitting, adjusting and applying the values of a culture through time is not only heritage or what is received, but new creation as this is passed on in new ways and in response to emerging challenges. Attending to tradition, taken in this active sense, allows us not only to uncover the permanent and universal truths which Socrates sought, but to perceive the importance of values we receive from the tradition and to mobilize our own life project actively toward the future. This diachronic sense of culture will be treated more below.

But because tradition has sometimes been interpreted as a threat to the personal and social freedom essential to a democracy, it is important here to note that a cultural tradition is generated by the free and responsible life of the members of a concerned community or civil society and enables succeeding generations to realize their life with freedom and creativity.

In fact, the process of trial and error, of continual correction and addition in relation to a people's evolving sense of human dignity and purpose, constitutes a type of learning and testing laboratory for successive generations. In this laboratory of history, the strengths of various insights and behavior patterns can be identified and reinforced, while deficiencies are progressively corrected or eliminated. Horizontally, we learn from experience what promotes and what destroys life and, accordingly, make pragmatic adjustments.

But even this language remains too abstract, too limited to method or technique, too unidimensional. While tradition can be described in general and at a distance in terms of feed-back mechanisms and might seem merely to concern how to cope in daily life, what is being spoken about are free acts that are expressive of passionate human commitment and personal sacrifice in responding to concrete danger, building and rebuilding family alliances and constructing and defending one's nation. Moreover, this wisdom is not a matter of mere tactical adjustments to temporary concerns; it concerns rather the meaning we are able to envision for life and which we desire to achieve through all such adjustments over a period of generations, i.e., what is truly worth striving for and the pattern of social interaction in which this can be lived richly. The result of this extended process of learning and commitment constitutes our awareness of the bases for the decisions of which history is constituted.

This points us beyond the horizontal plane of the various ages of history; it directs our attention vertically to its ground and, hence, to the bases of the values which humankind in its varied circumstances seeks to realize.[xviii] It is here that one searches for the absolute ground of meaning and value of which Iqbal wrote. Without that all is ultimately relative to only an interlocking network of consumption, then of dissatisfaction and finally of anomie and ennui.

The impact of the convergence of cumulative experience and reflection is heightened by its gradual elaboration in ritual and music, and its imaginative configuration in such great epics as the *Iliad* or *Odyssey*. All conspire to constitute a culture which, like a giant telecommunications dish, shapes, intensifies and extends the range and penetration of our personal sensitivity, free decision and mutual concern.

Tradition, then, is not, as is history, simply everything that ever happened, whether good or bad. It is rather what appears significant for human life: it is what has been seen through time and human experience to be deeply true and necessary for human life. It contains the values to which our forebears first freely gave their passionate commitment in specific histo rical circumstances and then constantly reviewed, rectified and progressively passed on generation after generation. The content of a tradition, expressed in works of literature and all the many facets of a culture, emerges progressively as something upon which personal character and society can be built. It constitutes a rich source from which multiple themes can be drawn, provided it be accepted and embraced, affirmed

and cultivated.

Hence, it is not because of personal inertia on our part or arbitrary will on the part of our forbears that our culture provides a model and exemplar. On the contrary, the importance of tradition derives from both the cooperative character of the learning by which wisdom is drawn from experience and the cumulative free acts of commitment and sacrifice which have defined, defended and passed on through time the corporate life of the community as civil society.[xix]

Ultimately, tradition bridges from ancient philosophy to civil society today. It bears the divine gifts of life, meaning and love, uncovered in facing the challenges of civil life through the ages. It provides both the way back to their origin in the *arché* as the personal, free and responsible exercise of existence and even of its divine source, and the way forward to their goal; it is the way, that is, both to their *Alpha* and their *Omega.*

Civilizations

On entering into the new millennium we stand at a point not only of numerical change to the series 2000 or even of a change within a system as with a substitution of political parties, but at a point of revision of the very nature of world ordering itself. Earlier the issue was one of the possession of territory under the leadership of great Emperors or of the physical resources and the military-industrial power that entailed. More recently we have seen the world divided by ideologies into great spheres. Since the end of the Cold War, however, it is suggested famously in the work of Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*,[xx] that the world order is being remade on the basis of the pattern of civilizations. The tragic events of 9/11 show how violent this remaking can be.

This reflects a deep transformation in interests and epistemology. Before attention was oriented objectively, that is, to things as standing over against (*ob*-against; *ject*-thrown) the knowing subject. In this perspective their quantitative characteristics, according to the classical definition of quantity as parts divided against parts; were particularly salient and were given major importance.

In this century the subject and its intentional life -- or subjectivity and values -- have come to the fore and phenomenological methods have been developed for their identification and interpretation. Whether it was philosophers who brought this realm of subjectivity into central awareness or whether it was attention to subjectivity which evoked the development of the corresponding philosophical methodologies can be disputed. Probably the philosophical methods provided the reflective dimension and control over the new self-awareness of human consciousness. In any case, it is suggested that the new world order will be based not on the resources we have, but on the civilizations we are: not on having but on being.

According to Huntington the notion of civilization seems to have developed in the 18th century as a term to distinguish cultivated peoples from the barbarian or native populations being encountered in the process of colonization. In this sense it was a universal term used in the singular. It implied a single elite standard of urbanization, literacy and the like for the admission of a people into the world order. When the standard was met the people was "civilized"; all the rest were simply "uncivilized".

In the 19th century a distinction was made between civilization as characterized by its material and technological capabilities and that characterized by a more elaborate political and cultural development in terms of the values and moral qualities of a people. The two terms tend to

merge in expressing an overall way of life, with civilization being the broader term. Where culture focuses on the understanding of perfection and fulfillment; civilization is more the total working out of life in these terms. Hence civilization is culture, as it were, writ large.

This appears in a number of descriptions of civilization where culture is always a central element: for F. Braudel civilization is "a cultural arena",[xxi] a collection of cultural characteristics and phenomena; for C. Dawson: the product of "a particular original process of cultural activity which is the work of a particular people";[xxii] for J. Wallerstein it is "a particular concatenation of worldview, customs, structures, and culture (both material culture and high cultures) which form some kind of historical whole."[xxiii]

Taken as a matter of identity it can be said that a civilization is the largest and most perduring unit or whole -- the largest "we".[xxiv] The elements included are blood, language, religion and way of life. Among these religion is "the central defining characteristic of civilizations",[xxv] as it is the point of a person's or peoples deepest and most intensive commitment, the foundation on which the great civilizations rest.[xxvi] Hence the major religions (Christianity, Islam, Hinduism and Confucianism) are each associated with a civilization, the exception being Buddhism which came as a reform movement, and was uprooted from its native India and lives only in diaspora among other nations.

Civilizations perdure over long periods of time. While empires come and go, civilizations "survive political, social, economic even ideological upheavals."[xxvii]

> International history rightly documents the thesis that political systems are transient expedients on the surface of civilization, and that the destiny of each linguistically and morally unified community depends ultimately upon the survival of certain primary structuring ideas around which successive generations have coalesced and which then symbolize the society's continuity. [xxviii]

But this does not mean that they are static. On the contrary it is characteristic of a civilization to evolve and the theories of such evolution are attempts to achieve some understanding of the process, not only of the sequence of human events but more deeply of the transformation of human self understanding itself. Famously, Toynbee theorizes that civilizations are responses to human challenges; that they evolve in terms of establishing increasing control over the related factors, especially by creative minorities; that in the face of troubles there emerges a strong effort at integration followed by disintegration. Such theories vary somewhat in the order of stages but generally move from a preparatory period, to the major development of the strengths of a culture or civilization, and then toward atrophication. In any case these imply extend cycles extend over very large periods.

It is significant that in the end, however, Huntington is not able to give any clear definition or distinction of civilizations. Whereas Descartes would require just such characteristics for scientific knowledge, Huntington notes that civilizations generally somewhat overlap, and that while no clear concept can be delineated civilization are nonetheless important.

Civilizations have no clear cut boundaries and no precise beginnings and endings. People can and do redefine their identities and, as a result, the composition and shapes

of civilizations change over time. The cultures of peoples interact and overlap. The extent to which the cultures of civilizations resemble or differ from each other also varies considerably. Civilizations are nonetheless meaningful entities, and while the lines between them are seldom sharp, they are real.[xxix]

In this light it can be seen that a shift of world order to a pattern not of empires or commercial blocks, but of civilizations bespeaks a great development in human consciousness, beyond the external, objective and physical, to the internal and subjective, the spiritual and indeed the religious. In contrast to Descartes it appears that what is most significant in the relations between peoples, indeed what defines them as peoples, is a matter not accessible by scientific definition, but for more inclusive aesthetic appreciation. It is in these terms that one's life commitments, personal relations, and interactions between peoples are realized.

We have seen now the nature of cultural traditions and of civilizations as constituted by freedom as it forms values, virtues and cultures. We must look next into hermeneutics as the method whereby these can be interpreted and applied in a mutually cooperative manner for a global age.

HERMENEUTIC INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF ONE'S CULTURAL TRADITION

Dialectic of Whole and Part

First of all it is necessary to note that only a unity of meaning, that is, an identity, is intelligible.[xxx] Just as it is not possible to understand a number three if we include but two units, no act of understanding is possible unless it is directed to an identity or whole of meaning. This brings us directly to the classic issue in the field of hermeneutics, described above as the hermeneutic circle, namely, knowledge of the whole depends upon knowledge of the parts, and vice versa. How can we make this work for, rather than against us in the effort to live our cultural tradition in our global days?

Reflection on the experience of reading a text might prove helpful. As we read we construe the meaning of a sentence before grasping all its individual parts. What we construe is dependent upon our expectation of the meaning of the sentence, which we derived from its first words, the prior context, or more likely a combination of the two. In turn, our expectation or construal of the meaning of the text is adjusted according to the requirements of its various parts. As we proceed to read through the sentence, the paragraph, etc., we reassess continually the whole in terms of the parts and the parts in terms of the whole. This basically circular movement continues until all appear to fit and be expressive.

One set of problems regarding a hermeneutics of tradition concerns not its content but rather its relation to the present, for if our present life is simply a deadening repetition of what has already been known, then life loses its challenge, progress is rejected in principle, and hope dies. Let us turn then from tradition as a whole to its hermeneutic application in our days.

Novelty

To understand this we must, first of all, take time seriously, that is, we must recognize that reality includes authentic novelty. This contrasts to the perspective of Plato for whom the real is idea or form which transcends matter and time, while these, in turn, arc real only to the degree that they imitate or mirror the ideal. It also goes beyond the perspective of rationalism in its search for simple natures which are clear, distinct and eternal in themselves and in their relations. *A fortiori*, it goes beyond simply following a method as such without attention to content.

In contrast to all these, to recognize novelty – especially the novelty of our living of our own tradition – implies that tradition with its authority (or *nomos)* achieves its perfection not in opposition to, but in the very temporal unfolding of, reality. For the human person is both deter-mined by, and deterininative of, his changing physical and social universe. Hence, to appreciate moral values one must attend to human action: to the striving of persons to realize their lives, and to the formation of this striving into a fixed attitude *(hexis).* In distinction from physics then, ethos as the application of tradition consists neither of law nor of lawlessness, but concerns human institutions and attitudes which change. Ethical rules do not determine, but they do regulate action by providing certain broad guidelines for historical practice.[xxxi]

What is important here is to protect the concrete and unique reality of human life -- its novelty -- and hence the historicity of our life. As our response to the good is made only in concrete circumstances, our cultural tradition and our ethics as a philosophic science must be neither purely theoretical knowledge nor a simple historical accounting from the past, but we must enable our cultural tradition via our moral consciousness to help in concrete circumstances.

Application and Prudence: Ethics vs Techné

In this an important distinction must be made between technè and ethics. In tcchnè action is governed by an idea as an exemplary cause which is fully determined and known by objective theoretical knowledge *(epistême).* Skill consists in knowing how to act according to a well understood idea or plan. When this cannot be carried out some parts of it are simply omitted in the execution.

In ethics the situation, though similar in being an application of a practical guide to a particular task, differs in important ways. First, in moral action the subject makes oneself as much as one makes the object: the agent is differentiated by the action itself. Hence, moral knowledge as an understanding of the appropriateness of one's actions is not fully determined independently of the situation.

Secondly, the adaptations by the moral agent in applying the law or traditions found in the various cultures do not diminish them, but rather correct and perfect them. In themselves laws and traditions are imperfect for, inasmuch as they relate to a world which is less ordered, they cannot contain in any explicit manner the response to the concrete possibilities which arise in history. It is precisely here that man's freedom and creativity are located. This does not consist in the response being arbitrary, for Kant is right that freedom without law or some traditional guiding nomos has no meaning. Nor does it consist in a simply automatic response determined by the historical situation, for relativism too would undermine the notion of human freedom. Human freedom consists rather in shaping the present according to a sense of what is just and good and in a way which manifests and

indeed create for the first time more of what justice and goodness means.

That laws and tradition are perfected by their application in the circumstances appears also from the way they are not diminished, but perfected by epoche and equity. Without these, by simple mechanical replication the law would work injustice rather than justice. Ethics, therefore, is not only knowledge of what is right in general but the search for what is right in the situation. This is a question, not of mere expediency, but of the perfection of the law and tradition; it completes moral knowledge.[xxxii]

The question of what the situation is asking of us is answered, of course, not by sense knowledge which simply registers a set of concrete facts. It is answered rather in the light of what is right, that is, in the light of what has been discovered about appropriate human action and exists normatively in the tradition. Only in these terms can moral consciousness go about its major job of choosing means which are truly appropriate to the circumstances. This is properly the work of intellect (nous) with the virtue of prudence *(phronesis),* that is, thoughtful reflection which enables one to discover the appropriate means in the circumstances. These now include the new components of one's own living cultural tradition; they include as well the other participants of a pluralist civilization. Indeed in the new global context they include all civilizations with all existent differences.

In sum, application is not a subsequent or accidental part of understanding, but rather codetermines this understanding from the beginning. Moral consciousness must seek to understand the good, not as an ideal to be known and then applied, but rather by and in relating this to oneself as sharing the concerns of others. In this light our sense of unity with others begins to appear as a condition for applying our tradition, that is, for enabling it to live in these global times.

There is then a way out of the hermeneutic circle. It is not by ignoring or denying our horizons and prejudices, but by recognizing them as inevitable and making them work for us. To do so we must direct our attention to the objective meaning of the text in order to draw out, not only its meaning for the author, but its application for the present. Through this process of application one serves as midwife for the historicity of tradition or culture, and enables it to give birth to the future. [xxxiii]

HERMENEUTIC INTERPRETATION OF OTHER CULTURAL TRADITIONS

We must now see how hermeneutics can help toward a better understanding of the structure of communication between peoples, what dynamisms separate us, make sagacity *(sunesis)* difficult, impede our judgment and thus inhibit living our traditionin a pluralistic context?[xxxiv]

Thus far we have treated, first, the character and importance of tradition as the bearer of long human experience interacting with the world, with other men and with God. It is constituted not only of chronological facts, but of insights regarding human perfection and values and virtues which over time have been forged into cultures and civilizations in man's concrete striving to live with dignity, e.g. the Indian ideal of peace, the Greek notion of democracy, the enlightenment notions of equality and freedom. By their internal value each stands as normative in relation to the aspirations of those who live within that culture.

Secondly, we have seen the implications for the content of tradition of the continually unfolding

circumstances of historical development. These do not merely extend or repeat what went before, but constitute an emerging manifestation of the dynamic character of the classical vision articulated in epics, in law and in political movements.

It remains now to look at how, conscious of our own tradition, we can live it faithfully and fruitfully with others in a time of intensifying intercultural engagement and cultural pluralism.

In brief the glorious character of a cultural tradition has its down side. For the greater be that tradition and the more beautiful, successful and satisfying the life it engenders, the more one is liable to remain therein in a process of mere repetition. Innovation and creativity shrivel and the response to new challenges is less vigorous, innovative and successful. If we hear only the same stories, fables and proverbs we remain locked into one mind set or horizon. The way out requires access to new stories which reflect the life experience and creative responses of other peoples. Their effect is not so much to add to our culture from without elements that are alien and incongruous, but to enable us to look afresh at our own cultural tradition and to draw out in a creative manner new responses to the new challenges we face.

Dialectic of Horizons

In encountering other cultural traditions we begin to look more consciously into our own tradition and come to a prior conception of its content. This anticipation of meaning is not simply of the tradition as an objective or fixed content to over against us. It is rather what we reproduce uniquely in our hearts and minds as we participate in the evolution of the tradition, thereby further determining ourselves as a community. This is a creative stance reflecting the content, not only of the past, but of the time in which I stand and of the overall life project in which I am engaged. For the cultural tradition it is a creative unveiling of its content as this comes progressively and histori-cally into the present and, through the present, passes into the future.[xxxv]

In this light time is not a barrier, a separation or an abyss, but rather a bridge and an opportunity for the process of understanding; it is a fertile ground filled with experience, custom and tradition. The importance of the historical distance it provides is not that it enables the subjective reality of persons to disappear so that the objectivity of the situation can emerge. On the contrary, it makes possible a more appreciative meaning of our own and other cultural traditions, not only by removing falsifying factors, but by opening new sources of self and inter-subjective understanding and new perspectives. These reveal in the traditions unsuspected implications and even new dimensions of meaning of which heretofore we were unaware.[xxxvi]

Of course, not all our acts of understandings are correct, whether they be about the meaning of another culture, its set of goals or a plan for future action. Hence, it becomes particularly important that our understandings not be adhered to fixedly, but be put at risk in dialogue with others.

In this the basic elements of meaning remain the substances which Aristotle described in terms of their autonomy or of standing in their own right, and, by implication, of their identity. Hermeneutics would expand this to reflect as well the historical and hermeneutic situation of each person or cultural tradition in the dialogue, that is, their horizon or particular possibility for understanding. An horizon is all that can be seen from one's vantage point(s). In reading a text or in a dialogue with other cultural traditions it is necessary to be aware of our horizon as well as that of our partners. When our initial projection of the meaning of another's words, the content of a cultural tradition or a sacred text will not bear up in the progress of the reading or the dialogue, our desire to

hear our interlocutor in the conversation drives us to make needed adjustments in our projection of their meaning.

The assessment of what is truly appropriate requires also the virtue of sagacity *(sunesis),* that is, of understanding or concern for the other. One can assess the situation adequately only inasmuch as one in a sense undergoes the situation with the affected parties. Aristotle rightly describes as truly terrible the one who can make the most of the situation, but without orientation towards moral ends or concern for the good of others in this situation. Hence, there is need for knowledge which takes account of agent as united with the others in mutual interest or love.

This enables us to adjust not only our prior understanding of the horizon of the other with whom we are in dialogue, but especially our own horizon. One need not fear being trapped in the horizons of our own cultural tradition or religion. They are vantage points of a mind which in principle is open and mobile, capable of being aware of its own horizon and of reaching out to the other's experience which constitutes their horizons. Our horizons are not limitations, but mountain tops from which we look in awe at the vast panorama all of humankind and indeed all of creation. It is in making us aware of this expansion of horizons that hermeneutic awareness accomplishes our liberation.[xxxvii]

In this process it is important that we remain alert to the new implications of our cultural tradition. We must not simply follow through with our previous ideas until a change is forced upon us, but must be sensitive to new meanings in true openness. This is neither neutrality as regards the meaning of our tradition, nor an extinction of passionate concerns regarding action towards the future. Rather, being aware of our own biases or prej udices and adjusting them in dialogue with others implies rejecting what impedes our understanding of our own tradition and that of others. Our attitude in approaching dialogue must be one of willingness continually to revise, renew and enrich our initial projection or expectation of meaning.

Dialectic of Question and Answer

The effort to draw upon a tradition and in dialogue to discover its meaning for the present supposes authentic openness. The logical structure of this openness is to be found in the exchange of question and answer. The question is required in order to determine just what issue we are engaging--whether it is this issue or that--in order to give direction to our attention. Without this no meaningful answer can be given or received. As a question, however, it requires that the answer not be settled or determined. In sum, progress or discovery requires an openness which is not simply indeterminacy, but a question which gives specific direction to our attention and enables us to consider significant evidence. (Note that we can proceed not only by means of positive evidence in favor of one of two possible responses, but also through dissolving counter arguments).

If discovery depends upon the question, then the art of discovery is the art of questioning. Consequently, whether working alone or in conjunction with others, our effort to find the answer should be directed less towards suppressing the position of another culture and the questions it raises, than toward reinforcing and unfolding these questions. To the degree that their probabilities are built up and intensified they can serve as a searchlight. This is the opposite of both opinion which tends to suppress questions, and of arguing which searches out the weakness in the other's argument. Instead, in conversation as dialogue with other cultures and civilizations one enters upon a mutual search to maximize the possibilities of the question, even by speaking at cross purposes. By mutually elimi-nating errors and working out a common meaning, we discover truth.[xxxviii]

Further, it should not be presupposed that a text or tradition holds the answer to but one question or horizon which must be identified by the reader. On the contrary, the full horizon and above all its transcendent source is never available to the reader. Nor can it be expected that there is but one question to which the global text or its multiple traditions hold an answer. The sense of any text, (a fortiori the global text,) reaches beyond what any human author intended.

Because of the dynamic character of being as it emerges in time, the horizon is never fixed but is continually opening. This constitutes the effective historical element in understanding. At each step new dimensions of the potentialities of the tradition opens to understanding. Especially, the meaning of a text or tradition lives with the consciousness – and hence the horizons – not of its author, but of the many who live the tradition with others through time and history . It is the broadening of their horizons, resulting from their fusion with the horizon of a text or a partner in dialogue, that makes it possible to receive answers which are ever new.[xxxix]

In this the personal attitudes and interests of the various cultures are, once again, highly important. If the interest in developing new horizons were simply the promotion of one's own understanding then one culture could be interested solely in achieving knowledge for the purpose of domination over others. But this would lock one into an absoluteness of one's prejudices; being fixed or closed in the past or in oneself they would disallow new life in the present. In this manner powerful new insights become with time deadening pre-judgments which suppress free dom.

In contrast, an attitude of authentic openness appreciates the nature of one's own finiteness. On this basis it both respects the past and the multiple cultural traditions and is open to discerning the future. Such openness is a matter, not merely of new information, but of recognizing the historical nature of man. It enables one to escape from limitations which had limited vision thusfar, and enables one to learn from new experiences. It is recognition of the limitations of our finite projects which enables us to see that the future is still open.[xl]

This suggests that openness does not consist so much in surveying others objectively or obeying them in a slavish and unquestioning manner, but is directed primarily to ourselves. It is an extension of our ability to listen to others and other cultures, and to assimilate the implications of their answers for changes in our own positions. In other words, it is an acknowledgement that our cultural heritage has something new to say to us. The characteristic hermeneutic attitude of effective historical consciousness is then not methodological sureness, but devout listening and a readiness for experience.[xli] Seen in these terms our cultural heritage is not closed, but the basis for a life that is ever new, more inclusive and more rich.

HERMENEUTICS FOR A GLOBAL AGE

Today we are challenged not only to draw upon our past or to live with others in a pluralistic community. We are newly challenged by economics, politics and especially informatics to live in a context in which our lives are impacted by the entire global context all at once. This requires an expansion of hermeneutics as the fusion of horizons becomes a meeting not only with another cultural tradition, but with all as parts of a larger whole. For this it becomes necessary to think in terms of the whole. In this some brief notes on the thought of Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464) who analyses what it meant to think in terms of the whole at the juncture of the medieval and Renaissance thought could prove helpful.

The thought of Cusa retains a mark of the ancient tradition with its focus upon unity of which Cusa notes four types: (1) that of the single, individual entity, (2) that of a collection of such

individuals, (3) that of the whole of which the individuals are parts, and (4) that of the one divine Absolute from which all come and to which all are directed

Diversity as Contraction

The situation is delicate however, for in attending to the whole it is imperative to avoid the kind of abstractive thinking described above in which personal uniqueness is dismissed and only the universal remains.[xlii] Cusa's solution is found in the notion of contraction, that is, to begin from the significance of the whole and to recognize it in the very reality of every individual, so that the individual shares in something of the ultimate or definitive reality of the whole of being. One is not then an insignificant speck, as would be the case were I to be measured quantitatively and contrasted to the broad expanse of the globe. Rather I have the importance of the whole as it exists in and as me -- and the same is true of other persons and of the parts of nature.

The import of this can be seen through comparison with other attempts to state this participation of the part in the whole. For Plato this was a repetition or imaging by each of that type of the one ideal form. Aristotle soon ceased to employ the term participation as image (*mimesis*) because of the danger it entailed of reducing the individual to but a shadow of what was truly real. Cusa too rejected the separately existing ideas or ideal forms. Instead what had been developed in the Christian cultures was a positive notion of existence as act[xliii] whereby each participant in being was made to be or exist in itself. This is retained by Nicholas of Cusa.

But he would emphasize that the being in which each person or thing participates is the whole of being.[xliv] This does not mean that in a being there is anything alien to its own identity, but that the reality of each being has precisely the meaning of the whole as contracted to this unique instance. To be then is not simply to fall in some minimal way on this side of nothingness, but rather to partake of the totality of being and the meaning of the whole of being, and indeed to be a realization of the whole in this unique contraction or instance. Things retains their identity, but do so in and of the whole.

De Leonardis formulates this in two principles:

- The principle of Individuality: Each individual contraction uniquely imparts to each entity an inherent value which marks it as indispensable to the whole.

- The principle of Community: The contraction of being makes each thing to be everything in a contracted sense. This creates a community of beings interrelating all entities on an ontological level.[xlv]

Hierarchy of the Internally Related

After the manner of the medievals Cusa saw the plurality of beings of the universe as constituting a hierarchy of being. Each being was equal in that it constituted a contraction of the

whole, but not all were equally contracted. Thus an inorganic being was more contracted than a living organism, and a conscious being was less contracted than either of them. This constituted a hierarchy or gradation of beings. By thinking globally or in terms of the whole, Cusa was able to appreciate the diversity of being in a way that heightened this ordered sense of unity in which relationships are not externally juxtaposed, but internal to the very make up of the individuals.

This internal relationship is made possible precisely by a global sense of the whole.[xlvi] For this Cusa may have drawn more directly from the Trinity, but this in turn is conceived through analogy to the family of which individuals are contractions. This, in turn, is lived in the interpersonal relations in a culture grounded in such a theology and especially now in the global reality constituted of economics and politics information and relations between civilizations. The philosopher can look here and find special manifestation of being. Indeed, hermeneutics[xlvii] would suggest that this constitutes not only a *locus philosophicus* whence insight can be drawn, but the prejudgments of philosophers which constitute the basic philosophical insights themselves. The critical scientific interchange of philosophy is a process of controlled adjustment and perfection of these insights.

In a family all the persons are fully members and in that sense fully of the same nature. But the father generates the son while the son proceeds from the father. Hence, while mutually constituted by the same relation of one to the other, the father and son are distinct precisely as generator and generated. Life and all that the father is and has is given from the father to the son. Correspondingly, all that the son is and has is received from the father. As giver and receiver the two are distinguished in the family precisely as the different terms of the one relation. Hence each shares in the very definition of the other: the father is father only by the son, and vice versa.

Further, generation is not a negative relation of exclusion or opposition; just the opposite -- it is a positive relation of love, generosity and sharing. Hence, the unity or identity of each is via relation (the second unity), rather than opposition or negation as was the case in the first level of unity. In this way the whole that is the family is included in the definition of the father and of the son, each of whom are particular contractions of the whole.

Explicatio-Complicatio

Cusa speaks of this as an *explicatio* or unfolding of the perfection of being, to which corresponds the converse, namely, folding together (*complicatio*) the various levels of being constitutes the perfection of the whole. Hence Cusa's hierarchy of being has special richness when taken in the light of his sense of a global unity. The classical hierarchy was a sequence of distinct levels of beings, each external to the other. The great gap between the multiple physical or material beings and the absolute One was filled in by an order of spiritual or angelic beings. As limited these were not the absolute, yet as spiritual they were not physical or material. This left the material or physical dimension of being out of the point of integration.

In contrast, Cusa, while continuing the overall graduation, sees it rather in terms of mutual inclusion, rather than of exclusion. Thus inorganic material beings do not contain the perfection of animate or conscious being, but plants include the perfections of the material as well as life. Animals are not self-conscious, but they integrate material, animate and conscious perfection. Humans include all four: inorganic, animate and conscious and spiritual life.

In this light, the relation to all others through the contraction of being is intensified as beings include more levels of being in their nature. On this scale humans as material and as alive on all three levels of life: plant, animal and spirit, play a uniquely unitive and comprehensive role in the

hierarchy of being. If the issue is not simple individuality by negative and exclusive contrast to others (the first level of unity), but uniqueness by positive and inclusive relation to others, then human persons and the human community are truly the nucleus of a unity that is global. This line of reasoning Cusa carries to its epitome in his theology of Christ as both man and God.

Global Dynamism

Thus far we have been speaking especially in terms of existence and formal causality by which the various beings within the global reality are to specific degrees contractions of the whole. To this, however, should be added efficient and final causality by which the ordered universe of reality takes on a dynamic and even developmental character. This has a number of implications: directedness, dynamism, cohesion, complementarity and harmony.[xlviii] Cusa's global vision is of a uniquely active universe of being.

Direction to the Perfection of the Global Whole: As contractions of the whole, finite beings are not merely products ejected by and from the universe of being; rather they are limited expressions of the whole. Their entire reality is a limited image of the whole from which they derive their being, without which they cannot exist, and in which they find their true end or purpose. As changing, developing, living and moving they are integral to the universe in which they find their perfection or realization, and to the perfection of which they contribute by the full actuality and activity of their reality.

This cannot be simply random or chaotic, oriented equally to being and its destruction, for then nothing would survive. Rather there is in being a directedness to its realization and perfection, rather then to its contrary. A rock resists annihilation; a plant will grow if given water and nutrition; an animal will seek these out and defend itself vigorously when necessary. All this when brought into cooperative causal interaction has a direction, namely, to the perfection of the whole.

Dynamic Unfolding of the Global Whole: As an unfolding (*explicatio*) of the whole, the diverse beings (the second type of unity) are opposed neither to the whole (the third type of unity) nor to the absolute One (the fourth type of unity). Rather, after the Platonic insight, all unfolds from the One and returns thereto.

To this Cusa makes an important addition. In his global vision this is not merely a matter of individual forms; beings are directed to the One as a whole, that is, by interacting with others (unity three). Further, this is not a matter only of external interaction between aliens. Seen in the light of reality as a whole, each being is a unique and indispensable contraction of the whole. Hence finite realities interact not merely as a multiplicity, but as an internally related and constituted community with shared and interdependent goals and powers.

Cohesion and Complementarity in a Global Unity: Every being is then related to every other in this grand community almost as parts of one body. Each depends upon the other in order to survive and by each the whole realizes its goal. But a global vision, such as that of Cusa, takes a step further, for if each part is a contraction of the whole then, as with the DNA for the individual cell, "in

order for anything to be what it is it must also be in a certain sense everything which exists."[xlix] The other is not alien, but part of my own definition.

From this it follows that the realization of each is required for the realization of the whole, just as each team member must perform well for the success of the whole. But in Cusa's global view the reverse is also true, namely, it is by acting with others and indeed in the service of others or for their good that one reaches one's full realization. This again is not far from the experience of the family and civil society, but tends to be lost sight of in other human and commercial relations. It is by interacting with, and for, others that one activates one's creative possibilities and most approximates the full realization of being. Thus, "the goal of each is to become harmoniously integrated into the whole of being and thereby to achieve the fullest development of its own unique nature."[l]

NOTES

[i] Francis Bacon, *Novum Organon, De Sapientia Veterum* (New York, 1960).

[ii] John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (London, 1690).

[iii] René Descartes, *Meditations on First Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1911), I.

[iv] Aristotle, Metaphysics, XII.

[v] Tr. C.K. Ogden (London: Methuen, 1981).

[vi] (New York: Harper and Row).

[vii] Tr. G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958).

[viii] Brian Wicker, *Culture and Theology* (London: Sheed and Ward, 1966), pp. 68-88.

[ix] (New York: Harper and Row, 1962).

[x] *Documents of Vatican II*, ed. W. Abbott (New York: New Century, 1974).

[xi] *Truth and Method* (New York: Seabury, 1975).

[xii] Ivor Leclerc, "The Metaphysics of the Good," *Review of Metaphysics*, 35 (1981), 3-5.

[xiii] *Ibid.*

[xiv] V. Mathieu, "Cultura" in *Enciclopedia Filosofica* (Firenze: Sansoni, 1967), II, 207-210; and Raymond Williams, "Culture and Civilization," *Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (New York: Macmillan, 1967), II, 273-276, and *Culture and Society* (London: 1958).

[xv] Tonnelat, "Kultur" in *Civilisation, le mot et l'idée* (Paris: Centre International de Synthese), II.

[xvi] V. Mathieu, "Cultura" in *Enciclopedia Filosofica* (Firenze: Sansoni, 1967), II, 207-210; and Raymond Williams, "Culture and Civilization", *Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (New York: Macmillan, 1967), II, 273-276, and *Culture and Society* (London, 1958).

[xvii] *Laches*, 198-201.

[xviii] H.-G. Gadamer, *Truth and Method, translated from the 2nd German edition, 1965, by G. Barden and J. Cumming* (New York: Seabury, 1975), pp. 245-253.

[xix] *Ibid.* Gadamer emphasized knowledge as the basis of tradition in contrast to those who would see it pejoratively as the result of arbitrary will. It is important to add to knowledge the free acts which, e.g., give birth to a nation and shape the attitudes and values of successive generations. As an example one might cite the continuing impact had by the Magna Carta through the Declaration of Independence upon life in North America, or of the Declaration of the Rights of Man in the national life of so many countries.

[xx] (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).

[xxi] *On History* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1980), pp. 177, 202.

[xxii] *Dynamics of World History* (La Sulle, Il: Sheed + Ward, 1959), pp. 51, 402.

[xxiii] *Geopolitics and Geoculture: Essays on the Changing World System* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

[xxiv] Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), p. 43.

[xxv] *Ibid*., p. 47.

[xxvi] C. Dawson, p. 128.

[xxvii] F. Braudel, *History of Civilizations* (New York: Penguin, 1994), p. 35.

[xxviii] A. Bozeman, *Strategic Intelligence and Statecraft* (Washington: Brassey's, 1992), p. 62.

[xxix] Huntington, p. 43.

[xxx] *Ibid*., p. 262.

[xxxi] Gadamer, pp. 278-279.

[xxxii] *Ibid*., pp. 281-286.

[xxxiii] *Ibid*., pp. 235-242.

[xxxiv] *Ibid*., pp. 278-289.

[xxxv] *Ibid*., pp. 261-264.

[xxxvi] *Ibid*., p. 262.

[xxxvii] *Ibid*., pp. 263-264.

[xxxviii] *Ibid*., pp. 333-341.

[xxxix] *Ibid*., pp. 273-341.

[xl] *Ibid*., pp. 336-340.

[xli] *Ibid*., pp. 319-324.

[xlii] *Of Learned Ignorance*.

[xliii] G. McLean, *Plenitude and Participation: The Unity of Man in God* (Madras: University of Madras, 1978); *Tradition, Harmony and Transcendence* (Washington: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1994), pp. 95-102.

[xliv] *Of Learned Ignorance*, pp. 84-88.

[xlv] David De Leonardis, *Ethical Implications of Unity and the Divine in Nicholas of Cusa* (Washington: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1998), p. 228.

[xlvi] *Of Learned Ignorance*, I, 9-10.

[xlvii] H.-G. Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (New York: Crossroads, 1975).

[xlviii] De Leonardis, pp. 233-236.

[xlix] *Ibid.*, p. 235.

[l] *Ibid.*, p. 236.

CHAPTER III

GLOBALIZATION AND ITALIAN CULTURE

ROBERT ROYAL

Religion, like other large-scale human structures, is one of those things that our postmodern condition is supposed to have made problematic. Identification with a particular spiritual tradition, like identification with a state, a locale, and other historic markers of identity, has been put under a great deal of pressure by various factors in a globalizing world. We have far more knowledge of a wide array of belief systems and ways of practicing religion than in the past. This is not only through electronic media, but through daily contact with people of other faiths in the workplace and on the street in our various pluralist societies. At the same time, adherence to formal institutions of all kinds B churches, synagogues, mosques, and temples B is assumed by most analysts to be weakening, and there is some evidence in certain parts of the world that this is true.

But I want to begin these reflections from a different perspective: the very forces that have given rise to the assaults on simple identity, be they postmodern or globalizing, have inevitably produced a counter-reaction. Human beings are by nature religious and will remain so, with religion serving as one of the counterweights to the vast impersonal forces of the postmodern, globalized world. The phenomenon of what is often referred to as Fundamentalism in various world religions is partly the result of threats to human identity. It is wrongly regarded, by grouping them all together, as a refusal to deal with modern problems. Some fundamentalisms are a flight from the world. But the turn to religion is one way human beings seek to anchor themselves in the very midst of modernity. Much of it is better thought of as a product of our situation, rather than a flight from it. I believe that the same is true of our identification with a territorial state, with local communities, with families, and with other deep sources of the self. These identifications will become more valued, not less so, as globalization proceeds.

ITALIAN CULTURAL IDENTITY AND INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE

On the religious challenge of a globalizing world for Italian cultural identity I have few firm opinions, primarily because it is so difficult to form a clear idea of contemporary religion or of Italian Culture in the abstract. Religion means many things globally; very few religions fit exactly the model people coming from Christian, Jewish, or Islamic points of view might expect. Hinduism, perhaps, presents a rough analogy to our traditions, but much of Buddhism can only be called atheistic. Tribal religions may or may not have the kind of overarching cosmic framework we think of as central to religion. Confucianism or Zen could be classified as philosophies, rather than religions. Scholars of religions have difficulties sorting these things out. But for functional or descriptive purposes, we might think of religion as the human beliefs that offer us the deepest and broadest systems of meaning. That is why Marxism or modern Western liberalism can serve as a sort

of religion for some people.

Similarly, I find it hard to know exactly what Italian culture means globally. One thing we can say as a kind of first approximation to the subject is that Italy has never been B from the time of the Roman Empire to our own day B a very theoretical society. The collapse of a strict Enlightenment rationality in postmodernity does not disturb Italian culture as much as it might others, because Italians never relied as much on that form of rationality for their social or religious lives. So Italy is well placed to maintain its cultural traditions, however we might define those, in our globalizing world.

Globalization, it is worth recalling, did not begin in the last few decades with the invention of jet travel, satellite communications, or the Internet. It began in 1492 when a visionary Genoese navigator sailed from Europe and set us all on the course of knowing that we live in one world. Prior to Columbus, people spoke in the abstract about the globe and its peoples; Columbus made the growing experience of that unity a reality. And as I have argued in my book *1492 and All That*, it is not true to say that this early form of globalization was merely the beginning of Western imperialism or the economic exploitation of the world by Europe.

Columbus did seek material rewards; they were the only way he could justify his enterprise of the Indies to those who would have to invest in it. He also sought compensation so that he and his family could live after his days as an explorer ended. But to limit our analysis to these factors is to overlook the very real role that the navigator's faith and courage played in his epic discoveries. I am convinced that he saw his voyages as one of the ways to preach the Gospel to all nations and arrive at the end times when Christ would return. But the cynical view also fails to appreciate the way that Europe was interested in other parts of the world as no other culture then or since. It is no accident that the early missionaries undertook the first studies that led to the later development of anthropology, ethnology, comparative religion, and so forth. At least for the West, economics, religion, and cultural curiosity were present at the start of global integration. We would be wrong to neglect any of them today.

Any analysis of the prospects of Italian culture in the religiously globalized world must, I believe, operate simultaneously on two levels. First, there is the level of what continental Europeans, following Habermas, usually call the life world. In more Anglo-Saxon regions, we usually speak of these as the structures of everyday life. I find the expression better because it is less tied to philosophical echoes from German idealism and other traditions of thought that may distract us from the reality itself. In this mode of analysis, the habits of ordinary people B their cuisine, family affections, local social relations, economic activities, and religious practices B are examined as constituting the true texture of life in any age. In every one of these categories, Italy has been and remains a source of attraction for many around the world. In North America, Italian restaurants are by far the most popular; Italian families B Mafia aside, and sometimes the Mafia as well B are admired as offering the kind of warmth people from other backgrounds would like to find in their own families; and Italy's long ability to produce beautiful environments while offering social and economic opportunities is a kind of model to architects and municipal planners. We also see, not least in American films, a fascination with the kind of Catholic parish that is common in Italy and not uncommon here, with its wealth of statues and artwork celebrating local saints and particular religious figures. All this interest, I think, reflects a certain thinness in our Anglo-Saxon heritage: we admire and are grateful to the British for their economic and political sanity. But no one turns to Britain for the thick and rich practices of a good life.

There is, of course, a second level of cultural analysis that must be added to this picture and brought into its proper relation with the first. This level involves large-scale public institutions of politics, economics, and education. Here, too, there are admirable Italian traits that are less well-

known or even entirely neglected. Americans are suspicious about governmental powers and believe others, especially Europeans, should be so as well. Our suspicions do not deny government's proper role, but show our belief that liberty requires constant vigilance against potential tyranny. That is one place where Americans and Italians are largely in agreement.

What I think needs further elaboration in the Italian case, however, is how the two levels B the culture of everyday life and the culture of public institutions B work together sometimes with happy results. I always think of Italian behavior towards Jews during the Second World War as the best example of this. Italy's behavior was not perfect; some Italian Jews fell afoul of the virulent anti-Semitism and absurd racial theories promoted by the Nazis. And the wildly exaggerated criticism of Pius XII's alleged "silence" during the persecution of the Jews B though mistaken B points to some failings that should not be overlooked. But I think Italy's relatively good behavior B or perhaps I should say the good behavior of many Italians B says a great deal about the way that the everyday level of Italian culture with its welcoming and tolerant ways, and the large public level, co-operated in producing something good. France certainly did not show the same cultural virtues. Italians may be reluctant to speak about this part of their past, but as an American, I have no such reluctance and say it deserves proper recognition.

It deserves recognition for itself, but also because it tells us some things about religious factors in an age of globalization. We cannot deny that Italian Catholicism played a positive role in that behavior at a very difficult time. And that contribution is an important datum for our own time when the events since September 11 and the continuing turmoil in the Middle East make it appear to some that religion is always a force for conflict. Like any other human thing, religion can be and often has been a bone of contention. But human beings are by nature religious. The much discussed secularization of societies as they modernize has not proved itself to be empirically true. In Europe, perhaps, there has been a falloff in participation in religious institutions. But spirituality and religiosity of a kind have continued even there, according to social surveys. So unless we intend to relegate religion to a wholly private realm B something both impossible and unjust B we have to find some way to sort out the good from the bad kinds of public religious influence in our globalized world

I think the Italian experience has much to teach here. To begin with, the Catholic Church as an institution operates on what can only be called an old Roman model. The central papal authority in union with subsidiary local dioceses is essentially an administrative feature of the late Roman Empire, its own way of acknowledging *Globus et locus*. Dissenting Catholics in America often say they are "Catholic, not Roman," meaning they want to do what they want to do B mostly in sexual matters B without papal interference. Italy's history, of course, reflects some of the difficulties when the Church and the State are too close, producing anti-clericalism at times even among Catholics. But whether these complaints are justified or not, they overlook the remarkable achievements of the multiplicity within unity that the Church has offered. Just think back to the ways throughout history that popes and bishops have resisted *improper* exercises of power by the state, or how the Church as an outside authority helped Solidarity in Communist Poland and continues to defend persecuted Catholics in a place like China today. You may believe that the whole institutional framework is clumsy, but what large-scale human structure is not? And we should not undervalue the institution's proven durability. As the American poet Ezra Pound once said, any institution that could survive "the picturesqueness of the Borgias has a certain native resilience." Say what you will about the Roman Empire or the Roman Catholic Church; the old Romans of both kinds know how to *govern*.

ISLAM AND THE DIALOGUE OF CIVILIZATION

And there are advantages to the right kind of centralizing structures. The American Islamist Bernard Lewis has argued in his recent book *What Went Wrong?: Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response* that one of the reasons we Westerners find dealing with Islam frustrating is that it has no clerical hierarchy. As we have seen, even terrorist actions that seem far outside the central Islamic traditions may be condemned by one scholar, praised by another, with no way of resolving the question. The Conference of Islamic Nations meeting in Kuala Lumpur, precisely because it represents the usual Muslim confusion of Mosque and state, had different in agreeing that blowing up women and children in Israel is simply wrong, as the best Muslim tradition clearly believes. There is too much emphasis on the political context, too little pure religious reflection backed up by religious authority.

I have deliberately singled out this feature of Islam because I think it cuts across the grain of some lazy analysis in the West. Many journalists and politicians believe that the Muslim world needs to separate itself from religious authority, to undergo a Reformation and Enlightenment on the Western model. In a sense, it has had its Reformation, which like the Christian Reformation introduced greater puritanical furor into the Middle Eastern mix. This was called Wahhabism, which began in Saudi Arabia in the nineteenth century. Its growth in the Middle East and support by Saudi Arabia, not least here in the United States, has produced no little potential trouble for the future.

In a similar vein, Western hopes for an Islamic Enlightenment fail to come to grips with the specific nature of Islam. The kind of Enlightenment that occurred in the West would be thought of as simple unfaithfulness in the East. Furthermore, this overlooks the very real limits of the Enlightenment, for all its benefits, even in the West. This lies at the heart of the postmodern turn. It may be possible for some sort of internal evolution to occur in Muslim societies that will make them peaceful and respectable partners in a global dialogue. But we should not deceive ourselves: if that evolution comes, it will have a Muslim character; it will not be likely to resemble anything in Western history.

Since September 11, we have heard a great deal again about the clash of civilizations. Samuel Huntington's thesis in the book by that name had fallen by the wayside somewhat prior to the terrorist attacks. You will recall that Huntington argues that the large cultural formations of the world, which he rightly sees as stemming from the *cultus*, the religious traditions, are permanent features of the world that may lead to conflict. The reason that End of History has not come, said Huntington, is because the secularization thesis has proven false. Indeed, the American sociologist of religion Peter Berger has spoken of a coming "Desecularization of the World" as peoples exposed to the impersonal forces of modernity and globalization seek a firmer identity in their own deepest traditions.

We may argue over the details or consequences of Huntington's thesis, particularly whether cultural differences automatically lead to serious conflicts. For instance, I often notice as a person who lives in a primarily Anglo-Saxon culture, but has spent a fair amount of time on the European continent, that there is a wide gap between the pragmatic approaches of England and North America and the more theoretical modes of thought of the continent. There is a kind of schizophrenia within the European tradition itself that leads to different ways of behaving. There was a time when such differences loomed large; and they persist. But would any of us say today that they must inevitably lead to conflict?

The same might be argued about conditions across cultural traditions. China, for example, is a large country that will play an ever larger role in world affairs. Its form of Marxism presents a problem, but perhaps also some opportunities. If one reads Chairman Mao's *Little Red Book* it is astonishing how much Marx may be made to speak like Confucius. And the basic Confucian and Chinese talent for commerce has made even its Marxist rulers look upon market economics in a far

different way than the old Soviets or *tercermundistas*. So we do have differences of a very deep nature. But much depends on the quality of the religious or philosophical tradition that we find ourselves engaging. And much depends on our own ability to draw on the fullest and deepest levels of our own religious tradition to respond with openness and a spirit of co-operation to other cultures.

For the foreseeable future, Christian/Islamic relations will be a sore point. We in the West have no necessary conflict with Islam. In Bernard Lewis' reading, even Muslims themselves are divided between those who think that the current turmoil in their countries is the result of their own failures, and those who think that someone outside has harmed them. Any dialogue between the Christian West and the Muslim East will first need to settle some thorny practical problems such as the Palestinian/Israeli conflict. But even if we could reach a tolerable political and economic settlement, we will still have to engage in a cultural dialogue that will engage the more basic problem of religious difference, and not only in Islamic countries, but in places such as India. There Hindu Fundamentalism has arisen in response to the same forces of globalization that have inflamed many other parts of the world. It has led to violence that never existed in India's generally tolerant history, against Christians and other Westerners.

THE CATHOLIC TRADITION AND THE DIALOGUE OFCIVILIZATIONS

The Catholic Church has many resources for such a dialogue of civilizations. As another sociologist of religion, Ernst Troeltsch, once observed, we have two main forms of religion in the West: the Church and the sect. The Church model, of which the Catholic Church is the pre-eminent representative, sees as part of its responsibility to be engaged with all dimensions of society. That is why the Church developed its just war teaching and why modern Catholic social thought has elaborated notions like subsidiarity and solidarity. The sect, by contrast, flees contact with the world. We have many such sects in the United States, groups that basically believe it is a corruption of the pristine purity of the religious body to soil itself with the affairs of the world. Each model has its advantages and drawbacks. But for those of us who believe that Christianity has and needs to have a role in the important work that faces us in the modern world, it is a great advantage to possess a tradition that has accumulated rich conceptual tools and flexible practices from its long engagement with several civilizations.

What do we most need from our religious traditions in our time of globalization B globalization of linkages and globalization of conflict? I would suggest that we need something that could be called the spirit of Dante. Dante is, of course, one of the greatest figures in Western civilization and therefore represents many things. But the thing that we might best learn from him, and that a properly ambitious Italian culture might offer to the world, is a drive to respect everything B theology, mysticism, philosophy, poetry, science, history, geography, and politics B in a single civilizing vision. That spirit need not be identified with a crushing drive for mastery or hegemony, as it often is in the modern world. The individuals Dante describes in the *Commedia* have vigorous lives, precisely because they are allowed to be themselves in their fulness, but are also viewed against a larger background.

Any attempt at such a universalism today, of course, is very ambitious and cannot be carried out by a single individual or a small group. It would take a fairly large number of people all striving to work along similar lines to weave the many loose strands of modern civilization into a substantial fabric. We are all quite aware of the many obstacles, including simple, practical ones, to this pursuit. Even one small area of science exceeds the capacity of individual scientists themselves to know

thoroughly. But our awareness of the complexity and extension of modern knowledge need not hamstring us. We need to know how much detail we need for purposes of cultural integration, and how much we can leave aside as important but less central detail.

Let me say as a Catholic and deep admirer of Italian culture that, for all these reasons, I hope the next pope will be another non-Italian. One of the problems internal to Catholicism that has to be frankly faced was the unfortunate perception since the Counter-Reformation that the Church was closed in on its own backward-looking culture. The creative energies of the High Middle Ages and the Renaissance had evaporated, and nothing in the Church seemed capable of galvanizing a new, forward-looking approach to culture. The European culture that had formerly been internal to the Church and produced the great philosophy, poetry, art, and music that is so much a part of the Italian patrimony, had to develop outside the Church for many reasons too complicated to trace here. Suffice to say, though, that the confident criticism of a figure like Voltaire B that the Church's anti-intellectualism and corruption would soon lead to her demise B proved absolutely wrong. The papacy since Leo XIII has been a vibrant element in European and world culture. And under John Paul II the Church is perhaps the most respected moral authority in the world.

That authority derives in no small part from the Polish Pope's capacity to present the rich Catholic tradition in terms relevant to the future of the world. If Voltaire were alive today, for instance, he would be shocked to find that the postmodern secular culture of Europe had all but abandoned its once robust faith in reason. And that the Pope in Rome had become one of the most vigorous advocates of a more confident and more ambitious reason that seeks truth not only in the everyday framework of the world, but in every sector of reality open to human knowledge, including the knowledge of the divine. Voltaire might also be shocked that the Church was the great defender of human life. The wide acceptance of abortion and growing acquiescence in euthanasia and assisted suicide are an ideological narrowness stemming from the more fundamental belief in the radical autonomy of individuals which needs to be countered by a more humane vision. We have reached the point where countries are regarded as relatively less free or actual offenders against human rights because they do not allow abortion. Countering this long slide into individual autonomy is difficult and requires a certain cultural position. I do not think that an Italian pope could be as effective at this moment in history in making the world aware of the Church's universalism in the face of this sectarianism. Situations change rapidly, and the right Italian perhaps could do so. But paradoxically, at least for the moment, the great riches of Catholic culture, a large percentage of which are Italian, may have greater influence in the world if they are advanced by a non-Italian.

Speaking as an American from an American perspective, I might even go so far as to say that it might be best if a non-European were to become the next pope. I do not say this from sentimental or politically correct motives. Both Europe and the United States, in my opinion, would benefit from some fresh currents of thought on the two central principles of Catholic social thought: solidarity and subsidiarity. These concepts have obvious affinities with the twin drive towards globalization and localism in the world as a whole. But Europe and America have some limited perspectives on these two processes. Subsidiarity as it is currently practiced in the European Union does not seem to me to be adequate to protecting the concrete needs of local communities. On the contrary, it's very idea of subsidizing the local has allowed larger national and international bodies to be involved in a variety of strictly local decisions.

In the United States, a similar process has been underway for some time. Its Constitution was carefully calibrated by the Founding Fathers to give only specific "enumerated powers" to the national government. States rights B and by states Americans mean the regional entities such as New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, or Virginia B were regarded as important checks on the excessive power of the federal government. After the Civil War, the term states' rights was used by some states in the South to resist changes demanded by the North in the civil rights of Americans of African

descent. That unfortunate element in American history made it possible to erode and, in some instances, almost eliminate the earlier, very robust notion of local control over local affairs. Recent U. S. Supreme Court decisions have tended to restore greater power among the states. But this trend, in my view, has not yet gone nearly far enough, and a change in the members of the court could easily return us to a more centralized government far from the classical spirit of the American Founders.

So both Europeans and Americans need to rethink the idea of subsidiarity in the light of the centralizing tendencies of the European Union and the U.S. government. For that purpose, we need input from the deeper sources of our own traditions and from other cultural currents. And we are about to get them. In a few decades, the Americas and Africa will each have more Christians than does Europe. Asia will still have fewer, but not for long. So as Europe becomes the third or fourth Christian continent in terms of size, it will have to introduce the new Christians to the fulness of Christian culture and principles, as well as welcome their input as to their concrete embodiment in the world.

Take the notion of solidarity. In *Sollecitudo rei socialis*, John Paul II spoke for the first time of solidarity as a *virtue*. He emphasizes that individual element because too often solidarity has been thought of as a set of policy mechanisms for helping the poor, the marginalized, and the victims of natural or man-made disasters. Solidarity must find expression in public policies, but we know that those very policies may sometimes have perverse effects. In *Centesimus Annus*, the Pope rightly points to the ways that social assistance, culminating in the social assistance state, may actually discourage the very individual initiative and enterprise they are intended to foster. These cautions have applications both at national and international levels. The way to be sure that we have good global input is to pay attention to local Christian churches. The Catholic Church, for example, not only runs an administrative structure of dioceses and parishes around the world. Catholic Relief Services offer the most extensive, permanent social assistance of any institution. The Church's minute knowledge of local conditions and its global capacity to transmit that knowledge to governments and international institutions is a unique resource in the global age.

One final notion from the tradition of Catholic Social Thought is the common good. There is no good definition of this notion in papal documents or even in the work of social theorists, yet it is indispensable. The *Catechism of the Catholic Church* says (no. 1924) that the common good is "the sum total of social conditions which allow people, either as groups or individuals, to reach their perfection more fully and easily." The perfection spoken of here has both spiritual and social dimensions, which may be distinguished in theory but in practice are closely related. Both American and Italian culture, at their best, have recognized that the virtues of the people contribute not only to individual well-being, but to social benefits as well. All societies that originate in European culture have tended in recent decades to overlook the importance of popular virtue. We have focused far more on economic, political, and military policies as constitutive of the common good. But it is impossible to conceive how our institutions will flourish without the proper formation of our peoples; and that formation is far more a product of family, church, and education than it is of public institutions.

Another factor that threatens Europe and America even more than these questions is the demographic collapse of advanced societies. Thus far, the United States has continued to maintain its population, and even to grow slightly, primarily because of immigration. Our immigrants come mostly from Asia and Latin America, and despite the problems brought by any large wave of immigration, they contribute a great deal and are assimilated into American culture reasonably well. How long this will continue to work B especially given the decline and corruption of indigenous American cultural forces B remains to be seen. But those in America who care about Europe cannot help but be alarmed at the European birth rate. This, of course, is a complex question that deserves

much attention. But I would simply point out that the Church's worries about the consequences of birth control B worries that were and are shared by other Christian churches B may here show its practical value. No one wants to return to a time of too many children for families to support. The Church accepts the spacing of births by morally licit means. But it is a profound question that deserves a searching answer whether a contraceptive mentality has not made Europeans and Americans less generous, less welcoming of life than they once were. Economic factors are insufficient to explain this phenomenon. We are wealthier now than at any time in our past; yet we find it difficult to welcome children. Italy and the United States once had a very different view of children, families, and the virtues they foster. We need to find some way to return to our better cultural traditions and attitudes.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, let me quote the words of an always wise Italian, Luigi Barzini. At the beginning of his book *The Europeans* he notes something that no one else B European or American B ever noticed in the American Constitution. The very first sentence of that remarkable document announces that the people of the United States are seeking to form "a more perfect union." Barzini comments that Americans "by their nature, have never been satisfied with mere perfection." This has led to some of the great achievements as well as several great follies on the part of the United States, Barzini counsels that Europe itself, as it sought to pass from a bickering group of historic nations to union would do well to adopt this goal "immediately, today, tomorrow at the latest, without wasting one more hour, or waiting for one more windy and inconclusive meeting of experts."

European unity now exists. America and Europe now share the leadership of an equally rapid growth in world integration. The Catholic Church, an institution that has had global reach since the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries is itself well situated for what the current Holy Father has often referred to as "the new springtime of the Church." The dominance of all three of these entities, which have their roots in Europe, does not mean that we need to impose our own values on other regions and religions. It would be not only wrong, but imprudent to do so. Historical processes have a pace of their own. Italian religion and culture more generally have had what are perhaps the most easygoing ways of all the European nations without losing the essential creative element that is the hallmark of a living civilization. Its contribution to a more perfect global union could become a model for what the West needs in order to engage in a productive dialogue with the rest of the world.

CHAPTER IV

ITALIAN CULTURAL IDENTITY AND MIGRATION. ITALIAN COMMUNITIES ABROAD AND ITALIAN CULTURAL IDENTITY THROUGH TIME

MADDALENA TIRABASSI

This paper deals with Italian cultural identity within Italian communities in the United States and investigates how, and how far, the Italian diaspora can be considered a vehicle of italicity.

The construction of Italian cultural identity was influenced by: the cultural and political attitude toward emigrants in the home country, the image Italy had in the course of time in the countries of settlement and, more recently, the way the media represented the ethnic group. In the United States the media's power in constructing and circulating ethnic stereotypes seems, in fact, to be deeply affecting Italian American identity today. This presentation will examine these aspects and, through a concise analysis of the Italian experience in the United States, will try do define how Italian American ethnic identity has been constructed over time. The range of possibilities opened by globalization to maintaining and developing ethnic identities will also be examined. This analysis will cover the period between the beginning of Italian emigration to the United States and the present.

ITALY AND EMIGRATION

Italian emigration has been defined by Fernand Braudel as the greatest migration in modern times: around 26 million Italians left the country over a 100 year period. The phenomenon can now be considered over, as from 1973 to the present, the net Italian migratory balance is negative. It should be noted, however, that between 1986 and 1997 some 528,700 Italians (57 per cent of them from the islands and Southern regions) left the country, 66 per cent of them going to northern Europe, and 22 per cent to North America.[i] The pattern of emigration over time is closely connected with ethnic identity. The presence of a not negligible trickle of migrants in the recent past may interact with established communities, possibly reinvigorating them to some extent.

Notwithstanding the huge numbers, the relationship between Italy and its emigrants was characterized by very weak governmental policies toward the emigration phenomenon, which has affected the country throughout its national history. The first major emigration law was passed in 1901, twenty years after the beginning of mass emigration[ii]. During the peak years of mass emigration, Italians "were still to be made", meaning that an Italian national identity had to be

constructed, to quote Massimo D'Azeglio. The scarce interest of the state towards its emigrants, together with the recent constitution of the Italian State and the weakness of the ties between different areas of the country, helps to explain why the Italian diaspora's identity lacked strong national connotation[iii]. Local and regional cultures were, on the other hand, very strong. Dialects were, to all extents, the native language of most migrants, given the lack of a national language. This, in turn, made any form of communication and cohesion more difficult. The state was also bypassed by the Italian business community, which established economic relationship along local or family networks. A diaspora transcending the nation state was thus already at work by the end of the nineteenth century.

The scarce sensitivity of the newborn Italian State toward its emigrants created a void that laid the foundation for the relative success of Fascist propaganda in Italian colonies. It was in fact only in the twenties, with Mussolini in power, that the Italian state changed its conception of emigrants, to quote Dino Grandi: "the poor, despised emigrant, forced to beg in a country he did not belong to, [changed] into an Italian abroad and thus regained for his homeland."[iv] The official label of "italiani all'estero" (Italians abroad) was adopted in 1927, when Fascism forbade emigration in response to the United States Quota Acts on immigration and opted for demographic expansion through its imperial policy. Fascist exponents were divided on the policy to be adopted toward the emigrants; eventually those in favor of the adoption of American citizenship by Italians abroad won. It was thought that they could influence the United States government to have a more favorable policy towards Fascist Italy. On the question of citizenship, Fascist and United States strategies therefore converged. As observed by Luigi Villari in 1939: "If World War and Fascism have reinforced nationalist feelings among Italians, the progress made by Italians has helped to reinforce the value of Italian voters in American politics."[v]

In the long term, the attempt to renew emigrants' loyalty to the Italian state in order to obtain political solidarity was bound to fail. World War II showed the loyalty of Italian Americans to their new country and the ultimate failure of Fascist propaganda[vi]. During those years, there emerged as a trait of Italian American identity the immigrants' double yet asymmetric loyalty to both the United States and Italy: sentimental ties to the home country and political loyalty to the United States. *Il Progresso Italoamericano*, the most important newspaper in the Italian community, well illustrates this point: the English section was strongly pro-Roosevelt, while the Italian section stood with Mussolini[vii].

On the other hand, Fascism's interest in Italian communities abroad, in its effort to bind Italian emigrants to the nation state and to the regime, has had consequences which are still felt today. Throughout this process, the very world *italianità* obtained a Fascist aura, making it a bit unpalatable for the democratic republic which was born in 1946.

ITALIANS IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM LITTLE SICILIES TO LITTLE ITALIES

When Italians arrived in America, they were barely able to communicate among themselves; as Rosa, the protagonist of one of the most famous biographies of an Italian woman remarked, people of other Italian regions were almost considered as strangers as Americans[viii]. The development of an Italian identity, as has been pointed out by the sociologist Francis Ianni, occurred together with the development of an Italian American ethnic identity : "The very term 'italiano' referring to nationality, applied to these provincial emigrants, . . . was at best a metaphor; the category 'italiano' was itself an invention of the new world as was the ethnic category 'italoamericano'."[ix] This process is well described in an article on the invention of Italian ethnicity: "To Americans, their provincial and village identities, so important to the immigrants, were meaningless; these were lumped together into ethnonational categories, Irish Catholics, Italians, or Poles (or more likely, Micks, Wops, and Polacks)"[x]. As Jonathan Sarna has observed, "miniature melting pots fused these particularistic elements into larger collectivities".[xi] In acquiring an Italian ethnic identity in America they did not give up their *campanile* or regional affiliation, they simply added a new identity. Family, *paese*, Italy, America, to put it very schematically, were their identity layers. I add America because from the moment they set foot in the United States, no matter how long they stayed, they became "americani" in the eyes of those who remained in the home country. Even the wives who stayed at home were called "le americane," as testified to by Italian social inquiries at the time, such as the Faina Report, and by many autobiographies[xii].

Their *percorso* from Italian immigrants to American citizens of Italian origin was also deeply influenced by United States policies which, in turn, always reflected social, economic and political attitudes toward the new immigrants. In particular, when the failure of the Anglo conformity model, with its strong anti-Catholic connotation, and the subsequent melting pot vision proved their inadequacy during the First World War years, and Americanization policies were undertaken,[xiii] Italian immigrants started to actively negotiate their ethnic identity in the United States. This subject has been well documented by social inquiries of the time: immigrants continuously "negotiated" between home country and American culture, and in so doing they were, up to a certain point, able to choose to keep or to change customs.

Family

At the turn of the century, when most immigrants arrived in America from the poorest Italian regions, the ideal model of an Italian American family was still far off. Recent scholarship has dismantled the stereotype of a family characterized by an idyllic cohesiveness and affection[xiv], showing that pre-modern family assets and values dominated. Material living conditions were easier to improve, even if emigration to America seemed, in the beginning, to accentuate them: for instance, health problems worsened because of unhealthy housing conditions, but modernization in

this field occurred rapidly[xv]. Infant mortality, which was extremely high in Italian families -- 120 deaths per thousand births in 1918 --, fell to 54 in 1932, in line with the rate for American whites. Fertility rates were also soon equal to the American.[xvi]

On the other hand, certain customs and attitudes often represented an obstacle to successful integration in American society. In particular, this refers to the position women and children held in Italian American families. Since the immigrant family is where ethnic values were negotiated at their very core, we shall take a closer look at this. The immigrant family, as has been well depicted in the sociological works of the 1920's and 1930's, had areas of conflict: the main ones were the generation gap between first and second generations, i.e. between parents born in Europe and their American-born children, and the gender rift.

The field was closely examined by social workers of the time, since social work with immigrants included various aspects of the immigrants' culture: attitudes toward children, education, work, health, food habits. The inter war years were crucial to the Italian community since they saw the passage from the first to the second generation, and second generation problems soon emerged showing the difficulties that the immigrant culture had in adjusting to the new environment.

An area of cultural conflict between the old and the new generations was that of American-born daughters' relationships with boys and, more generally speaking, decisions about marriage. In the United States the modern idea of egalitarian marriage was by that time accepted by all classes, implying the freedom to choose one's partner and, therefore, marriage for love. Second generation Italian women's marital choices were guided by parents toward "very" endogamic marriages. To be very schematic, primary and literary sources show that: a *compaesano* held the first position, followed by a *corregionario*; then came a husband from the same southern, northern or central area. It took generations to expand the possible choices to a foreign Catholic. Italian immigrant daughters rebelled up to a certain point, as more than one girl declared to the social workers: "I don't want to marry an Italian, they are too bossy. I want to marry an Americanized." By "Americanized" they meant an Italian man who had immigrated many years before. Years later, in a recent book of interviews by Connie Maglione, many women also gave replies of this kind: "I swore that I would never marry an Italian." "I was determined not to marry an Italian-American." As emerges from many witnesses, girls demanded the right to choose perhaps a compatriot, but more Americanized, to be able to see him outside the family, to be able to go out with boys without being obliged to marry them. They did not want a dowry, they wanted to go out with boys without getting engaged.

Another area of conflict was the ethnic group's attitude to women working: As sociologist Luise Odencrantz noted as early as 1919, women's work "was a necessary evil induced by conditions of American life which did not in any way alter their dependent position."

In fact, young women, who worked mainly in clothing, packing, candy and artificial flower factories, were not allowed to use even the smallest part of the money they earned, or to enjoy even basic

freedoms, if not that of working. This was the cause of many a family argument. Even if work is not in itself emancipatory because it does not offer a corresponding freedom of movement, the request to be able to use part of the wages to enjoy consumer goods, from clothes to entertainment, led away from the traditional family orientation and challenged the paternal authority which had been unquestioned up till then[xvii].

The most difficult relationships were between mothers and daughters because of the new position the latter found in America. Both school and work favored going out of the house.

Italian women (and children), the victims of patriarchal authority, were the first to challenge the traditional power structure of their ethnic culture in the New World[xviii]. Change might not have occurred without a redistribution of power within the family. The immigration experience, and the consequent assimilation process, brought tools to the weaker members of the family which helped them to readdress their roles. Americanization, if considered in its broader meaning, meant development of individualistic values and thus helped women to reject pre-modern values and certain traditions. This was true especially as Americanization entailed education,[xix] the right to vote and the right to work; taught home economics, housekeeping and child rearing; and in a more general sense pushed for the development of personal autonomy. Men, for their part, sought in the family a guarantee of cultural continuity with the Old World, proven by the frequent search for a wife from the country of origin and by the attempt to maintain their traditional role of unchallenged authority.

There emerges from the reports of social workers a very active relationship between workers and those they helped. Young Italian women, far from passively accepting the worker's advice, turned to them any time they felt they could gain support for their demands for independence from the family.

Immigrant mothers were under particular pressure because they found themselves in the situation of having to exercise the dual role – the traditional one of protecting and transmitting the values of their own culture in a context which was radically different to the native one – and that of continuous mediation between old and new roles and values in order to adapt themselves and survive in American society. Their difficulties were worsened by the fact that their daughters showed themselves to be particularly keen to grasp the opportunities for independence offered by American society, which had already recognized more rights for women. These included the right to education, to participation in social events and more in general the right to greater independence from the family. Out of this difficult relationship, in which normal generational conflicts were worsened by the experience of emigration, often emerged among the defeated mothers. They were not able to mediate with a society they did not know, the daughters who found new strength in the American example to challenge maternal authority, and the family in general. They remained without having acquired the basic elements of the new culture. The first two generations had to pay the price of the rapid modernization of customs within the immigrant family, in which all elements were brought simultaneously into play. On the other hand, the liberating impact for the women of a modern society

must have borne fruit with a surprising rapidity given the way women started to work, increased their educational level, etc. This did not mean giving up ethnic culture and its values, but it tended to show the great flexibility of Italian-American women who managed to become agents of integration for the whole ethnic group. They grasped the many useful aspects in American society in order to improve their position within the family and for suitable social integration.

According to this interpretation, the actual social processes which shaped the families of Italian immigrants may be much more complex and ambiguous than actual stereotypes would lead us to think. For once an identitarian model is defined in the public sphere, once a cultural issue has been "adopted" by the media industry or in political discourse, it has a life of its own. The narrative centered on family themes has become a crucial element in the definition of Italian Americans: its cultural expressions have become "true" in themselves, and have actively redefined features of italicity on the global scale. I am thinking of both the bright side (movies like *Moonstruck* and *Tarantella*) and the dark side (the theme of the *famiglia* in the Mafia movies). Thinking also of the political use of the family theme by Mario and Matilda Cuomo. This is, by the way, a good example of the pluralistic nature of the cultural fields of italicity. For the source of the images and metaphors, icons and symbols, is not to be found in Italy itself as a supposed "center," Italy itself; but is rather the result of a network, where the diaspora is no less relevant than the metropolis.

Food

Italian cuisine has became an icon of Italian ethnicity, but it required many years to begin appreciated in America. Some historians maintain that the most visible Italian cultural model is Italian food traditions. But, as many studies recently done on Italian immigrants' dietary customs shows, Italian American *cucina* is the best example of an invention of an ethnicity fueled by different tides of immigration.[xx] Italian *cucina* today is a sort of regional melting pot, a construction like the Italian identity. We shall begin with a few examples of how immigrants ate at home, and comparisons with the immigrant diet in the United States.

The *contadino*'s diet at the end of the century was very poor. When working in the fields, men ate three times a day and took their meals of bread and vegetables in the fields; there was usually a vegetable soup at dinner, and wine was sometimes part of the diet. These meals were considered part of the *giornaliero*'s pay. In Calabria the *contadino* diet consisted of bread, olive oil, and vegetables at noon, *polenta* or beans or potatoes at dinner. Meat was eaten only at great festivities; for the poorest, bread was made out of lentil flour and wild weeds, without oil, when the harvest was bad.[xxi] We have a list of the foods eaten by a Sicilian farmer over the year: 4 hectoliters (22 gallons) of wheat, 360 liters of wine, 40 kilograms of cheese, usually ricotta which is the poorest in terms of calories,

80 kilos of pasta, 15 kilograms of rice, one kilogram of meat.[xxii] In Puglia, too, the diet was made up of cereals and bread plus olive oil, beans, maize, and carobs. Because salt was very expensive, sea water was used to season foods.[xxiii] In Campania, Fedele de Siervo, the inspector in charge of the regional enquiry, tried to evaluate the calorie content of the *contadino* diet, calculating a daily average of 130 grams of protein, which was considered satisfying.[xxiv] A *giornaliero*'s diet in Monteleone, Calabria, was made up of: 1.2 kilograms of maize bread, one of salted sardines, 0.8 kilograms of potatoes or boiled vegetables one *soldo*'s worth of salt, and oil.[xxv]

Sophonisba Breckinridge's 1921 classic study, *New Homes for Old* , reports the diets of the immigrants from different ethnic groups. Among Italians the diet of a Sicilian family from Palermo is described. The family has four children ranging from ten months to seven years. The author says "they have been in America over twenty years, but their diet is little changed"[xxvi]. If we compare their American diet to the description reported above we notice that there are many changes in their daily diet, even if the recipes and the ingredients may be the same as those of the home country [xxvii]. First of all they had breakfast every day: coffee or chocolate, toast, Italian cookies; meat, salad, bread and fruit for lunch; spaghetti, stuffed peppers, bread and fruit for dinner is the Monday summer menu. The diet changes every day and it always includes meat or fish and fruits, plus various vegetables. On Sundays it was richer: homemade macaroni with tomato sauce, veal pot roast, corn, eggplant, bread, fruit salad.[xxviii]

Social workers often complained that Italians' diet, even if healthy, was too expensive: in order to maintain their traditional habits, they had to spend a lot on imported ingredients such as olive oil, cheese and so on[xxix]. In Italy a few years later, when the Faina inquiry was made, an improvement was noticed in the *contadini*'s diet in the regions with the biggest emigration, with meat in the *maccheroni* sauce on Sundays and an increase in slaughtering pigs. In terms of eating they did not change their habits in America, but they were able to realize their ideals: "In America everyday is festa." [xxx]

From the American side at the end of the nineteenth century, there were prejudices regarding certain ingredients Italians used and their way of preparing food: oxalic acid present in tomatoes was considered carcinogenic, pork was decried by hygienists, spicy foods were connected with alcohol consumption, garlic was regarded "with particular horror," and in general mixing many ingredients in cooking was considered bad for digestion.[xxxi]

By 1910, teaching immigrants to cook in the American way was becoming a profession. As far as Italians were concerned, the campaign was doomed to failure: they never accepted the American way.[xxxii] While Italian immigrant women took courses in American domestic economy they resisted taking courses in cooking.[xxxiii] During WWII "Victory gardens" and food preservation campaigns said nothing new to Italian Americans, who had devised strategies of planting vegetable gardens in backyards and window sills since their arrival in the United States. By the Twenties there was a complete change in American attitudes toward Italian food customs: the healthiness of the

Italian diet started to be praised. Social workers complaints regarded only the cost of imported food and efforts were made to make Italians substitute it with American ones, though still with little success. By then Italian cuisine was becoming fashionable among Americans.[xxxiv]

An essay from a Canadian scholar, Luigi Pennacchio, on "Italian Immigrant Foodways in Post Second World War Toronto,"[xxxv] illustrates how generations of immigration matter in terms of identity. Among the many things he notes, in painting a Canadian picture very similar to the American one in the 1920's, there is children's discomfort over their lunch boxes, full of provolone and mortadella sandwiches (the second generation peanut butter & jelly syndrome), which illustrates the way Italian American food went from prejudice to acceptance in Toronto. He cites the case of a food store chain that in the 1990's changed its name in Italian neighborhoods from "Loblaws" to "Fortinos" and "Rocco's." But the best part of the article is the one in which he shows how quickly Italian American foodways permeated the Canadian way of eating:

> An informant from South-East Asia related the following: "Abdul [son] insists on eating *Canadian* [emphasis mine] foods such as *Calabrese* bread, *prosciutto,* salami, and pasta. He refuses to eat our food, and this has become quite a concern to my husband and me. Even the Master [spiritual leader] has remarked alarmingly at this development among our children.

In terms of eating, Italicity has succeeded in permeating American society. The very use of Italian names for food, recipes and restaurant dishes, which has become more and more common, testifies to it. La cucina italiana proves once again to be the best example of Italicity, which is over and above Italian tradition.

Italians and the American landscape

In some cases Italian immigrants were even able to embrace Italian artistic traditions; this occurred through the immigration of artisans, who became a vehicle of another sort of Italicity. To quote Regina Soria, author of a study on this subject, *American Artists of Italian Heritage, 1776-1945*:

> After publishing a dictionary of Nineteenth-century American artists in Italy, for the next twenty years I have researched Italian immigrant artists in the United States, fascinated by the continuing relationship and exchange of inspiration between Italy and America. In fact, if Italy has been the pollinator of American art for the American

artists who since the birth of the Republic came to Rome, Florence and Carrara to learn painting and sculpture, it has also been the pollinator for the American artists of Italian heritage whose "ingrained qualities," love of color and form, I invariably found in my research. I listed 350 artists: sculptors and painters, but also stone cutters, marble carvers, *figurinai* and stucco decorators, bronze casters, puppet makers, wood carvers, carousel figure makers, iron mongers, poster designers, anyone, in fact whose works took a visual form. All these diverse artists played an important role in the shaping of America[xxxvi].

The urban landscape changed as immigrants created Little Italies; Italian ethnic neighborhoods were, and in some cases still are, recognizable.

In concluding this first stage in the formation of Italian ethnic identity in the United States, the 1920's and 1930's were, on the whole, years in which the modernization of customs opened the way to the construction of an ethnic identity that was bound to survive. Immigrants' material culture, culinary habits and dialects changed to meet the requirements of the new society, but often did so according to a supposed tradition. On the whole, a modernized Old Country life style was reconstructed in America.

THE CONSTRUCTION OF ITALIAN ETHNICITY

The post-war years marked the economic success of the Italian community in the United States. On the other hand, those were the years less marked by a visible role for ethnic identity. This is well summarized in a seminal article on the invention of Italian ethnicity published in *Altreitalie* in 1990, written by some of the most prominent scholars on immigration, Vecoli, Pozzetta *et al.*:

to many observers in the 1940's and the 1950's it appeared that Italian Americans were comfortably melting into the melting pot as particularly the second generation realized increased social mobility, adopted middle class values, and joined in the rush to mass consumerism. By the 1960's, however, third and fourth generation Italian Americans unexpectedly began to assert their distinctiveness as part of wider ethnic revival sweeping America.

Italian Americans joined with other ethnics to renegotiate their ethnicity in the midst of a national political crisis during which dominant societal values and identities came under increasing assault. . . . Once again, the self-conscious crafting of symbols, rituals, and images became heightened as Italian Americans attempted to generate as much internal unity as possible, lay claim to being fully American, and inscribe a more dignified place for themselves in the dominant narrative of American history. This diversity of opinion was further sharpened by the proliferation of Italian American organizations of all kinds during the sixties and seventies. Upwardly mobile and social climbing individuals, for example, attempted to fashion a more positive image by focusing on the glories of old country high culture, seeking to connect Italian Americans with the accomplishments of Dante, Da Vinci, and other

renowned Italians. In a variant of this strategy, other Italian Americans sought to cash in on the cachet of contemporary Italian design and style, by consuming Gucci, Pucci, Ferrari, etc.

Status anxieties engendered by negative stereotypes inherited from the era of peasant immigration generated intensified efforts to highlight the "contributions" of Italians to the development of America. Seeking to compensate for insecurities, filiopetists campaigned for the issuance of commemorative stamps to Filippo Mazzei and Francesco Vigo; recognition of exceptional immigrants such as Constantino Brumidi, Father Eusebio Chino, and Lorenzo da Ponte; and erection of monuments to other overlooked notables.

Perhaps the most vigorously fought struggle was the successful effort to have Columbus Day declared a federal holiday. Such a strategy, common to all ethnic groups, challenged the standard rendition of American history – indeed, often stood it on its head – by showing how the group's values and heroes were instrumental in shaping national development.[xxxvii]

During those years, ethnic cultural traits that had been hidden, or preserved within the private sphere of family and ethnic neighborhoods, were reevaluated in a public and political dimension. Ethnic diversity was finally considered a value by society at large. Italian American studies were offered in American colleges and universities, and a body of literature on the Italian experience in America was created – all in parallel with a greater reflection on the meaning of Italian ethnic identity.

During the phase which marked the revival of ethnicity, 1970-1980, ethnicity was considered a cultural construction relative to a given time in history, constantly reinvented to face changes either internal to the group or within the society of settlement.[xxxviii]

Ethnic Identity and Globalization: from Little Italies to Virtual Communities

If in the past it was true that there were as many emigration histories as immigrants, now the question is complicated even more by the number of generations of immigration, since the perception of Italian identity is very much related to the immigrant generation to which one belongs. From a rapid look at the biographies of Italian American authors and literary critics in Italian Americana, very few belong to a generation that goes farther back than the second or third.

Italian American literature and literary criticism, as well as cinema, offer a deep insight into Italian American identity today. In the last fifteen years there has been a publishing flurry in terms of novels and literary criticism.[xxxix] The reason is, as many authors say, it took years before they decided to break the wall of silence. A journalist and author very well known to the American public, Gay Talese, declared that he had started to write *Unto the Son*, the novel about his father's life, in 1955, and interrupted his writing because:

temevo che un libro imperniato sul passato di mio padre potesse concentrare su di lui un'attenzione indesiderata e . . . persino qualche derisione da parte dei suoi amici e vicini americani appartenenti alla conservatrice comunità anglosassone . . . del New Jersey, dove dopo trent'anni di residenza mio padre era accettato come un integrato cittadino statunitense. . . . L'istinto di protezione nei confronti di mio padre non dovrebbe stupire gli scrittori italoamericani della mia generazione. Non proteggere l'intimità della propria famiglia . . . nella propria produzione letteraria era considerata una mancanza imperdonabile all'interno del nostro gruppo etnico, prevalentemente originario dell'Italia meridionale e ancora condizionato, persino a distanza di una generazione o due dall'arrivo in America dai nostri genitori o dai nostri nonni, dalle antiche esortazioni alla discrezione, alla dignità familiare e al mantenimento de segreti.[xl]

Another Italian American author, Mary Jo Bona, in her introduction to *The Voices We Carry* writes:

The writers collected in this anthology all acknowledge implicitly the dual and conflicting role involved in being a daughter of Italian/Sicilian ancestors and the writer who breaks away from the traditions imposed by the code of *omertà* in order to write the family's secrets. . . . We live the closely knit Italian/American culture which (quoting Tina De Rosa) "regardless of our education, expects us to get married and have babies". What this culture did not expect was for Italian/American women to be married with children *and* write. Writing the family secrets may very well border the treason.[xli]

As Fred Gardaphe very perceptively points out in *Italian Signs, American Streets*, the polarities between which Italian American identity worked in the past, *omertà* and *la bella figura*, had to be overcome in order to develop a literary canon[xlii].

Talese's testimony introduces another important element that explains the delay in the growth of an Italian American literature. He states that he did not want to interfere with his father's full integration into WASP society.

As Anthony J. Tamburri states, using Daniel Aaron's interpretation, there are:

three stages non Anglo/American writer might pass. The first stage writer is "the pioneer spokesman for the . . . unspoken for" ethnic, racial, or cultural group – that is the marginalized. This person writes . . . with the goal of debunking negative stereotypes . . .; the second stage writer abandons preconceived ideas in an attempt to demystify negative stereotypes . . . presents characters who have already sunk "roots into the native soil," . . . readily indicates the disparity and, in some cases, may even engage in militant criticism.[xliii]

It is only in the third stage that Italian ethnic writers, having appropriated the culture of the dominant group, and feeling "entitled to the intellectual and cultural heritage of the dominant group" speak out uninhibitedly as Americans "but without abandoning the cultural heritage."

Italian ethnic women writers testify to this development by redefining their identity and by rescuing their family history through writing. They are no longer afraid of breaking ethnic codes and, in the meantime, they are eager to disrupt taboos, no longer worried about family or American public judgement. Their writings, far from dismissing ethnic culture, tell much about their identity which is well rooted in family cohesiveness, and consciously far from the Anglo American model based on separation and autonomy[xliv].

  Helen Barolini's *Umbertina*, published in 1979, now a classic of Italian American literature, well orchestrates ethnic and gender identity through a family story of various generations of women[xlv]. *Umbertina*'s search for her roots testifies to mobility and not the survival of an archaic past. Tina, her daughter, does research on Dante in Italy, embraces Italian culture, but is not prone to nostalgia for the archaic Italy of her forefathers. The voyage to Italy in this novel represents the overcoming of the ethnic family identity and marks the acquisition of consciousness of an Italian identity which we would call italic. This new identity does not contrast with her American one.

        Today, just like Tina, many third generation Italian Americans do not have to rely on family myths about Italy, as they can easily visit the country of origin, and comfortably live their multiple identity.

  Loretta Baldassar, an Australian scholar of north-eastern Italian origin, illustrates this point by analyzing the importance of emigrants' visits home as a significant moment in the migratory process, useful for the study of the territory-identity relationship. On the basis of an analysis of visits home by first, second and third generation emigrants from a small town in North-Eastern Italy, currently living in Australia, she reaches the following conclusion. For the first generation of immigrants, the return visit often represents a moment of spiritual renewal; whereas for the second and later generations, the visit home is frequently seen as a rite of passage which leads to a transformation in their identity. The ethnographic data she presents are used to discuss the concept of de-territorialized identity, according to post-modern theories. At the same time, the data serve to provide an understanding of how it is possible to construct a sense of identity through emigration. Such an identity lies somewhere between the country of origin and that of adoption.[xlvi]

        To the descendants of emigrants, globalization also means easier contact, either through travel or communications.

Militant Ethnicity

The web revolution has also brought about a new wave of ethnic consciousness, as shown by the intensive use of ethnic forums, the proliferation of genealogy web sites, the spread of sites related to Italy. A call for papers by the American Italian Historical Association[xlvii] that appeared on the web read:

> Contest "Italian American Culture: Its genesis, shape and prospect."
> Contestants should define Italian-American culture: what it is, what it is not,
> its relationship to American culture (how it is a part of it,
> complements it, and/or works against it), how it relates to the many other
> sub-cultures/minorities in America including ethnic, racial and gender classes.
> Emphasis should be placed on both how Americans of Italian descent identify
> themselves and how they are identified by others. The essay must
> include the roots of IA culture, how it came to be what it is today, and the likely
> direction it will take in the years ahead. In essence, where and how
> does the Italian-American culture fit into America? Will it be able to help America
> defeat terrorism or any other enemy inimical to America's cherished
> institutions? Will it be able to help America deal with its "culture wars" and
> continue to be a world leader in espousing democratic and humanitarian
> principles? Do the values of the organized crime stereotypes represent the
> essence of Italian-Americans or are they more closely akin to the Antonin
> Scalias, Lee Iacoccas, and countless unsung heroes of this world?

Apart from the interest it shows towards ethnic identity today, the call for papers mentioning "organized crime stereotypes» shows that negative stereotypes still affect Italian Americans. It refers to a topic which seemed to be vanishing twenty years ago. Italian Americans are disturbed by the way the media portrays them mainly as members of organized crime. To quote Hamid Nacys: "In highly mediated postindustrial societies the popular culture they produce and consume, especially television, continually reconstructs and circulates collective identities."[xlviii]

A book written by a third generation Italian American journalist and author, Maria Laurino, expands the analysis to all the stereotypes, showing the power of the media - film in this case – to affect peoples' identity . She poses the question going back to Sartre on anti-Semitism: "The victim of stereotyping who internalizes the characteristics he is said to possess, attempts to separate himself from the negative image . . . they live in the fear their acts will correspond to the stereotype."[xlix] According to this definition, she shows how annoying portraits of Italian Americans such as Travolta's macho, "exaggerated Bensonhurst Italians" may be. "The screen personas force Italian-Americans into a . . . no win position: choose to be a Bensonhurst Italian or an assimilated American . . . both share an uncertain sense of self and fierce defensiveness." There must be a third way, she seems to suggest Laurino.

The web on the whole shows a revival of defensive ethnicity. The target are serials such as David

Chase's the *Sopranos* and *Bella Mafia,* Teddy Bears dressed in a pinstriped suit with a violin case named Guido, even the Simpsons are sometimes called in as non politically correct. The issue is so strongly felt that even authors and film directors such as Mario Puzo and Martin Scorsese[l] are asked to change the subjects of their books and movies.

Another kind of defensive ethnicity is represented by the revival of filiopietism, the celebration of great Italians in order to reassure one's own ethnic origins, which had been dismissed by thirty years of social history on Italian Americans. To quote the presentation by the author in a recent book on this subject, *Heritage Italian-American Style*: "From chariots to Ferrari. If you have Italian ancestors you will go with pride at your own long heritage of art, science, music, literature, history and food."[li]

The H-Itam web forum moderators try to orient the discussion on more positive policy concerning Italian identity, such as developing Italian ethnic studies and Italian culture in general. Defensive and constructive policy are at work together. It is too early to judge a medium that has only been widely used the last ten years, but we may say that the Internet has shown that ethnic issues are still very much at stake, that it has furnished new instruments to ethnic activists, and that it facilitates contacts within the Italian diaspora.

CONCLUSIONS

Italian emigrants and their descendants developed their ethnic identity thanks to their capacity continuously to transform and elaborate their culture, and to reconcile multiple identities. Italians in America, as a self-conscious ethnic group, were on the edge of extinction when, thanks to the ethnicity revival in the seventies and the web revolution of the nineties, many people started to consider themselves part of a diaspora. To use the term introduced by an American historian, Donna Gabaccia, one of the few who has used the diaspora approach to study Italian emigration, they see themselves as part of a plurality of diasporas, which reinforce themselves through their ties with their regions of origin.[lii] This was possible also because transnational relationships were an essential element of Italian ethnic communities. The community's ties with the home country had in fact been developing over a century, bypassing the nation state, connecting local sites on the two sides of the ocean. Contact and exchanges, which had never been interrupted, were made more visible, easier and faster by the ICT revolution.

Paradoxically, the rebirth of an active Italian American milieu, in the wake of the "new ethnicity" movement, took place at a time when the structural underpinnings of a specific Italian American identity were being eroded. As Richard Alba pointed out, territorial and social mobility, together with increasing rates of exogamy among Italian Americans, implied not only the disappearance of

the traditional Little Italies, but also a growing trend towards families of mixed ancestry. In such a situation, identities and their redefinition become much more a matter of subjective orientations, of personal interrogatives, of voluntary choices, than a matter of a more or less objective process of transmission.

Even in this case, we are reminded of the relative autonomy between structures and cultures; the twilight of the structural preconditions of ethnicity may very well coincide with a dawning of new ethnic cultural and organizational expressions.

[i] Caritas di Roma, *Dossier Statistico '97*, Roma, Anterem, 2001, pp. 53-4.

[ii] Luigi De Rosa, "Introduzione" in Gianfausto Rosoli (ed.), *Scalabrini tra vecchio e nuovo mondo*, Roma, Cser, 1989, pp. 5-13.

[iii] Maddalena Tirabassi, "Introduzione" a Edmondo De Amicis, *In America*, Vibo Valenzia, Monteleone Editore, pp. 7-26; Vanni Blengino*, Oltre l'oceano. Un progetto di identità, gli immigrati italiani in Argentina (1837-1930)*, Roma, Edizioni associate, 1987, p. 106.

[iv] Stefano Luconi, *La "diplomazia parallela." Il regime Fascista e la mobilitazione degli italo-americani,* Milano, 2000, p. 45.

[v] *Ibidem*.

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[xix] Illiteracy in Italy, 1871-1881

Total Population		Male		Female	
1871	1881	1871	1881	1871	1881

Abruzzi e Molise	86,83	83,3	79,69	74,82	93,63	91,26
Campania	82,4	78,41	76,40	71,61	88,82	85,05
Puglie	86,52	83,11	81,64	77,63	91,24	88,41
Basilicata	89,62	8732	83,62	80,67	95,33	93,56
Calabrie	88,77	87,02	82,06	79,79	95,44	93,96
Sicilia	87,22	83,97	83,03	78,85	92,21	89,53

Source: Stefano lacini, *Atti della Giunta per l'Inchiesta Agraria sulle condizioni della classe agraria*, Roma, Forzani, 1881-85 (since now on IIA).

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CHAPTER V

IDENTICAL DIFFERENCE: NOTES ON ITALIAN AND ITALIAN AMERICAN IDENTITIES

FRED L. GARDAPHE

The experience of Italian immigration to the United States can help us explore the effects of globalization on the identity of Italians. Italian immigrants to the United States were in the position of constantly negotiating their relationship between the local cultures of their origin and of their land of immigration. This process has enabled Italian Americans to grow into a more glocalized American. Such experiences as the adoption of the English language and the refusal to maintain Italian can gives us a glimpse into the difference between Italianity and what Professor Basetti has coined as "Italicity." The renunciation of the national experience of Italian immigrants involved the processes of emigration, immigration, and the formation of Little Italy. The creation of Italian America, as I see it, was a defensive reaction that helped protect the vulnerable Italian immigrant through the replanting process. As the Italian moved more and more away from the little Italys, the risks and the rewards became greater. For example, many immigrant men received U.S. citizenship by fighting in the various wars.

GLOBAL AND LOCAL

The interaction between global and local often took place in schools, and sometimes even in homes through what was brought in by the mass media. The Italian American learned early not to depend on a single master national narrative to explain U.S. identity, thus American identity could be seen as a syntheses of competing narratives to which individuals are exposed. Close examination shows that Italian American identity was formed from both history and story. Until recently there has been a film/fiction emphasis in Italian American culture, as opposed to a non-fictional emphasis via documentary studies. When we begin to examine just what it is that can be called Italian American culture, we see that Italianità becomes a closet with all the claustrophobia that small spaces encourage. For example, rarely can one see an horizon in an Italian American film or novel. Even the paintings by Italian Americans tend toward the urban, the crowded and close up as opposed to possible meditations on the open spaces of the country, the unknown and the natural. Instead there is a claustrophobic concentration on the known and the familiar, as though reality and history was a mantra that could make everything safe were it simply repeated often enough.

Where the local identities are strong is where Italian Americans are an integral part of political and social infrastructure; it is weak where there is little or no connection to that community. Fortunately, Italian Americans were cut from nation before Italy had created a strong sense of national identity. This experience facilitates the movement away from Italianity and toward Italicity.

The idea of a glocal identity requires acknowledging multiple identities. This can best take place if we first acknowledge it in our selves, and then understand and acknowledge it in others. This is why is it so important for Italian Americans to understand their own histories. If this does not occur the problem is that Italian Americans will become fixed on how others identify them: as gangsters, buffoons, obsessed with food and the other ways society packages and consumes commodities inspired by Italian culture. While much of this representation and commodification is simply so much spice to create alternatives to the bland, Anglo-Saxon fare, it is also a way to project opposites to a people obsessed with separating good and evil, light and dark, black and white.

Without knowledge of ethno-history, without knowledge of ethno-stories. Individual ethnic groups are limited to reacting to what others produce and kept from creating their own expressions. Italian Americans are being defined by others not by themselves.

One key to understanding this is the loss of the language, which happened when communication flow stopped between parent and child, between one generation and another. By the time I learned to speak standard Italian, those who spoke Italian would not respond because all they knew was dialect, and many were dead. I had to go to others then to gain an understanding of what being Italian was, is and could be. By the time I traveled to Italy I did not recognize it. As though I was my own grandfather returning, I was looking for the Italy that he placed into my head from his memory and which by then was over 50 years old. My son will have a different experience this summer when I bring him to Italy for the first time. A 17 year old has an ability to learn Italy that far exceeded mine at the same age.

We need studies of how and why dialects and language were lost. We also need to understand how Italian Americans lost a vital sense of irony that would enable them to grasp how this loss took place, what actually was lost, and to examine the toll taken on Italian American identity by the traumas of immigration and two world wars. We also need to examine the various elements that make up identity, in terms of race, gender, class, and lifestyle. Italian Americans must find out where they are in relation to each of these elements. As they do, they will no doubt begin to grow different from each other and more like the other Americans with whom they interact.

The work of Italian American intellectuals, while in many ways the avantgarde of Italian American culture, has not yet been a strong part of Italian American identity. Now that we are developing Italian American studies at all levels of education, Italian American culture will become part of the American educational system in ways unimaginable to previous generations. What is called for is nothing less than to include Italian American histories and stories in the body of material that one must master to be considered American. Obviously only that which works will be maintained, but for that to happen one must be exposed to as much as possible.

But this will not be easy. Even Italians have not paid attention to Italian American thought and culture, sometimes seeing in it a mirror of its own weaknesses or own past, refusing to see how some people chose to answer that infamous "Questione Meridionale" that never seems to go away. The vital familism of Italian American culture has permeated American culture through the work of such artists as Francesco Capra, a Sicilian immigrant. He defined America through the power of his films which have touched many generations, giving credence to the notion that while Italians may not have come to the U.S. with valuables, they have certainly come with values. This also comes into play in such strange places as HBO's *The Sopranos*, in which an Italian American producer-director is redefining what it means to be a citizen of the United States in a post millennial culture. David Chase (formerly DeCesare) is returning the focus on the mother/son paradigm previously suppressed by such artists as Mario Puzo, Francis Coppola, Martin Scorsese, and Michael Cimino. Before we can understand all this, we must become familiar with the way Italian Americans have been defined and redefined since the arrival of the first Italian immigrants to the United States.

THE HISTORY

Between 1920 and 1950, the number of Italians immigrating to the United States diminished each year. No longer were Italians leaving their homeland by the thousands. Two reasons are usually given for this: during this period living conditions in Italy had greatly improved and the American government had placed limits on the numbers of people who could immigrate to America from any one country. However, the end of World War II brought a new wave of Italian immigration, and these immigrants would change the definition of Italian America.

For the children and grandchildren of the first major wave of Italian Immigration to the United States, these new arrivals came as the enemy they had defeated, the people they had liberated. They came as their people, and most Italian Americans wanted nothing to do with them. But no matter what they wanted, their arrival would forever change the identity of the Italian in the United States.

I saw my family as finally becoming Americans when the Fazzolo family moved in next door. They were the new Italians, and even though our lives were separated only by a picket fence and a small garden that the previous owners had neglected for years, we were worlds apart. Until they moved in, whether or not we wanted it, we were America's Italians. In spite of the fact that our speech was only seasoned with the Italian that was the only language of our grandparents, in spite of the fact that hamburgers and hot dogs had long since replaced lunches of "*pasta e fagioli*" or escarole and beans, and in spite of the fact that the red, white and blue had become our new "tricolore," we were still the Italians, if only because others saw us as having different names, noses, or skin color. But this all changed the day the Fazzolo family moved in next door.

It was early spring when their moving van pulled up outside our home. I was out front, bouncing a rubber ball against the front stoop steps. Pretending not to notice them, I continued playing while the family ferried boxes and furniture from the street onto their front porch. My mother yelled for me to lend them a hand, and I pretended not to hear her, She came out of our house, grabbed me by the arm and dragged me over to their front steps where they had gathered to take a break.

When my mother tried to speak to them in English, they could barely respond and so Mr. Fazzolo asked if she spoke Italian. She tried, but she spoke a dialect that hadn't changed in over thirty years, one peppered with Italian/American words like "basciamento," that made them snicker and scratch their heads. When the new immigrants heard her speak what she thought was good Italian, they laughed. As though in some form of retaliation, I decided it was OK to laugh and mock their broken English. I helped them, only because my mother had forced me, but throughout the whole ordeal not a word passed between us.

These were the Italians who immigrated to America during the 1950s. We called them immigrants with wings, for they came to America in airplanes, unlike like my grandparents, who had crossed the Atlantic in overcrowded boats. These people came with a truckload of possessions, not like my grandparents who were lucky if they could carry along a cardboard suitcase or a burlap sack stuffed with what they had to bring to America. You would have thought that there would have been a natural affinity between the two groups of immigrants, but nothing could have been more different. They came better educated and with a greater knowledge of America than had their turn-of-the-century predecessors. They had been prepared by years of association with American soldiers, and the subsequent media invasion of their culture. They arrived more like Americans, yet they remained quite different. To us they were the new greaseballs, and we wouldn't let them forget it.

It took a few years for the Fazzolos to become more like us, but in the process we were

becoming more like them. Mrs. Fazzolo would send over samples of her homemade cooking. My grandfather worked with Mr. Fazzolo to triple his yearly production of wine. My grandmother joined Mrs. Fazzolo in their backyard for the drying of tomatoes into paste. They rejuvenated my grandparents' Italian and kept the sound alive so that later, when I finally decided to study my ancestral language, my pronunciation would be near perfect.

Years later, after I had learned Italian, I went back to my old neighborhood and spoke, for the first time, at length with the people next door in what I came to call "our language." I learned that Mr. Fazzolo had been a "*partigiano*" during the war and had spent three years in a fascist prison until he was freed by Allied soldiers. He told me of having witnessed the machine gunning of innocent people by the Nazis, he told me of how his father had been shot by a firing squad, he told me of how his whole family had been driven out of their village for fear of their lives. And all that he told me made me ashamed of how we had treated them when they first moved into the house next door.

Essentially their immigration had created two types of Italian Americans. They maintained contact with Italy, and every few years took trips back. But as the years passed, and the trips grew fewer and farther between, the people next door eventually grew to be different from contemporary Italians so that if for some reason a new emigration to America had begun, our next door neighbors would be viewed by the new immigrants as American.

This whole experience forced me to question just what it was that the experience of immigration to America could do to a human being. In our efforts to preserve an Italian/American culture, are we just preserving a memory that is frozen in time? For the people next door had a different memory of Italy than had my grandparents, than even I have since I've traveled back. It made me realize that with each wave of immigration the image of Italy changes, just as the experience of being American changes. In their own peculiar way, the people next door, brought me closer to my Italian heritage, but only after I realized that my idea of being American was falsely rooted in trying to distance myself from them. For I thought, and wrongly so, that the only way for me to be American was to alienate the people next door.

SELF DEFINITION

Italian Americans are as different from Italians as the egg is different from the eggplant. There is a familiar word connected to each, but they are two very different things. There are as many different definitions of Italian/Americans as there are Italian Americans, and the same goes for Italians. We have a tendency, when we use the word Italian American, to refer to a specific segment of Italian America: the children and grandchildren of those who immigrated from southern Italy during the turn of the century. Even though most of today's Italian Americans can indeed trace their past to this period of immigration, we cannot forget that there were political refugees during the 1850s from northern Italy, and that after World War II there was an entirely new wave of immigrants whose experiences were completely different from earlier immigrants. So, when we use the word Italian American we cannot claim to be all-inclusive. Examples of how these different identities have been and continue to be created and how they change can be found in the art created by Italian Americans.

For more than one hundred years, Italian American artists have been defining and documenting the Italian experience in America; yet Italian Americans are still very much at a loss for who they are. In less than three generations, Italian Americans have assimilated so rapidly and so well into the American way that they have become strangers, not only to contemporary Italians, but

strangers unto themselves. This alienation can be observed in the experience of many Italian American writers.

Unless Italian American writers succeed in the eyes of non-Italian Americans, they are rarely supported by their own "*paesani*." Novelist and professor Ben Morreale addressed this lack of support in my interview with him that appeared in a 1985 issue of "*Fra Noi*."

Perhaps our problem has been that we've never developed an audience. Unlike other, ethnic centered writers such as Philip Roth, who from the very beginning of his career has had a Jewish audience, we've never been able to depend on our own people to buy and read our books. During our early development as writers, we've had to rely on those outside our ethnic group to encourage our storytelling. We've almost set ourselves up for isolation.

The isolation that Morreale speaks of has created a situation which affects the Italian American identity. Why have Italian Americans never been able to effectively join hearts and minds to make the most of what they have experienced in this country? Why are our artists and scholars often viewed as ragpickers, rummaging through remnants of the past to piece together images of Italian American history and culture?

The answers to these questions lie in the Italian Americans themselves. Often there is a wish to forget about and even deny the difficult immigrant past that made it difficult for Italians to become accepted as Americans. Today's Italian Americans, the ones who have successfully achieved middle and upper class status, more often than not want to erase the memory of the times when they were not welcome in this country. This wish creates a confused culture. On the one hand, there is a common memory of a land, a language and a different way of life; on the other hand, there exists the memory of a lasagna that nonna used to make. Which is stronger? "For this my life, their death made ample room," says Joseph Tusiani in his poem, "The Song of the Bicentennial," and with what have Italian Americans put into that room?

Ask anyone, even any Italian American, to name one Italian American writer and if you are lucky you will hear the name of Mario Puzo. Even though there are over two hundred Italian American novelists who have published excellent works, our food has fared better than our authors' creations. And what does that tell us?

Even though they have made it past many social and economic barriers to the American cultural mainstream what have Italian Americans contributed to it? Do they still have a distinguishable identity? With no language to link them to Italy what do they have in common other than memory that grows more mythic as generations progress? Their generations have gone from having first hand knowledge of Italy to having a memory of Italy, to having a memory of Little Italy, to having a memory of people who used to live in Little Italys. The immigrants instilled in their children an image of Italy as the old country. Those of us who have traveled to Italy in the past ten years have found a new country that has made us realize that the Italy of our grandparents is as impossible to find as the Land of Oz. What will happen to that memory in future generations? With such a diluted memory, what do we have that we can call our own, that we can call common cultural experiences? And how will experiences in contemporary Italy change those memories into myths?

We have done little if anything to put the best of what has come from our culture into the minds of our children. It is no wonder, now as I sit on scholarship committees which award money to Italian Americans students, that the candidates I interview know little if anything of their culture. When I ask the question "What does being Italian American mean to you?" The most common

response is, "Well, my family and I eat meals together."

Well, so do herds of cows.

There must be more to our identity than the fact that some of us eat big family meals once in a while. Certainly answers such as the ones offered show that these scholarship candidates identify with their Italian heritage through their family. But is the family the only place where these students can learn about their Italian heritage? What will happen when these students move away from their families, as is the American way, and develop their separate lives? Given what is happening to the American family (it is shrinking, splitting up, and constantly being wooed by the media into disintegration) what of our Italian heritage will our youth carry into the next generation? What will our future generations inherit from us that will still be called Italian?

HERIGAGE

To answer these questions we need to define terms like inheritance and heritage? Do we all inherit the same heritage? We can probably discuss this notion of our heritage for a long time without coming to any agreement. One way to begin any controversial discussion is to start with a definition of terms. According to the *American Heritage Dictionary*, "heritage" means: 1. property that is or can be inherited; inheritance. 2. Something other than property passed down from preceding generations; legacy; tradition. 3. The status or lot acquired by a person through birth; birthright. The Italian word for heritage is *eredita*, which means: 1. the transmission of patrimony from the dead to the living; 2. the transmission of parental characteristics to children.

There are physical and spiritual dimensions to our heritage. If the characteristics and the processes of transmission never changed then we would see little difference between ourselves and the many generations of Italians and Italian Americans that came before us.

For anyone who has examined his or her physical and spiritual states lately, it is no surprise that there is indeed a great deal of difference visible when we begin comparing generations. Yet some things do move through generations unchanged and we tend to refer to these characteristics as our heritage. However, beyond the packaged products, costumes, and food, our heritage is composed of processes, ways of behaving, ways of being.

Typically these products and processes move from generation to generation by way of elders, both in their words and their actions. I still can't stand to see food wasted, and have often avoided ordering a full meal in a restaurant when I'm with my children. This is something I learned from my grandparents and parents. It is often looked upon as crude behavior, but a slice of bread insures total consumption of any sauces or gravies on my plate. My sister is really the true keeper of this tradition in our family; she can turn a fried chicken leg into a piece of bony pipe. This waste-not attitude is one of those physical products of our heritage.

In terms of processes, the stories of our past, especially when told by our elders, has been the major vehicle by which our heritage is transmitted from generation to generation. But this process became endangered when Italians migrated to America. Loss of shared primary languages, lack of shared environments (as children leave not only the homes, but the neighborhoods and often the states of their upbringing), contributed to the distortion of our heritage.

When our families relinquished the task of storytelling to radio, television and film, the inside stories remained locked away and only the outside stories were accessible. Those outside stories are

the shadows that haunt us in stereotypes.

Shadows are caused whenever an object is illuminated. The purpose of throwing light on a subject is to get a better look at it. Unfortunately, it seems that whenever the light is thrown on Italian Americans, the only things that people see are the shadows. If you think of media exposure as the light and Italian Americans as the subject, then you might wonder why all the beauty (and most of the reality) of our heritage ends up in the shadows. I believe the answer lies not in what our heritage is, but how it is perceived. To determine appropriate perceptions means controlling the light. Whether it's writing, sculpting, dancing or singing, Italian Americans in the arts are often practicing their talents in the shadows of their community. I know of many actors who must resort to playing Italian stereotypes in order to survive in the business; to feed their families they must often play the parts that producers and directors have designed for them. And how many of us know and read our Italian American writers?

Occasionally we control the aim of the light, for example at organizational gatherings, conferences, exhibitions and performances, but for the most part the number of viewers at these events is minimal to the number who see such films as *The Untouchables*, *Saturday Night Fever*, *Moonstruck* or *Goodfellas*.

Most regions that have Italian Cultural centers are able to create and promote an alternative to these Hollywood visions. But, in comparison to Hollywood, the light is of low wattage. Often there are such events as Feste Italiane, which can provide a regular forum for the experiencing of Italian American life, but even then the light only lasts a few short days. For many years Italian American artists have learned the process of creating and projecting light onto Italian American heritage, but it is not enough to provide a means for Italian Americans artists to reach the public (through educational opportunities); the public must reach their art. There must be images out there that reflect the realities faced by Italians and Italian Americans.

People learn by imitating the people and images by which they are surrounded. Any parent can attest to this. We send our children to schools to learn how to become a part of society, to learn what society is, and how they can improve it through their contributions in the areas of business, arts, science, government--through whatever area they choose to study.

What is it that our children are learning from us and the society we have created for them? When I was going to school I learned two things about Italians in America: Christopher Columbus discovered this country and Al Capone robbed it. I've had to live with the legacies of both these men, but will my child have others to identify with?

A few years ago, Geraldo Rivera, attempted to uncover the secret treasure trove in the basement of Al Capone's hotel. When he knocked down a wall on live televison only to reveal an empty room, America should have gotten the message that behind the image of Al Capone, there is nothing. There is no further mystery waiting to be uncovered. There is only dirt and an empty hole. The Capone story was all surface and no depth. When we dig into the past in that direction we will find nothing of value. So let us begin digging in other directions.

A good education should provide the student with a knowledge of the past, an awareness of the present and the tools to develop a vision of the future. We have left our children with better financial support than we were given. But if we want to support the continuing education of our young Italian Americans, it is time we turn our attention and our resources to what the American educational institutions have neglected: Italian American history and culture.

To strengthen their ethnic identification we must increase their awareness of what it meant to be Italian in the past, what it means to be Italian today and the prospects for continuing to identify with our ethnic background in the future. One of the best ways to explore this identity, I believe, is to

look to our writers. In 1971 Michael Novak's *The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics* woke Americans to the realities that "white" ethnicities were not lost in a fog of assimilation. Novak pointed to the ambivalent attitude of progressive intellectuals toward the early 20th century immigrant as one example of how the idea of a melting pot was, and would no doubt always remain, a myth. Their ambivalence, said Novak, resulted from their privileging of individual accomplishments over those of the family and community. For Italian Americans, the fifth largest ethnic group in the United States, the years since the publication of Novak's book have been challenging in terms of developing leaders on all fronts. But they have most challenging in dveloping intellectuals, those who Novak describes as creators, rather than distributors, of intellectual culture. Those Italian Americans who have become intellectuals have followed a model in which alienation from one's birth community and often birth class, was more often than not; this was a requirement for acceptance into the club. Never stabilized by political lobbies, cultural foundations, or endowed university professorships, American intellectuals of Italian descent have never had an institutional home connecting them to their ancestral culture, nor have they consciously set upon building a community through which Italian/American culture might be transmitted. In less than three generations, Italian Americans have assimilated so rapidly and so well into the American way that they have become strangers, not only to contemporary Italians, but unto themselves. This alienation can be observed in the experience of many Italian American writers.

In a 1987 *Fra Noi* interview, Jay Parini, celebrated novelist and poet, revealed that his most recent fictional effort, *The Patch Boys*, was a novel of recovery--one in which he had been able to use the Italian elements of his upbringing to tell a story, and in so doing could regain aspects of his heritage which, for the most part, had previously been ignored or untapped.

ITALIANITÀ

Parini's recovery of "*Italianità*" is indicative of the sentiment and spirit of many of today's younger Italian American writers who wish to remember, to preserve a past and a culture that has shaped their lives. This act of recovery implies an attempt to restore something that once was an integral part of one's identity. But just what is this "*Italianita*" that writers such as Parini are interested in recovering?

"*Italianità*" is many things. But we must remember that more than anything else "*Italianità*" is an invention, a construction that each builder tailors to his or her own ideas. Some scholars suggest that the idea is primarily a fascist construction used to build an Italian nation; but what these scholars forget is the pre-fascist notions developed by the authors of the Risorgimento. "*Italianita*," in America, is quite different from that notion as it developed in Italy. However, in both countries, this construction is tempered by the images that the larger culture permits being presented to the public.

Italianità can be whatever leads young Italian Americans back to the real and mythical images of the land, the lifestyle, the values, and the cultural trappings of their ancestors. It could be language, food, a way of determining life values, familial structure, a sense of religion, it can be all of this and certainly is much more.

Many of the Italians who immigrated to the United States did so before there was a united Italy. Most of those leaving southern Italy left during a period in which "*Italianità*" was just beginning to develop as a geo-political identity. In fact, most of what we know about those early immigrants leads us to believe that they identified themselves with their home town or region rather than with Italy as their country.

And so what we refer to today as "*Italianità*" would have been called, only a few generations earlier, "Barese," "Abruzzese," or "Milanese." Through assimilation, such regional divisions today are secondary to national identity. For example, these days, when two Italian Americans are introduced to each other, quite often one of the first questions raised is "And what part of Italy do your people come from?"

Though regional identification is still possible, even in third and fourth generation Italian Americans, the tendency is to relate to each other first as Italian Americans. This established Italian American identity is composed of the qualities that separate us from Americans of other ethnic backgrounds. If we can isolate these characteristics then we can begin to identify the ingredients of what goes into "*Italianita*" and so we can construct a basis for establishing a distinct Italian American culture.

Because they were identified as foreigners, whether because of their dress, food, native language or accented Italian English, first and second generation Italian Americans suffered both misinterpretation and prejudice. These early generations, the ones from which our first writers emerge, had a closer connection to and thus a stronger identification with Italianita. This meant that they were forced to either defend that identity or disguise it with new names, new fashions, or other assimilative techniques.

Very often, one's *Italianità*, became something that prohibited entrance into the American cultural mainstream, and so quite often it was a label that one avoided. Early in their education, many Italian Americans were taught that their ethnicity was worthless. Leonard Covello, who with the help of novelist Guido D'Agostino, wrote *The Heart is the Teacher*, recounts this experience:

During this period [1900s], the Italian language completely ignored. In fact, throughout my whole elementary school career, I do not recall one mention of Italy or the Italian language or what famous Italians had done in the world with the possible exception of Columbus, who was pretty popular in America. We soon got the idea that Italian meant something inferior, and a barrier was erected between children of Italian origin and their parents. This was the accepted process of Americanization. We were becoming Americans by learning how to be ashamed of our parents.

Covello's words explain, in part, why so many first and second generation Italian Americans found economic paths and the more popular cultural avenues (sports and popular entertainment) easier to travel on the journey to becoming American. These choices enabled success without strong identification with what was considered an immigrant way of life. Very few of these immigrants or their children ventured into the field of letters, and those that did, were considered cultural immigrants, just as their parents had been considered economic immigrants; they faced same prejudice and discriminations at the cultural level that their parents had at economic and social levels.

With the publication of *Blood of My Blood* in 1974, Richard Gambino, presented the first popular study of what it meant to be Italian American. This book, the first best seller by an Italian American that did not feature organized crime, perhaps more than any piece of fiction, was responsible for setting off the third generation's search for a usable past. Gambino's approach, weaving historical, sociological and psychological data with personal anecdotes, combined the story telling techniques of earlier writers with the power of non-fictional material to give a framework and an insight to the development of an Italian American consciousness.

ASSIMILATION

The successful and rapid assimilation of Italians into the American mainstream has happened on many fronts. If the children of Italian immigrants to America became true Americans in the economic sense, then it was their children who have become Americans in the cultural sense. These children, whose connection to the immigrant experience is more mythical than real, based on story as opposed to experience, were the first generation of Italians in this country to enter the literary arts in any great number.

The rush to become Americans was very often characterized by the third generation's inability to speak the language of their immigrant grandparents. Much of the immigrant experience would be denied, erased and misinterpreted in this process. Much of *Italianita* would have been lost had not the "Roots" phenomenon of the late 1970s entered the consciousness of young Italian Americans. 1976 was the year of the American Bicentennial, a year in which the examination of the American cultural conscience was in vogue. Black writer Alex Hailey, published *Roots*, a non-fictional account of his search for his African ancestors. Hailey's work had repercussions throughout America, prompting Americans of all ethnic backgrounds to search for their own roots. *Roots* drew its share of imitators; epic novels such as Howard Fast's *The Immigrants* rose to new heights on bestseller lists. Italian American writers such as Helen Barolini made sure that the Italian story was included.

Barolini's *Umbertina* tells the story of three generations of Italian American women: the immigrant grandmother, the American mother, and the identity seeking third generation daughter. This epic novel reveals, for the first time, the plight of the immigrant through the women's eyes. This novel gives us in true fiction, what previous writers could only give us through an autobiographical, episodic perspective. In an important essay. Barolini explains how she, a child of immigrants, came upon this distanced perspective. "I had to make the long journey to Italy, to see where and what I came from, to gain an ultimate understanding and acceptance of being American with particularly shadings of '*Italianita*.' To say that I was at odds with the dominant American culture is an understatement. It is the essence of a lifelong psychological conflict."

Today's Italian American writers are presented with greater economic, educational, and social opportunities than their predecessors. Thus they are in position to become makers and shapers of American culture. They also come to the task of writing with a greater knowledge of the world outside their ethnicity. Born into a more economically secure, and by immigrant standards a more "American" home, third generation Italian American writers were able to pursue the education that was often considered a luxury by earlier generations. Many of these younger writers were the first in their families to attend college. As a group, they would be the first equipped with academic skills that would enable them to take a more intellectual approach to the literary arts. In almost every case, academic literary study preceded publication of their first works of fiction. These advantages place them in better positions to examine their cultural makeup, to use it in telling their stories, and to redefine what it means to be Italian American.

Today, we can see that "*italianità*" is a fluid concept, one that is redefined each time an artist addresses it in his or her work, each time an American chooses to relate to his or her ancestral heritage. Until we come to terms with what Italian Americaness means to us, we cannot become good Americans. To deny or distort a part is to tamper with the whole; we must encourage a diversity within our notion of *italianità*, just as we must embrace the diversity that defines America and Italy. Teachers of Italian need to build off the natural curiosity that lies, often dormant, in students of Italian ancestry. They must feed the hunger they might not even know they have, to know about the culture which, often in silence, they have inherited. Once the student's identity is connected to the language, the students will begin to teach themselves and continue the process of

redefining themselves as Americans of Italian descent. Until this is realized, we will not be able to see that to make eggplant Parmesan you have to break eggs and slice eggplants. Now while this may seem to be a daunting task to undertake as an individual, it is quite easily accomplished through existing organizations. Italians are notorious for not joining public groups, but this is a legacy left over from a political system that did all it could to alienate peasants. We must learn the lesson in America that in order to get things done we need to work in numbers, together in groups that are dedicated to the survival of the Italian language, the Italian spirit and the Italian way of life. This is the only way an Italian American identity will mean something more than the past.

I believe that the future of Italian American culture is in educational institutions and that the future of American education is in the streets. By this I mean that the Italian American family can no longer bear the burden of keeping and passing on Italian culture. This also means that the educational institutions must look to the private sector to support areas like the arts and humanities that are not naturally fed by the economy. This makes Italian Americans and the educators vital partners in the development of the future American. Italian Americans, who have finally exceeded the average for achieving a higher education and are well seated in the middle and upper classes of American society, are in good position to foster the inclusion of their culture in all American institutions. The need for that inclusion has never been more necessary.

There are projects underway across the country to address these issues. The Italian American Cultural Foundation Inc., of Cleveland, Ohio, is a not-for-profit corporation that purchases books by and about Italian/Americans and donates them to high school and college libraries. Students are encouraged to read a book and respond with book reports or essays. The IACF has also recently raised the funds to endow a program in Italian American Studies at John Carroll University in the name of Cleveland's Archbishop Pilla. UNICO has successfully initiated programs that helped to raise endowments for chairs in Italian history at the University of Connecticut, Seton Hall and with the help of OSIA at California State University at Long Beach. Now they have directed their efforts to help secure the first privately endowed chair in Italian American studies at Stony Brook University where there is the Center for Italian Studies and a full-fledged program in Italian American studies that will develop archives both to preserve what we know and create new knowledge.

As director of Italian American studies, I teach courses both in the European and American studies programs. One course, "American Identities" has as a goal for each student to understand the history of the creation and recreation of American identities and to see themselves in the process of fashioning their own identity. Many are first- or second-generation immigrants who need to see and consume a multiplicity of narratives so that they can imagine beyond the narrow confines of the local into the vast horizons of the global; the goal of this interaction is the creation of the glocal identity.

Within Italian American culture a glocal identity must be understood in terms of race: coming to terms with whiteness and the privileges awarded those who adopt and maintain racist thinking; of gender: understanding contemporary and historical power relationships between men and women; of lifestyle: coming to terms with various sexualities; of religion: how different religions came to be practiced in the United States; of class: understanding the economic system and their place in it. We must all understand how these elements condition behavior and identity. The ultimate goal is to create a self-knowledge based on self-study that will then prepare us for another study and other knowledge. The transmission of anyone's heritage is more and more being controlled by institutions; artistic, educational, economic, political and religious institutions have replaced the family as the means of conveying cultural values. When we have learned this, and moved to insure that such institutions are sensitive to our Italian American identities and heritage, then we will begin to concentrate on the light that illumines and not the shadows that distort.

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THE ESSENCE OF ITALIAN CULTURE AND THE CHALLENGE OF THE GLOBAL AGE: ITALIAN CULTURAL IDENTITY AND MIGRATION

MICHAEL BARONE

The subject assigned for this talk—Italian cultural identity and migration to the United States—presents some difficulty. Of course some of the Italian immigrants to America were people of great culture. They included intellectuals of great renown with wide-ranging knowledge of culture. But the great mass of Italian immigrants were men and women who had relatively little contact with high culture. The large majority of Italian immigrants to the United States came between the years of 1890 and 1914. About 90 percent of them were from southern Italy which 30 years before 1890 were not part of Italy at all, but part of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. Some came from the great cities of Napoli and Palermo, but the great majority were paisani, from small villages, people who spoke in dialect—Napolitano, Calabrese, Siciliano, Pugliese—rather than Tuscan Italian.

The culture they brought with them was not so much the high culture of Dante or Michelangelo, but the village culture of the region or village from which they came. Still, that culture was vibrant, and contained elements of genius. The Italian eye—the visual acuity that somehow, inarticulately, understood the harmonious proportions of visual art—was part of their heritage. We can see it in the vernacular architecture of the Italian village in which the proportions of the structure and the grace with which it fills its allotted space shows an inarticulate appreciation of the aesthetic principles which govern the buildings of Rome and of Palladio: somehow everything is just right. In America the Italians lived in neighborhoods where the buildings were not of their own design, and the exterior landscapes of the Little Italies of New York and Chicago and Cleveland and Boston did not necessarily show this aesthetic principle. But the interiors of these structures did, at least as Italian-Americans achieved enough affluence to redesign them and build them anew. To those fortunate enough to enter the Italian brownstone house or restaurant, the unprepossessing exterior yielded, to beautiful paneling and marble work worthy of the classical and Renaissance Italian heritage. As Nathan Glazer notes in his chapter on the Italians in *Beyond the Melting Pot*, there is never a lack of men with talent for carpentry or craftsmanship in an Italian neighborhood.

The Little Italies today have become mostly depopulated; yet this tradition lives on, quietly and anonymously in the suburbs. It is in the work of leading interior designers of Italian descent, whose work is sought after by the most affluent and fashionable members of American society.

Another tradition the Italian immigrants brought with them was tailoring. The story is best told by Gay Talese, whose parents were immigrants from Calabria and who set up a clothing store in the Presbyterian precincts of Ocean City, New Jersey. Talese tells the story of his grandparents' tailoring work in Calabria, in which in one instance a nephew-apprentice made a bad cut and destroyed the fine cloth for a pair of suit pants for a local grandee apparently involved in organized crime. The uncle managed to convince the client that the fashion in Paris was for pants with a horizontal cut stitched up in the middle of the leg—hoping nervously that the man was not well enough acquainted with high fashion to know that the story was a fabrication. In Ocean City his father tailored men's suits and his mother designed and sold dresses of the highest style in a town which was a summer beach resort. Though their shop was just a block from the beach, he never saw either parent in a bathing suit or with sand in their toes. Talese himself, after a brilliant career in journalism and as an author, is always impeccably dressed in suits of a distinctive and stylish cut. The tradition of Italian tailoring and of appreciation for clothes designed and crafted with aesthetic flair, is by no means universal in America; yet it has affected and enhanced the national style.

Then there was the opera. Italian immigrants, with very little money and spending most of their hours working, often at low-wage manual labor, nevertheless often had a fine appreciation and intimate knowledge of the operas of Verdi and Puccini. They did not necessarily form a large part of the audience in America's opera houses—they did not have the money to be able to afford seats at the Metropolitan Opera as impecunious Italians did at La Scala. But they did sometimes attend, and with the development of recordings and broadcast media, they became prime and discerning audiences for the early records of Enrico Caruso and the Saturday radio broadcasts of the Metropolitan Opera.

Their children in turn built on this musical heritage and created some of the finest American musical popular culture. Starting in the 1930s, Italian-American crooners became enormously successful popular singers. The prime example, of course, is Frank Sinatra, but there were many others—Vic Damone, Perry Como, Tony Bennett, whose career continues today. Their first efforts were of the nature of Elvis Presley's: Sinatra was a heartthrob of teenage girls, who screamed in ecstacy as he entered a performance venue or when he sang. But their careers were longlasting and their abilities far transcended the genre of teenage music. Their sensitive rendition of both melody and lyric, their exploration of the gamut of emotions from joy to despair, from celebration to lament—created a popular culture of high quality, and one which would not have existed in this country without their presence,

In food, the Italian immigrants, from the south of Italy, did not bring with them the great cuisines of the Italian north—the cotoletta milanese, bistecca fiorentina, pesto genovese. They cooked with olive oil, not butter, and could usually afford a lot of pasta but not very much meat. But cocina italiana became, in time, standard American food. Spaghetti with meatballs, with tomato sauce or ragu, was established as a common American food, by the 1930s. The pizza—an exotic, unusual food when I was growing up Detroit in the 1950s—became a staple of American life by the 1970s; more than any other it is the food of American children today. The principles of Italian cooking are not always followed: in Italy the portions of each course are small, restrained; while American restaurants may advertise "all the pasta you can eat." But the culinary consequences of Italian Americans cannot be overestimated. American food is increasingly Italian-influenced; one can even find in major and minor metropolitan areas, supermarkets with authentic Italian ingredients and Italian restaurants that would pass muster in Italy itself.

Politics and religion were the subject of much of my chapter on Italians in *The New Americans: How the Melting Pot Can Work Again*. Politics was not a central preoccupation of Italian immigrants to the United States. In the Italy of the years around 1890 and 1900, politics was primarily a matter for the elites, particularly in southern Italy. Italian men could vote, but typically they voted for local notables whose political success was a reflection of their prominence in the local community—they were large landowners, proprietors of the few local businesses, ancestral scions who took deference as their due. Of course these things were changing as we learn how in Tomasi di Lampedusa's *The Leopard*. But the habits of mind that Italian immigrants brought from Italy did not necessarily reflect these changes. In the great cities of the United States to which virtually all immigrants migrated politics was dominated by political machines—some run by Yankee Protestants, most by Irish Americans who did not willingly enlist immigrants from other countries in their ranks. In some places the Italian vote was targeted by opportunistic machines, but by no means always. Italian immigrants, unlike the Irish then or blacks today, did not vote overwhelming for either major American party. Their political preference was affected by where they came from in Italy and by the political situation in the city where they settled. There was some sentimental attachment to Italy: many Italian Americans looked with favor on Mussolini in the 1930s—though almost none did after December 7, 1941— and many Italian voters resented Franklin Roosevelt's comment in June 1940, after Italy invaded France, that the hand that held the dagger has stabbed his neighbor. But that was more a resentment of the Italian-American criminal stereotype than an endorsement of Mussolini's regime.

A similar pattern obtains with respect to religion. As Glazer pointed out, Italian immigrants were not uniformly Catholic. Many were affected by the anticlericalism which was the policy of the leading parties in the Kingdom of Italy in the years around 1890 and 1900, and the Church, like other institutions, was often deeply distrusted. Adherence to strict Catholicism grew stronger among the second and third generations of Italian-Americans than it was among the first. Moreover, the Catholicism that did prevail was more about the traditions of village and city saints—the various San Gennaros—than it was about technical Catholic doctrine; more about figures like Padre Pio (who lived some of his early years in the United States) than about Popes Pius IX, Leo XIII and Pius X. In addition, the Irish dominated the Catholic hierarchy in the United States just as they dominated the urban machines of the Democratic party. The first Italian American bishop was not appointed until 1954.

My point is that the Italian cultural influence in America is largely not the product of high Italian culture, but the product of the vernacular. The Italian immigrants who came to the United States between 1890 and 1914 and between 1918 and 1924, when American immigration laws largely shut the flow of migration off, were mostly southern Italians. Like most immigrants from Latin America today, they came from a society with very low levels of trust in institutions. Italian immigrants did not trust the government, or businesses, or labor unions, or the church, or any other institution; they trusted only in their families and hard work. They did not see their salvation in politics or government—rather, they saw government and politics as something to be avoided; the intelligent position was to keep your head down, to keep quiet, to escape notice by the people who ran the major institutions of society. The Italian immigrants did not trust the schools, either; like today's Latino immigrants, their children tended to leave school early, and to seek jobs in the private sector—even in the unregulated, black economy—so they could help support their families and, after that, to work their way up if possible. They left little imprint on the institutions of high culture in America.

But the vernacular culture, in the United States as in Italy, had its own great strengths and has had its own notable achievements. The Italian immigrants recognized the claims of the higher culture early on. Glazer, in *Beyond the Melting Pot*, notes the tendency of Italian communities to erect statues in memory of great Italians—statues of Dante and Michelangelo, Puccini and Verdi, Mazzini and Garibaldi, and of course, more than anyone else, of Christopher Colombus. They came to know, early on, that for all the modesty of their claims for Italian vernacular culture, they were also heirs to a higher culture that had contributed massively to European and American civilization. Their own personal knowledge of, and connection to, these cultural icons was limited—except for the opera. The connection of their children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren to these cultural traditions is often attenuated indeed, if not nonexistent. And their connection to the high culture of Italy today—to the literature of Italo Calvino or Umberto Eco (despite his one bestselling book), to the design culture of Milano or Firenze—is no greater than that of Americans generally, which is to say not very much.

And yet in many ways America today—with all its strengths, all its resiliency, all its creativity—is in important ways a country in which the Italian vernacular culture has made a visible, enduring and vital imprint. It would not be the same country, it would not be as rich and as vibrant, without the contributions the Italian immigrants and their offspring have made over the last century and a few years. This Italian contribution is not alone: the contributions of Eastern European Jews, of Poles and Germans, of Irish and Scandinavians, of today's Latino and Asian immigrants, have also played a part in making America what it is today. But the Italian contribution should not be forgotten. I would venture to say that it is not forgotten, though it is not often articulated in America today. As Italian-Americans increasingly populate the highest levels of American society—in politics and in business, in popular culture and high culture, in great institutions from labor unions to the Catholic Church—the Italian-American cultural influence increasingly permeates American society, even as it becomes less of an identifying characteristic of individual Italian-Americans themselves. There is not a complete or entirely satisfying fit here between the vernacular contributions of Italian-Americans and the high culture of Italians in Italy. Yet there is some relation, some commonalty, which needs to be recognized, respected and remembered.

CHAPTER VII

THE MAKING OF IDENTITY IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD:

AN OVERVIEW OF THE ITALIAN-AMERICAN BUSINESS COMMUNITY

CONSUELO CORRADI

INTRODUCTION

For all of us modernity turns even the smallest choices and the most fundamental values into "risky freedoms".[1] On the one hand, individualization means dissolution of pre-established forms of social life. On the other, we wonder which are the ways of life that emerge when the former ones, established by the old tradition or the State, fall into pieces. The dissolution of known styles of life does not entail a social void, but, if anything, "exceeding fullness". The options that modern subjects have at their disposal are many, and the distinguishing characteristic of this situation is that the subjects have to learn to incorporate this "exceeding fullness" into their biographies. At times, exceeding fullness can be perceived as chaotic and menacing, but it can also be perceived as a rich opportunity for personal mobility and enhancement.

In these pages I sketch a portrait of the Italian-American global business community. I see it as one interesting starting point for a renewed understanding of the making of identity in modernity, i.e., in the context of the unprecedented combination of greatness and danger which caracterizes our globalizing world. There is a wealth of sociological and philosophical literature dealing with the subject of modern identity. This literature seemingly draws two different patterns: on the one hand, we are presently climbing to a higher level of social integration, a higher level of social life as opposed to mid-1900s, on the other hand, societies are now declining. Losing and forgetting important features they are threatened by social disintegration.

I am myself dissatisfied with both of these views. Sociologists – I believe – still have to come to grips with and capture the unique combination of greatness and danger, individualization and new community bonds, single-mindedness and ambiguity, which caracterizes modern age individuals, or better. A growing number of social actors acquire in modernity a sense of oneself as a being with inner depths, as well as being in the context of enormously growing possibilities of risk and freedom. Italian-American entrepreneurs are a very good example of this.

There is another important reason why a portrait of the Italian-American global business community makes an interesting point for the making of identity in modernity. As Charles Taylor has put it,

There is a question about ourselves – which we roughly gesture at with the term

'identity' - which cannot be sufficiently answered with any general doctrine of human nature. The search for identity can be seen as the search for what I essentially am. But this can no longer be sufficiently defined in terms of some universal description of human agency as such, as soul, reason, or will. There still remains a question about me, and that is why I think of myself as a self. This word now circumscribes an area of questioning. It designates the kind of being of which this question of identity can be asked.[2]

The Italian-American business community is made of entrepreneurs, who are restless and mobile individuals, active in a globalizing world. As I will try to show in the following pages, speaking to them, listening to their experiences and perceptions of the economic and social context in which they live and to which they relate gives us rich access to identity. This is privileged, not because it defines identity once and for all, or because it applies a better and more accurate universal description of human agency, but merely because we are thus invited to listen to them to comprehend their ways thinking and see them as selves.

Hence, my stronger claim is that in order better to understand globalization and the Italian contribution to it as an instance of modernity, we must go back to the words, lives and experiences of concrete, ordinary people.

THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY

I have followed the development of the Italian business community with great curiosity, passion and scientific interest. This interest was originally stimulated by a research that the Association of the Italian Chambers of Commerce in the world commissioned, in 1990 with the University of Rome in which I was engaged. The research used an explorative approach to investigate the characteristics of an emerging global community.[3] *Global*, in this context, meant that the business community crossed over various identities, different national territories and several economic spaces, all of which were relevant to its action. *Emerging* referred to the fact that, as we would later verify, although the business community wasn't conscious of behaving like a community, it already had all the characteristics. Since then, I have constantly monitored this subject.[4]

By "Italian global business community" I refer to the body of companies and entrepreneurs who operate in different countries while maintaining constant connections with Italy. Piero Bassetti has defined it as Italicity[5], meaning a wide group of people who identifies with the values and lifestyles directly related to Italy: "a millenary culture, a lifestyle targeted to quality, a taste for beauty in its uniqueness, the predilection for values of peace rather than war, and an innate charm, because unlike other people, Italians don`t consider foreigners as enemies, but interact with them in such a way that facilitates communication".[6]

In the context of this paper, I will deal only with the Italian-American business community, i.e. the group of entrepreneurs that live and work in the USA and Canada. This is not a homogeneous group, and is made up of different types of companies and entrepreneurs. In a few words, we can identify four basic types:

1.   The "ethnic" entrepreneur, who is born in, and closely linked to the Italian-American community.

2.   The "modernizing" entrepreneur, who in spite of being born within (and belonging to) the community, follows an economic and a social model which we could define as globalizing.

3.   The Italian citizen who moved abroad.

4.   The American citizen who does business with Italy.

Each type is characterized by particular traits, and the first two types include some interesting sub-types. The entrepreneurship of the Italian Diaspora has risen to such levels of social integration that it can no longer be considered "ethnic" in an old-fashioned sense. In the context of this paper, ethnic acquires the new meaning of rooted, as opposed to disembodied or "indipendent" of any particular place or region[7]. Here I will use the most general meaning of the expression "Italian-American business community". All the excerpts are taken from interviews with Italian-American entrepreneurs.[8]

MAIN CHARACTERISTICS

The expression "business community" is in fact a paradox, as it juxtaposes a "cold" element (business) and a "warm" one (community). Thus, economic exchange can be described as a network of vertical lines (indicating rationality, i.e., attention to profits and meticulous calculation of costs and advantages), and horizontal lines (indicating values, i.e., attention to all those mutual relationships among individuals who share a strong sense of belonging to the same place or group). Two examples of this intertwining of cold and warm lines follow:

1) T. M., majority shareholder of an important company for technical servicing of agricultural and industrial machinery on the East Coast, says: "The beginning of my love-story with Fiat was quite accidental. In Boston there weren't many Fiats, and everybody used to call them "Fixit It Again, Tony" because the machines used to break down quite often. My name is Tony. Consequently, people at the workshop where I worked at the time, used to say 'Well, now Tony is here, he can fix the machines'. I took this joke quite seriously. I understood that there was a real need, and I began to study in the evenings in order to understand how these Fiats were built and which were the most common faults. So, after a while, I could fix Fiats for a third of the price. This is how it all began".[9]

2) M.P. is a businesswoman who was born in Italy and moved to America with her parents when she was only a few months old. She and her sister are the owners of two metallurgical establishments. When she had to buy new machinery for the production of iron rings, she compared an Italian company with a German firm. Finally, she chose the Italian product, mainly because, being already familiar with the culture and the language of our country, she found the contacts much easier. "When we deal with Italians, it is easy to understand each other – she says – we speak the same language, we come from the same country, we share a Latin origin".

What we have here, then, are two examples of a network consisting of the cold dimension of "business" and the warm dimension of "community". In the first example, it seems as if it is the community that enables the future entrepreneur to identify a market need, as well as his ability to satisfy it. In the second example, the community becomes an informal network of contacts and a privileged channel for reaching the market. These cold and warm lines intertwine. Warm lines do not disappear in the globalizing world, but on the contrary are reinforced.

The business community is a *societas,* that is to say a free association of individuals deprived not only of the State's presence, but also of a specific territory. However, although it is without an organized hierarchy and is rather dispersed, its identity can be considered neither uncertain nor weak. The business community is not a "steady and factual reality", but, rather, a project, and this is what, as we shall see, determines its identity**.** By saying that the business community is dispersed, I mean that it does not originate from a particular territory, although it obviously belongs to many. The manipulation of various symbols such as money, professional specialization, the label *made in Italy* and so on, therefore helps the construction of identity as a project. As a consequence, it facilitates its re-introduction in those socio-economic spaces within which it can recognize itself.

VALUES AND INTERESTS OF THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY

From a theoretical perspective, I find the distinction between values and interests unsatisfying; it has lost its heuristic power. However, I will not go deeper into this, but will list some of the fundamental values/interests which act as the fuel, and sometimes the glue, of the Italian global business community.

Beauty and Good Taste

The taste for beautiful things guides the entrepreneur. He or she believes that customers buy Italian products because they are more beautiful, made with greater care and better refined. The Italian way of life, which distinguishes Italian people from the rest of the world, is actually determined by good taste and by an harmonious approach to life. In some cases, the entrepreneur buys an Italian machine (and not, for example, a German one), because it is more beautiful: "It was better made, more beautiful, the seat was more comfortable and it wasn't made of some horrible plastic, but of fabric".

This is how the owner of one of the largest Italian restaurants in Chicago, that developed into a successful catering and entertaining business, understands his mission: "My lasagna is better than other people's lasagna, but also, "I have fun while I eat your lasagna"... This is not a small-sized, fashionable restaurant, high class cuisine. I don't think this is Italy. In Italy everything must be happy and must have a touch of bonanza. And bonanza doesn't make you feel bad."[10]

The Family

For every entrepreneur the family really is a fundamental element. Very often, the family is, or has been, the first economic resource of the entrepreneur. When the company was born, the entrepreneur`s wife and his children started working in it, even if that implied making huge sacrifices. More often than not, the children carry on their father's business, thus making the company less ethnic and more globalizing. Only the loyalty towards the family is as intense as the attention to profit. As one interviewee clearly stated, "I went to work in my father's restaurant because I loved my father, I really loved him. I believe in love, it is really basic. There is nothing cleaner than mother and son, father and son. There is no egotism, it's there."

Family relations that are above and beyond profit and economic interest can also explain the extraordinary capabilities for strain and success of the Italian global entrepreneurs. They are not alone but are emotionally supported; they can face risk and strain for, in any case, they can always count on unconditional acceptance by their family. "Italian people can do whatever they want because they can always go back to their families".[11]

What is Deeply Symbolic, then, is also Deeply Commercial

"*Italy sells well*." The Italian business community is founded specifically on the ability to transform a rich symbolic heritage into a strategic economic resource simply by manipulating it with great skill: the old recipe for homemade bread, the "Mamma Rosa" cake, Fiat, etc. can (and have) become, with time, small economic empires.

And what is symbolically Italian? This is the implicit answer of one interviewee: "At home everything is Italian. . . . No, not the electronic appliances or things like that, those are things that are very well done by Americans and Germans, no, I mean good taste things, things that give pleasure to life, like furniture, sofas, curtains**. . . . L**ook at this curtain fabric, you can't find this in America. . . . The sofa, even the pans have a different style, Italian design this is what they call it here. The more personal things are, the more they are Italian."[12]

The Strong Relationship between Interests and Community

The Italian community often "creates" both the entrepreneur and his/her skills; the latter are never imported from outside, but are born within the network of primary and secondary relationships the entrepreneur establishes with his/her context. The community is also, and quite fundamentally, the market-reference of the business community which over a certain period of time (namely from one generation to the other), becomes a global community.

"At the beginning our clients were the people who were coming from Italy. These people used to eat a lot of bread. They were used to eating bread with anything. It was normal to go to a house and deliver 6 or 8 loaves of bread 2 pounds each. We delivered two to three times a week. Families were larger and there were more people eating at home. It was easy, we knew exactly how much bread we needed for the following day, so we made it and delivered it. We began by delivering bread in the trunk of a Chevy '56, and then we grew. We had four vans that visited all the neighbourhoods. We went to Roselan, there was an Italian community there... We went to Blue

Island, Highwood and Highland Park, they were all Italian communties. We chose places where we thought there were people coming from Italy, who were still all grouped together: Chicago, Noridge, Cicero and Berwyn... So these were the places where we concentrated".[13]

The Weak Relationship with National Identity

Contrary to other Diasporas, the Italian one didn't coincide with the scattering of an entire nation, but rather with the dispersion of local communities. It was in fact the natives of Sicily, Veneto, Piedmont, etc. who emigrated, not "the Italians". This is demonstrated also by the fact that the Italian business community is organized on the basis of local communities: the "Sons of Sicily", the "Calabrians of America", the "Natives of Veneto in the World". Let us listen to the words of one interviewee: "Italy?... We tought about it very often, but it was something quite mysterious, for me it was only Naples that was farther and farther from the boat, and at the end you could only see the Vesuvio, so a strip of land, something lost but, how can I say it? not very concrete. Our town was concrete, our godfather and our relatives were concrete, Italy not really".[14]

Furthermore, as one of our interviewees stated very clearly, "he who does serious business does not belong to any particular country". Or – as another interviewee put it – "no place is too far if there is business, no place is too close is there is none". Consequently, the already weak sense of Italian national identity is made even weaker by the loyalty to profit.

Real or Hoped-for Italy

The economic sector of the Italian Diaspora can refuse to recognize itself as part of a "nation", but it would never avoid acknowledging a common origin, as it would never refrain itself from considering Italy as its emotional, economic and symbolic referent. Emotionally speaking, i.e., when talking about their lived experiences and their memories, entrepreneurs replicate the same mixture of contradictory attitudes which characterize many emigrants. They hover between idealization and devaluation, nostalgia and refusal, memory and repression, love and resentment.

Italy is "the most beautiful country in the world", "I am proud of its great past, great heritage", "I was not born in Italy but I have memories as if I was really born there". Or, in the touching words of an entrepreneur who owns a medium-sized winery firm in Napa Valley: "We went away from Sulmona because we wanted to. . . . We didn't run away from it, it is just that, there, the land is like a milkless breast. Here in America, the land is generous and free. . . . I didn't want to speak Italian with my children. Only sometimes, at night, I like to play Verdi, the opera, and nobody, really nobody can disturb me. Sometimes I spend so much time that my son comes and says "Dad, what are you doing? That language really has a special sound for you." And then, I really don't understand, tears come to my eyes".[15]

Whatever the case, Italy always plays the part of an economically stable referent, a partner who is searched for and desired. "They used to tell me I had to expand, to launch out on a larger market . . . because I had the ability. . . . I thought about it and considered the possibility on paper. . . . Then I said 'No. I sell Italian products to people who still have Italy in their hearts. . . . I make dresses and shirts the Italian way. . . . I import Italian cheese and Italian wines from the Southern

Italian regions…because there are many people from Calabria and Abruzzo. . . . Of course, I can sell my products to other people as well, to Americans. Last Christmas, I delivered almost 60 thousand packs of mixed Italian products, and at least half of those were delivered to the American and Irish neighborhoods. . . . But I live and sell in the local Italian community. . . . I am happy with this…with four good, modern companies. . . ."[16]

Individualism

Entrepreneurs are individuals in the strongest sense of this concept. As such they are characterized by their ability to decide, their tendency to risk, the possibility they have of making different choices, a great enthusiasm for new projects, together with selfishness and discipline. "For me, the single, most extraordinary feature in business . . . really is the ability of fast decision-making. If you interview 20 managers and ask each of them "Are you able to take a tough decision", they will all say "Yes, of course", then you look at their faces and know that their interpretation of this ability is very limited. For instance, I worked for a man who used to say "Give me all the facts, and I will make a decision". Well, why the hell would you need him, if you have all the facts? Decision comes by itself. . . . When I try to understand why I am not afraid of taking tough decision, and why I take them, and why they are fast, well, I do believe that every time an employee comes into my office with one problem, I owe him an answer. If I let him go without an answer, well it means he doesn't need me".[17]

Every entrepreneur underlines the Italians' tendency to anarchy, their constant inclination to assume the role of *free riders*, free from any obligation and community encumbrance. The rule is "among Italians, every man for himself, and God for us all".

A Core of Localism within a Global Vision

To remain, quite concretely, within the boundaries of a local environment, is the entrepreneur`s "cognitive cunning". He/she thus achieves an efficient economic action. This cleverness plays two fundamental roles. On the one hand, it maintains the tension between the two discontinuous levels of "globalization" and "localism" (to which correspond the related paradigms of "modernization" and "tradition"). On the other, the concretely lived experiences of the local environment, its warm emotional dimension and face-to-face relationships, and the (at times denied) involvement of the economic actor with the community – prevent the entrepreneur from falling prey to the same inflexible model of procedural rationality, which sometimes seems to distinguish globalization.

Such abstract rationality is, in fact, only apparent. By remaining within a local environment, the entrepreneur is able to maintain his/her flexibility, and he/she is able to make decisions in very difficult situations, relaying not only on rationality but also on intuition. As one of the people we interviewed beautifully put it, "Whenever there's a difficult decision to be made in the company, I never make it rationally, with a business plan at hand and a consultant sitting next to me, but I guess. I guess because my roots are strong".

Localism, embeddedness into an ethnic community can enhance "economic rationality". Here, again, is a paradox of italicity. As one entrepreneur living in Toronto beautifully put it:

"My company has offices in nine countries, and contacts in more than 20. . . . My employees from the different offices in the States come to see me, I look at their faces, they try to hide their surprise but I can see it. . . . It's my office, it's so small, you see, the furniture is old, . . . the couch you sit on is uncomfortable, some springs are broken. . . . And also, this building is not at the right address, like . . . the business district . . . near the Fair, it is still in the Italian neighbourhood. . . . I laugh when I see their surprise. I don't say anything, but I can say it to you. This is the office I stay in ever since I began, and my father was next door. . . . This is where we began. . . . Caffè Italia at the corner is just the same. . . . Many things have disappeared, the neighbourhood is changing, and even Englishmen come to live here . . . . But I find the smells, I don't know, some things that are in the air or in front of my eyes and, how can I say it?, they make me rest. . . . This is a hideaway, and I will go on staying here. . . . You see, tomorrow I will be in Chicago and the day after tomorrow in Los Angeles, but just thinking that my office is here and that I will come back to it, is something that helps me. . . . On Saturdays and Sundays I don't want to go away. . . . I take a walk in the streets and I feel good".[18]

Or, in the funny words of another entrepreneur: "Ethnic community is like parmesan cheese on tagliatelle. . . . You can always not have it. . . . Now my clients live in a great number of North American cities, . . . but if you don't have it is worse, it doesn't taste as good"[19]

The Denial of the Community

Because of the absence of public and civic participation and loyalty, entrepreneurs tend to deny the existence of a manifest Italian business community (understood as their privileged and primary circuit of action). The internal contacts which develop horizontally within the Italian-American community are in fact presented in a fairly reductive way. And yet, the same business people who deny the community, admit that among "Italian people" one feels very rapidly at ease. There are no misunderstandings, but a sort of agreement determined by the same way of approaching problems, the same ability to adapt to different situations, the same flexibility, the same taste for the risks and the pleasures entailed by every human relationship.

"A community among us entrepreneurs, is that what you mean? Well maybe cooperation, maybe for a project which is too large for only one of us. . . . But this never happens, we are all so individualitic here in Philadelphia. . . . Maybe solidarity, if somebody has a problem and other people in the same field think that they too could be bound for the same risk, then we have solidarity . . . here, among us who know each other from childhood. . . . With other people is much more difficult."[20]

"No, among Italians, everybody for himself and God for all, and God must have a lot of work . . . Irish, Germans, Koreans, they really are united, they move as a block, we are not able to do that: work, our family, and that's all"[21]

The Refusal of Efficiency and Standardization

Italian entrepreneurs define themselves as outgoing, capable of understanding intuitively some fundamental aspects of their customers, co-workers, possible partners etc. This "Italian spirit" is identified by many entrepreneurs as a fundamental aspect of a supposed "national character;" quite

often it is really a project, and not a natural given. For example, when the entrepreneur still occupies a marginal position in the local society, he/she learns to use this Italian spirit to cope with risky and complex situations in which rationality and dominance are not at hand. "We are the greatest of all; we should not say this aloud . . . but we are the greatest. . . . Nobody can beat an Italian entrepreneur. We are creative, practical, astute; we are fast in letting go, but we are also very determined and other people don't expect this. I think we are fastest, we immediately see things as they are. . . . They talk, calculate; we use intuition. Besides, we know people, we can "feel" them at first glance and we are seldom wrong".[22]

IDENTITY

The construction of identity relates to the constitutive symbols and the unifying and collective representations of a social system. This corresponds not necessarily to the material conditions of life of a social system, but to its own representation of itself as a cohesive whole. On a personal level, the making of identity is a question about ourselves. It is, simply, what I think of myself as a self.

Under what conditions is the making of identity a successful project? Or, better, under what conditions does it give rise to strong, independent, rooted, organized and self-centered individuals who are able to navigate in our globalizing world and make the most of it for themselves? When is it that individuals do not feel menaced by globalization but, on the contrary, have the ability to face risk and overcome it? What is the specific contribution of Italian culture to this?

Summarizing what we have seen so far, then, we can say that for the Italian global business community, identity is constituted by:

a. A group of ethnic (as opposed to Nation-State) characteristics: the Italian and Italian-American stereotype, the Italian spirit.
b. A group of cultural and social characteristics according to which the larger community is organized.
c. A group of interests, stronger and, in my view, much more binding than values, which often are prescriptive and work as a unifying force within the community.
d. A double national reference: it can be strong or weak, real or presumed, factual or simply planned. Occasionally, it leads to a feeling of permanent division ("I am not a resident, I am only passing by, I have been passing by for 40 years now"), but more often than not it is experienced as a further resource on which the individual can rely according to the necessity and the convenience of the moment ("I am proud of my Italian heritage").

The sense of identity is reached thanks to a fairly unstable balance between total dispersion and an extremely strong sense of "Us". A global community is capable of maintaining the sense of belonging to an original group thanks to a paradox: a "double belonging" and the spatial distance which characterizes it. As we have seen above, the Italian business community is characterized by a multiple register which can become contradictory and, occasionally, openly conflictual, but never in an aggressive or violent way. The register can therefore range from the sense of belonging to the community to its denial, from the emphasis posited onto the individual to the acknowledgment of a strategic "Us", from the exaltation of the family to the acceptance of the individual's total

responsibility, from love for Italy to resentment.

As a conclusion, I would like to summarize the main traits that, in my view, make this possible, i.e., help the construction of a vital, symbolic, locally rooted community within the process of globalisation. We have seen traits in the words of our interviewees, and how they speak about themselves. These traits are:

1. Strong ethnic or regional, as opposed to Nation-State, roots.
2. Double national loyalty at the level of social and cultural, not political, life.
3. Denial of community, which is matched by an active reinforcement of community.
4. Definition of oneself as a self-centered individual. Member of, not a group, but at most a family.
5. Unresolved tension between global/local, cold/warm, modern/traditional perspectives in almost every aspect of life.
6. Perception of this tension, not as a permanent source of conflict, but as a rich, symbolic source of economic opportunity.
7. Ability to reduce reality's complexity through the exercise of risk.
8. Ability to transform a rich symbolic heritage into a strategic economic resource.
9. Tendency to perceive reality through the singular, the unique, as opposed to abstracts concepts.

This is the paradigmatic value that the business community has for the study of Italian culture and values in a globalized world. The business community is, so to speak, a fiction which allows a strong sense of "Us" in a world which tends to the individualization of the ways of life. But there is a lot of truth and passion in this fiction! There is a lot of energy which is used to deny it and, simultaneously, to keep it alive!

The entrepreneur belonging to the Italian-American business community constructs his/her identity as a project. He/she constantly moves between different levels (local/global), opposed loyalties (community/profit), and split nationalities (USA/Italy). The sense of the community is intermittent, as it goes on and off according to necessity and the (always economic, occasionally social) convenience dictated by the circumstances. Global identity is a dynamic process, a permanent tension which is never solved. It is an incessant and exhausting work, and it corresponds to the risky assertion of freedom.

It would be very interesting to compare this Italian-American business community model with other economic global models, based on ethnic or Nation-State identity. Are they also based on paradoxes, double loyalties, global-local dynamics? Or, rather, are they organized by rationality and domination, prestige and power?

But this, of course, would be the aim of a different paper.

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[1] Ulrick Beck, *I rischi della libertà. L'individuo nell'epoca della globalizzazione* (Bologna, Il Mulino, 1997).

[2] Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), p. 184.

[3] Consuelo Corradi and Enrico Pozzi, *Il mondo in italiano. Gli italiani nel mondo tra diaspora, business community e nazione,* I quaderni di Impresa e Stato (Milano, 1995).

It is thought that there are 50-60 million Italics in the world. Even though we do not have satisfactory estimates regarding Italic entrepreneurship, it is worth remembering that our research considered, on the ground of all five continents, over 5,000 companies and 180 businesspeople, who were interviewed in North and South America. In 1995, the companies members of the Italian Chambers of Commerce in the world were 25,000. Today, they are more or less 30,000, with a critical mass of almost 200,000 contacts.

[4] Consuelo Corradi, "La business community italiana: dati e caratteristiche", *Affari sociali internazionali*, 2, 1997; and "La rete delle business communities italiane nel mondo: una risorsa strategica per il Paese", *Politica internazionale,* December 2001.

[5] Piero Bassetti, *Globals and locals! Fears and Hopes of the Second Modernity* (Lugano: Giampiero Casagrande Publisher, 2002), pp. 64-77.

[6] *Ibidem*, p. 66.

[7] Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity* (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1990), p. 19.

[8] Cf. C. Corradi and E. Pozzi*, Il mondo in italiano*.

[9] Cf. Corradi and Pozzi, *Il mondo in italiano*, p. 93.

[10] *Ibidem*, p. 140.

[11] *Ibidem*, p. 111.

[12] *Ibidem*, p. 182.

[13] *Ibidem,* p. 118.

[14] *Ibidem*, p. 136.

[15] *Ibidem*, p. 137.

[16] *Ibidem*, p. 167.

[17] *Ibidem*, p. 98.

[18] *Ibidem*, p. 160-161.

[19] *Ibidem*, p. 168.

[20] *Ibidem*, p. 132,

[21] *Ibidem*, p. 170.

[22] *Ibidem*, p. 104.

CHAPTER VIII

ITALIAN AMERICANS IN A PLURALISTIC AMERICA

JOHN KROMKOWSKI

The American urban crisis and violence experienced during the 1960s established a context from which the problematic of Italian and Italian-American cultures can be broached, and certain elementary findings presented and catalogued. Consideration of elementary findings are essential to a topic such as this because social realities are complexes of interactive phenomenon comprised of ideas, institutions and populations. Moreover, such complexes have a particular historicality as well as an ontological dimension; they are processes of participation in the mystery of human existence. This process of self and group articulation for the persons and groups of persons engaged in such complexes include the lived experience of meaning and/or the search for meaning as well as the explications of such complexes. The latter, at times, become the very ideas that in fact create, recreate and develop forms of consciousness and new institutional supports for the organization of social realities informed by such insights and explications.

Even the most rudimentary explication of *Italicity* within the American reality must include the powerful articulation of personal and group meanings and the new sense of cultural pluralism that erupted in this era. These eruptions within public action and consciousness persisted through the formation of institutions and practices related to these new symbolizations of order, collectively shared meaning and the emergent cultures rooted in a type of 'peoplehood' that may by a uniquely American socio-cultural phenomenon. This type of 'peoplehood' can be characterized by its situation in a large immigrant receiving country, by the variety of cultural traditions from which these immigrants arose, by the existence of conquered populations in addition to immigrants and by the large scale federal republican form of governance infused, in part, with an abstract form of universalism and legalism.

Historically in practice the regime's original restrictions on participation were quite limited. The regime was structured to assure outcomes that would be balanced by the division of powers. This was aided by its design as a mixed regime with sufficient powers and types of representative that in effect fostered the ongoing influences of liberalization caused by market forces and political democratization. The most ominous regime crisis, the civil war/war among the states, near the mid-point of the 19th century was a pivotal macro factor for the development of the regime[i] and for the historical grounding of the role of immigration, and *a fortiori* for the concept of *Italicity* within the American reality.

The post-civil war era of urbanization and industrialization and the cultivation of immigration as human capitalization strategy, primarily in the Northeast, Midwest and Far west, initiated a set of nationalizing dynamics as well as cultural contradictions. These related to the capacity and rapidity of these social forces to the imaginary expectation and transformative tasks of incorporating immigrants into the American reality.

This brief and elementary sketch of the precursory factors within the American experience is parallel to the development of the European Union and its agendas and expectations regarding the relationship between: spheres of governmental and social being, the cultural and meaning-bearing aspects of social realities and the diverse traditions of various forms of 'peoplehoods.' These are found both within and at the margins of the Europeanizational dynamics of markets, as well as in the rational action of consensual governance, the expectations of such a process, and the tasks required to achieve these goals.

Understanding and applying the concept *Italicity* to the American context can begin by reviewing the contemporary process of reconceptualizing and redefining American history found in the following

elementary periodization related to *Italicity.*

It is a truism that America is a land of immigrants. Some of these immigrant groups achieved great success quickly while others endured major difficulties at first, but have come to find the American dream of equality and prosperity. Still others have yet to achieve their dream in America.

One of the largest and most successful immigrant groups has been Italian Americans. They were here in small numbers during the periods of discovery and early nationalism. They began a great migration at the turn of this century. They experienced discrimination, but have achieved substantial success.

An examination of the history of Italian Americans will give us not only in depth understanding of the history of this single group, but also will help students to understand the role of ethnicity and heritage in American life. The following periodical outline and extensive bibliography provide a short and yet detailed pathway by which the exploration of the relationship, of ethnic and racial groups to each other and to the American goal of civic nationalism. This should be added to the body of insight and documentation expressing the Italo-American facet of Italian culture and *Italicity* as a world-wide phenomena. An even more extensive list of observations could be compiled if locally focused studies of neighborhood cultures were added to the bibliography. Comprehensive small scale studies and fine-grained analysis are particularly relevant to cultural studies. Such examinations of local realities for their experiences and for how they have been portrayed in American popular culture reveal the tension between the lived cultures and cultural artifices. These have been increasingly articulated in a variety of forums and modes of communications that transmitted the into the global. That is, the glocalization of ethnically and nationally rooted cultures as occurred which has occurred has provided new modalities of existence and new forces of human expression.

In this context an examination of American ethnicity is perhaps more important now than at any time. European integration and the expansion of market forces and communication capacities, as well as the search for deep insight into the bounding substances of human community and the ethical and social values embedded in cultures, suggest that such research may be related not only to tracing the ongoing presence of things Italian, but also to the wider matter of recovering the truths of human existence. This can articulate new findings associated with the stunning pluralism of cultures, the endemic problematic of respecting and understanding diversity, discovering fuller dimensions of the mystery of human imagination, and its social applications to the task of peaceful resolution of conflict and development of humankind in our time. In this respect, while America cultural and ethnic diversity have the power to help unite America, but they can also be divisive. The American experience suggest that each of us, from whatever heritage, needs to understand our own history and culture in order better to accept and celebrate the multiple heritages of America. Understanding *Ita/icity* requires the inclusion of the Italo-American experience into the canon of materials and methodologies used to explicate the essential contours of *ItaIicity* from the particulars and contingencies that concretely reveal themselves in broadest outline in the following schematic of American ethnic history. This constitutes the context within which the Italo-American reality emerged as a facet of the wider phenomena of Italian culture and related to the larger problematic of explicating *Italicity* as a social form.

1. America: The Colonial Period
    1.1 Some perspective on ethnicity
    1.2 The earliest Americans — an ethnic survey
    1.3 Italians in early America

2. From the Revolution to the Civil War

2.1 American reaction to the new immigrants

2.2 The ethnic diaspora

3. The Growth of America, 1865-1920: The Great Migrations

3.1 Italian American diaspora

3.2 The role of immigrant groups in America

3.3 American reaction in law and violence

4. America between the World Wars

4.1 Who owns America?

4.2 Immigrants in urban America

4.3 The beginnings of the Italian American success story

5. Italians become Americans, 1945-Present

5.1 Italian Americans in World War H

5.2 Sinatra and DiMaggio; From Vito Corleone to Tony Soprano

5.3 Ethnicity, Popular Culture, and Public Perceptions

6. The Dawn or Twilight of Ethnicity?

6.1 Socio-demographic data on the American ethnic community

6.2 The newest immigrants

6.3 American nationalism or balkanization?

6.4 The process of assimilation... does it still work?

7. Ethnicity, Race and Civic Nationalism

7.1 Defining America in the 21St Century

The foregoing periodization of the Italo-American experience is but the first of elemental aspects from which its specific contribution can be discerned. The American interpretative tradition and the self-interpretative contributions from within the Italo-American community must be added so as to augment the latent narrative illustrated in the seven-step periodization found above. The bibliography attached to this paper constitutes the second level of cultural artifacts that represent the Italo-American component of *Italicity*.

In addition to this periodization and the appended bibliography of materials which rearticulate and reexplicate the 'peoplehood' to whom the concept of *Italicity* may be appropriate, the following sources are included:

Appendix 1. US Census Data in aggregate for Ethnic Populations

Appendix 2. A Profile of the social/economic anatomy of Italian Americans

Appendix 3. A Index of Ethnic Concentration by Congressional Districts

Appendix 4. Two Public and Issues Opinion Profiles of Italian Americans

The discussion of the validity and truth-value of these elementary characteristics are aspects of the American reality related to the search for *Italicity* in America. The following types of elementary materials form an essential and existential grounding for furthering a globalizing sense of the variety of meanings of reality envisaged in the concept of *Italicity* or (as may be more technically correct) the new 'cultural articulation' or 'symbolization of meaning' called *Italicity*. Whether *Italicity* will become the next articulation of meaning and sufficiently credible within the American reality depends on how well it can be folded into the following account and other accounts of race and ethnic relations in America.

The American search for meanings of ethnicity and race occurred in the frayed and shredded fabric of order in American cities, especially in the urban, ethnic and immigrant neighborhoods at the intersection of social, educational, economic and ideological change. The implications and consciousness of ethnicity and race in America extends well beyond the immediate situation of conflict and violence. The tragedy of the era that began over four decades ago is intensified when one recalls its origins in the moral impulses, the universal human claims to justice, and the banner of social justice through integration.

The Civil Rights Movement was sustained by an outpouring of religious passion for universal rights that should not be denied by invidious discrimination. The action of the Supreme Court to end school segregation in 1954, the Civil Rights Acts of 1964, the Immigration Reform Acts of 1965 embodied the open society of the liberal imagination and the American aspiration of the post World War II era which espoused the freedom of all people and the end of discriminatory practices in domestic policy and the end of colonialism throughout the world. This vision of a free international order was shaken early on by the formation of new imperial conquests and dominations. The dream of an integrated society at home erupted with the revival of local group conflict. This became especially searing to the entire nation through the televised images of police action and civil disobedience, and the violent world of urban conflict, including widespread destruction, arson, and the emergence of ideologies of racial and ethnic hatred. To be sure the manipulation of ethnic and racial division was fostered at the highest levels of national leadership: the politicization in campaign appeals preyed on the fears of people. It revived the latent nativism of the American Know-Nothings that resurrected the KKK and rekindled xenophobic. Anti-Catholic and Anti-Union impulses of the past yielded a welter of additional strains to the shouts of cultural and generational change.

The upshot of such public policy and political rhetoric coupled to the division concerning Vietnam

and deindustrialization tended to polarize ethnic and racial relations. Moreover, the institutionalization of racial and ethnic categories by the Office of Management and Budget in Directive 15, 1972 rigidified relationships among designated minority groups and the so-called white majority. The meaning and efficacy of "affirmative action" produced new tensions between Jewish-Americans and Blacks, Women and Blacks, and the "Silent Majority" and "Special Interest". The divisiveness of such contentions devolved and fragmented the founding vision of social justice and good relationships among the diverse populations that constituted America.

This impasse in group relations and the trauma of violence remembered and the bitterness of suffering endured echoed in the fractured inter-racial, multi-ethnic coalitions that attempted to pick up the broken pieces of the dream of equality and integration. The consequences of twenty-five years of expanded immigration merged into these seething cauldrons of race and ethnicity that existed throughout America in many and varied forms of group conflict and competition.

This is not to say that all issues are racial and ethnic, but to suggest that in most contexts an ethnic factor hovers and shrouds the development and resolution of controversies. In some contexts these relationships periodically erupted into violence. This situation has continued into the 1980s and 1990s. The accounts of daily papers, news and opinion magazines bear witness to the ongoing quandary, much more complex and nuanced than the problematic posed to the nation by Gunnar Myrdal in the challenging analysis *The American Dilemma*. In retrospect it seems that Moynihan and Glazer's *Beyond the Melting Pot (1963)* was closer to the heart of the matter. Thus while the intellectual formulation of the centrality and ongoing character of ethnicity and race related issues was unsettled, the praxis of American society, economy, culture and polity lurched into the unknown terrain of change. The expansion and transformation of the urban landscape altered the systems of cultural transmission that mediated the personal, community and public worlds that America had experienced. Add to this ferment the bold strokes of various judicial and administrative devices of the national government that sought to end *dejure* and *defacto* racism at every level of public life.

By 1980 the nation scene has utterly discredited in the popular political imagination as a source of leadership for better ethnic and race relations. The Reagan Revolution simply announced that a color-blind society was the American ideal. His budget coup of 1982 diminished national resources devoted to national initiatives related to ethnic studies, school desegregation, and various discretionary vehicles which funded bridge building efforts to depolarize and develop community-based cooperation among groups at the ragged edges of race and ethnic relations.

All of these elements have entered our current legacy and portions of this violent and tension-filled era continue to shape the shared mentalities that determine our understandings of race and ethnic relations. Given the record of regimes and polities throughout the world and the unspeakable brutality of ethnic war and the invocation of ethnic passion that terrorizes populations in Europe, the Middle-East, Africa and throughout the globe, the American record has not contributed singularly nor significantly to the carnage of the twentieth century. Nonetheless, America is a country that promised hope and dignity. Its criteria of excellence imposed by its proclamation of liberty and justice for all are standards which deepen the gap between vision and reality and strain our best resolves to assure cultural justice and wholesome relations among ethnic and racial groups. Thus the American experiment in pluralism and democracy can be instructively explored in the American experience indicated in the following theses:

- Ethnic and race relations over the past three decades have become spatially disengaged as settlement patterns driven by the segmentation of the housing market have tended to cluster and divide as well as isolate and segregate persons by education and income;

- The persistence of media messages that divide and designate such as Black-White, Hispanic-Anglo, Immigrant-American is stereotypic and not sufficient to the nuances of exiting group relations;

- The media highlighting of divisive and exclusionary mono-cultural educational and cultural agendas tends to caricature ethnic and race relations, thus exacerbating disagreements and divisions; and

- Mean-spirited interpretations of multiculturalism, and the attendant mood of cultural warfare and perceived threat to the core values of the American tradition, are vastly over dramatized.

The forgoing combination of factors leaves a vast public deficit and gap in understanding the importance of education that is inclusive and pluralistic. Nor do these dimensions address the need for education that is supportive of democracy, economic well-being and the peaceful civilizing function of appreciation for the diverse wonders of cultural endowments. Moreover, the patent reality of the American situation proclaims that since its founding America has been necessarily associated with a variety of commingling heritages. These relationships have included domination and denial. They have provoked strategies of isolation and integration, as well as superficial expectations that such alternative categories as: class and interest; individual merit and expertise; and citizenship and nationalism would be sufficient. Some thought these would be satisfying replacements for the symbolic, yet all too human, affinities of community and the persistence of ethnic-racial factors that have been institutionalized and constitutive of the America order and regime. The search for alternative approaches to inclusiveness in group relations may be found in the following findings:

Beginning in the decades of most profound turmoil and tension the National Center for Urban Ethnic Affairs (NCUEA) worked with local ethnic community leaders to design and apply remedies for the personal, community and institutional trauma at the edges urban and ethnic diversity. The purpose of this work was to find evidence and arguments for the pivotal insight and action derived from the pioneering attempts of local communities to fashion a catholic policy of inclusivity regarding ethnicity and race relations. This method and goal are as relevant today as in the 1970s. In fact they are more relevant because national complacency and fanciful disengaged theoritization of literary ethnicity and the works of ethnic/racial imaginations that proliferated dream-world expectation during the 1980s contributed to the bankruptcy of practical and proven approaches to resolving group relations at the local level. Moreover, the lack of national leadership in this period is responsible also for the paucity of vetted and community authenticated model curricula and materials that were beginning to be developed in the late 1970s by the DOE Ethnic Studies Program, Title IX, Elementary and Secondary Education Act and the Public and Community Programs of the National Endowments for the Arts and Humanities.

The following selections yield glimpses into the creative elan that NCUEA and its founder Msgr. Geno Baroni brought into being from their encounters with local level efforts to shape and share the burdens and benefits of pluralism. The communities that were the focus of this work were in the older industrial cities of the Midwest and east. Exploring the findings that emerged and are associated with this work will suggest other facets of moral imagination especially the embedded in community practices that promote the development of personal character and public institutions that enhance the shared sense of civility essential for urban accord. This personal, community and institutional approaches are grounded in a body of thought and action articulated in social justice teaching of Pope Paul VI's letter, *A Call To Action*, of May 14, 1971, issued on the eightieth anniversary of the *encyclical, Rerum Novarum*. These social justice teachings are based in a pre-enlightenment tradition that is significantly different from the insularity of the Anglo-American intellectual foundations that drove the climate of opinion and determined the legal and political discourse within which race and ethnicity were discussed and decided upon in America. Curiously post modern in tone, *The Call to Action*, posits the interrelations of person and community as both essentially and phenomonologically the warrant of the moral and institutional reforms prescribed. Paul VI wrote:

> There is an urgent need to remake, at the level of the street, of the neighborhood or of the great agglomerative dwellings, the social fabric whereby man may be able to develop the needs of his personality. Centers of special interest and of culture must be created or developed at the community and parish centers, and spiritual and community gatherings were the individual can escape from isolation and form a new fraternal relationship.

Within this form of moral and institutional discourse the NCUEA aspired to build up the city as the

place where persons and their expanded communities would create new modes of neighborliness and relationships of social justice based on a much fuller register of ethnic variety than the American convention and practice legitimated. In this regarded Msgr. Geno Baroni and his associates set-out to reform the language of racial and ethnic relations. Their insistence on ethnicity as a category in itself was an important addition in as much as it invited America to differentiate beyond such dichotomous terms as Negro and White, as well as regional terms such as Anglo and Chicano. Thus the development of a new model of multi-ethnic discourse and community practice emerged at the margin for public recognition.

NCUEA convened a Workshop on Urban Ethnic Community Development under the auspices of the United States Catholic Conference and The Catholic University of America. At this conference, community spokes persons, ethnic leaders and other interested persons struggled to answer the principle question "Is there an ethnic dimension to America's urban malaise?" A transcript of the arguments indicates two conflicting viewpoints. On one side stood those who rejected the use of the term "white ethnic" and the things that it connoted. They said:

The concept of white ethnic is a fiction of the media, most Polish and Italo-Americans do not call themselves white ethnics. They eat kielbasa and spaghetti and speak a few Polish or Italian words, but they are Americans. They have been melted into the great American melting pot. Group discrimination is no longer a serious problem for them. Most are working people and their woes are related to economics and other problems with which every other working man in the United States must cope. To talk about white ethnics and their needs is to promote artificial social distinctions and intergroup discord that will foster polarization.

Others expressed an opposing view, contending that:

The melting pot is a fiction. Ethnic group loyalties are a fact of life. It is a mistake to suppress ethnic communal ties and values, as the "assimilationalists" have attempted, for both are necessary to the mental health of the individual and to the stability of the community of which they are a part. It is true that most of us are still working people, but whatever our occupation or income we hold our heritage in high regard. We are fearful that our children, stripped of a strong group identity, will become defenseless and be unable to cope with the pressures which are a prominent part of today's society. The demagogue exploits the rootless man whose fears compel us to think and act in a manner which is inconsistent with our needs and those of others. It is not necessary to affirm that we are Americans; we know that and we are proud of it. But don't forget that many are reminded of their "ethnicity" when they hear Polish jokes or illusions that any office seeker of Italian descent must be involved in criminal activities. Because stereotypes of this kind have been perpetuated over generations and still thrive, many of our people carry invisible wounds. To recognize our uniqueness is not to promote inter-group hostilities. On the contrary, as long as man is without commonalties of some kind and values which guide him through difficult periods of his life he will be unable to relate to, and work with, others on the basis of respect and good will.

As the opposing sides clashed, most the protagonists began to listen to one another and, in turn, revised some of their earlier preconceptions. Thus, a young organizer with a "working class agenda," after talking to Polish and Italo-American spokespersons, began to appreciate that the single most important common bond in many urban communities is ethnic group self-identity. Members of ethnic organizations, on the other hand, were reminded that the issues which were urgent to most of their people were related not to their threatened heritage but to "nitty-gritty" economic concerns, like wages, inflation, unemployment and taxes. Baroni provided the synthesis in which he argued that after decades of the "racial polarization" and valiant, but often quixotic, urban social legislation directed towards the most disadvantaged blacks and poor white, it was past time to realize that no social program or urban recipe can succeed without the American

working class. Yet that ethnic variety of the working and middle class was an untapped source of creative energy from which a new model of cultural democracy should be sought. His approach to this problematic was to make persons experience the ground from which a fresh exploration of American identity could begin. The following stories are illustrative of the new approach to understanding the impasse in racial ethnic relations. They suggest the new model of personal community and institutional reformulation required to overcome the limits of the still current dichotomous understandings of American pluralism.

Kevin. My father spoke Italian; he did not speak English very well and had an accent. They told me I should forget about my father's language and culture if I wanted to get a job when I grew up. If I forgot about his culture, I could be president or anything I wanted to be. I went to public school all my life until the third year of college. They had some missionary nuns who were Irish come in and try to teach us religion. I was already ahead of them because if you go to a public school it is really a Protestant school and you learn all the Protestant hymns. I was reading from the King James' Bible and reciting the Lord's Prayer the Protestant way. These Irish nuns wanted to change my name to Kevin. From Geno to Kevin. I told my father. And my father said, "No Kevin. He don't look like no Kevin." "My mother still tells me that if God had wanted me to be a politician, he would have made me Irish Catholic."

Rocky. I got a nephew who lives in Philadelphia. His name is Rodney Ruggerio. He doesn't know who he is. He lives six blocks from Puerto Ricans and he's afraid of them. He lives five blocks from blacks and he doesn't understand them. He lives three blocks from the university where there are lifestyle people. They wear sandals. They have long hair. My sister says they look like Jesus. But Rodney says he's afraid of the lifestyle people at the university. And then in school, guess what Rodney's studying. He's studying a $5 million course called "Man: A Course of Studies." That's great. That's great. It's the most advanced educational curriculum. So my nephew says to me, "Hey, Uncle Geno. Guess what? I'm studying Eskimos. They're great." So he's studying Eskimos. He's afraid of the blacks in his city. He's afraid of the Puerto Ricans. He's afraid of the lifestyle professors and their children. But the great tragedy is that he doesn't know who he is. He has no sense of his own identity. And that is very, very important. You can't say on top of people some history and background about someone else if they don't know who they are.

White Boots. This is how I learned about living in a cultural democracy. When I was in the third grade, the teacher asked us to stand up and say what we had done over the weekend. And I said we had made wine. That's what you did on the weekends in September and October when I was growing up. And the teacher said, "That's nice. Tell the class." So I said, "We made wine with our bare feet." And she said, "Stop. We don't do that in America." I was so embarrassed. I started to cry and created quite a stir. So I went home to my father and he said, "Well, we're going to make some more wine." And I started to cry and tried to get away. "What's the matter," he said. So I told him that the teacher said that we don't make wine with our bare feet in America. So my father said some things I cannot say here. And he went down to the company store to buy a little pair of white boots, because if that's the way they want it, that's the way they were going to get it. So we sent the teacher a bottle of wine for Christmas.

John. I went to Alaska where they wanted to put in some housing. Housing in Alaska is horrendous, very expensive. A house, about two rooms, costs $120,000, and they didn't have any plumbing. They never had plumbing. They had to blast the ice to put in plumbing. They built 12 houses in a circle and in the middle of the circle they built the little community center. Very expensive. A couple of hundred thousand dollars for 15 square feet. A year later I went back. Six of the houses are missing. I wanted to know what happened to the houses. I go into the community center. Guess what? They're burning the houses for fire wood. They didn't want to live in these houses. They want to live all together in the community center. That's what I mean when I say it's important for human development that we involve people in the decisions government makes for them.

I was on an Indian reservation and I saw an empty hospital. I said, "How come that hospital is empty?" They said, "Our tribe never had a hospital. We didn't want the damned hospital." But somebody in Washington said they needed a hospital and the government built the hospital. And the hospital is still there empty. That shows the government has to let people have their own dignity and worth.

A teacher said to me, "I now have some new kids in the class and I don't know how to teach them." And I said, "What do you mean, 'new kids?'" And she said, "I'm not sure if you call them black or Chicano

or Mexican or Hispanic or Latino or what. It's very uncomfortable with the 'new kids' because I am inter-culturally incompetent."

Now that's a revealing and honest statement, and it could be made by people in professions like teaching, and in industry, politics, public service and business. And she said to me, "Not only am I uncomfortable as a person, but I'm uncomfortable as a professional."

So I said to her, "What have you been teaching for 25 years?" And she said, "Dick and Jane." "But I don't think it's any good to use that book to try to teach white kids and black kids and Hispanic kids about the American way of life."

That tells us something about America. We deny class. We deny race. We deny diversity. And that's a tragedy.

These parables and reflections defuse the manipulative exacerbation of ethnic and race relations and they became a well spring from which organizing community-based initiatives designed to reinterpret the immigrant and ethnic experience. A national convening of community-based activists called the Bicentennial Race Ethnic Coalition--BERC -- emerged.

In June 1974 the Berc Conference hammered out a set of conceptual formulations. The following account of the BERC perspective suggests its urban ethnic concerns. For each of the three thematic areas of Bicentennial planning: Heritage, Festival and Horizons, the BERC group synthesized their concerns and conceptualized their critique: In the area of heritage and education, the emphasis was on the ethnic experience in American education and the ethnic and racial contributions to the building of America.

History has been made unpopular by persons who would use it to teach a specific lesson. Ethnic and racial Americans must understand their past before they can chart a useful future. This means that they must avoid narrowness while at the same time emphasizing the richness that the ethnic and racial groups have contributed to the American pluralistic experience. This experience of "otherness," which has been a hallmark of the American experiment, must not be feared or shunned, but must be accepted in terms of its contributory role in America's heritage.

In the area of Festival and the Arts, the focus was on the need to legitimize the cultural diversity of American life by preserving and developing ethnic and community arts, music and folk ways, and by providing a means of expression for the benefit of diverse communities. The basic statement of this philosophy:

> Far from being a cultural melting pot, we are a nation whose diverse and singular blend of cultural expressions yields a different flavor with every tasting. It is a fact of our society that the channels for cultural expression and appreciation of the diverse groups of which we are comprised are not well developed. Our culture is our essence made visible. Whether it is manifested in the mundane or the profound, it adds inspiration, satisfaction and pleasure to our lives. The extent to which our citizens are limited from a full experience of their right to cultural expression is the extent to which we condemn ourselves to a bland and homogenized national existence.

The Horizon dimension focused on the economic and social revitalization of neighborhoods. Issues concerned neighborhood restoration and preservation, economic growth and stabilization, and the permanent duty to serve basic human needs of all citizens. The statement focusing on economic and social revitalization of neighborhoods said:

Because people's behavior is affected primarily through the surroundings where most of their

experiences occur, we believe that economic and social revitalization of racial and ethnic neighborhoods is one is the key means of bridging the existing gap between the two nations which make up this country - that of the rich and that of the poor.

In each of these areas participants from the more than 21 different ethnic groups contributed their own ideas about appropriate agendas for action recommended a fully representative advisory body to assist in funding and legislative consultation and review, and to serve as an outreach network for ethnic and racial groups throughout the country.

The BERC initiative quickened the development of a unique political perspective which establishes a set of criteria from which an interesting and provocative view of the American domestic policy emerges. At bottom, the thrust of BERC supports a new vision of urban and cultural policy. This concept prompted studies and program recommendations which set out to remedy the malaise in the civic culture of America during the mid 1970s.

The American regime is a design and dream of liberty and justice for all that might have been pushed to a higher level in the electoral campaign and Inaugural of 1992. There was an invocation of a more ancient memory than that with which most are acquainted. The inspirit of deepest memory with its prescription to care for our endowment of rock, river and tree was intoned by the Inaugural poet, Maya Angelou. Her account of the peopling of this country, the healing of divisions and the fresh and gentle good morning closed this public liturgy.

The timeliness of reconsidering the relationship of ethnicity and race was underscored by the announcement in the *Federal Register* of the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) call for public comments on Race and Ethnic Standards for Federal Statistics and Administrative Reporting.[ii] Currently OMB is reviewing Directive 15 which decades ago institutionalized certain national aspects of the modern civil rights movement that began in 1954. This extended to the civil rights and immigration reform laws of the mid-1960s and was amended into the statutes and related judicial action policy in OMB Directive 15 approved by President Carter in 1977.

But beginning from President Nixon there was an administrative action that can be viewed as the governmental institutionalization of a cruelly shortsighted and narrow political wedge designed to broaden the base of Republican support in the South and to marginalize protected populations and programs. It would appeal to public administrations and employees, but with little or no effect on the social relations or the development of race and ethnic relations in America. The mind-set derived from this perspective led to the redistricting of Congressional districts in 1992. The Bush Justice Department and Republican activists fostered the isolation of African American voters in Congressional districts. This increased the number of African American Congresspersons, while simultaneously increasing the influence some have argued of Republicans in newly created safe districts and the subsequent marginalization of African American Congresspersons in the Republican Congress. Thus the marginalization strategy of protection and isolation through the politics of categories continues to play itself out in the fears and hopes of minority relations in mainstream American institutions. Whatever the motive and intention as well as the current impact of Directive 15, it established the current practices of defining minority status in America. The current categories are: American Indian or Alaskan Native, Asians or Pacific Islander, Black, Hispanic, and White.

The following statement regarding the future of federal policy regarding ethnic and race was developed by a coalition of researchers and advocates concerned about the inclusivity and accuracy, as well as the narrow politicization of equal protection and due process that hampered race and ethnic relations and public policy implementation during the post civil rights era. The statement begins with an appeal to support the collection of ancestry data in the U.S. Census 2000:

The ancestry question on the decennial census is the only source about the ethnic composition of our nation's population. We know the value of statistics on ethnicity and the importance of maintaining a national reservoir of accurate and reliable information on society's changing demographic composition.

Ancestry is important regardless of racial identity. Equally essential is our ability as a   nation to capture the rich, complex and dynamic nature of Americans' identity with their immigrant roots and ethnicity, in a way that includes all countries of origin, and all generations. Without the ancestry question, data on ethnicity is incomplete and skewed and prevents a comprehensive picture of our country's overall patterns, assimilation, mobility and success.

Census data on ancestry have been used by a wide spectrum of stakeholders including:

1.   Educators and human service providers who use the data to ensure that programs are inclusive and representative of the local populations;

2.   The private sector whose use of ethnic data continues to expand as corporations, researchers, journalists and marketing professional seek to identify, study and reach more discreet segments of the population;

3.   Politicians are increasingly interested in knowing the types of ethnic groups who vote for them and subsequently where fund raising foci must be;

4.   State, county and municipal agencies are recognizing the growing need to identify and reach constituent groups beyond racial classification;

5.   Federal agencies such as the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights which recognizes the need for ancestry data to monitor discrimination based on national origin.

These arguments for the collection and use of ancestry information and its value for public policy claim that it would yield an adequate reflection of pluralism in America. This inclusive position is one critical current clarification of race and ethnic issues in America. Another perspective gained popularity during the 1980 and 1990s: its advocates prescribed a color-blind approach. They include critics of the persistence of ethnic identity and in place of the dense symbols systems of cultural tradition and religiosity propose an alternative form of symbolization: American-whiteness and the harkening to the original founding of the republic and its enlightenment origins of reason and rights as the foundation of person and social order. One aspect of this modern invocation of American universalism emerged in the twentieth century search for an appropriate U.S. public policy to ensure equal employment opportunity. The warning and challenge that De Tocqueville posed regarding democracy in America and participation for marginated groups finally was taken-up and launched during World War II[iii]. To achieve national unity among racial, nationality and religious groups in the midst of a wartime crisis, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt took the first dramatic step to end employment discrimination in defense industries and the armed services On June 25, 1941, he issued his famous Executive Order No. 8802[iv] banning discrimination based on race, creed, color, or national origin in defense plants, government offices and the armed services. He also established the nation's first Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC) in the Office of Production Management and later recognized and strengthened it, locating the FEPC in the Executive Office of the President[v].

By his initiatives Roosevelt provided the citizenry of the United States with the classic formulation, "because of race, creed, color, or national origin," thereby identifying the individuals and groups whose right to equal employment opportunity would be safeguarded under the law. That legal phraseology, with

significant additions, prevails to this day. While other categories (sex, age, handicap, etc.) were later added to the list, the existence of unfair treatment of job applicants and employees on account of their national origin was recognized in the earliest definitions of individuals and groups which the government sought to protect. The term "national origin" was born out of the public debate and legislative history of the early federal immigration laws which created quotas of immigrants on the basis of national origin. Just as it was clear that the national quota system intended to discriminate against immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe, it was equally clear that the President's Executive Order sought to prevent such discrimination in public and private employment.

At the state level, the pioneering step was taken bye New York in 1945[vi]. The New York State Legislature enacted a law declaring that equal opportunity employment was a civil right. Using the formulation established at the federal level, the law stated that:

> Practices of discrimination against any one of New York's inhabitants because of race, creed, color, or national origin are a matter of state concern . . . such discrimination threatens not only the rights and proper privileges of its inhabitants, but menaces the institutions and foundation of a free democratic state.[vii]

Realizing that a statute which simply outlawed discrimination was not enough to erase the practice of discrimination, the New York state legislature also established an educational, investigative and enforcement agency, the State Commission Against Discrimination[viii]. Other states soon followed New York's lead. By 1962 twenty-two states, embracing two-thirds of the nation's population, had passed FEPC (Fair Employment Practices Commission) laws[ix]. Using the standard formulation, state laws prohibited employment discrimination on the basis of race, creed, color or national origin[x]. Thus at the state level "nationality" barriers to jobs had, from the beginning, become unfair labor practices which were legally prohibited because they were deemed to deny U.S. residents equal opportunity in employment[xi].

THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA

The 1960's witnessed a concentration, long overdue, on the civil rights of Afro-Americans. During this decade unprecedented actions were taken, in both the governmental and non-governmental arenas, to guarantee equality of opportunity for Black Americans. Such a national outpouring of concern, from the private sector at first and from the public sector later, resulted in three giant steps by the federal government on the road toward equal employment opportunity. These advances laid the legal framework which eventually enabled civil rights agencies to insist upon affirmative action by public and private employers alike.

Two federal executive orders set the pace. In 1961 President John F. Kennedy issued Executive Order 10925 on equal opportunity in federal employment and federally assisted construction[xii]. The most significant contribution of Kennedy's executive order was the insistence that contractors:

> take affirmative action to insure that applicants are employed, and that employees are treated during employment without regard to their race, creed, color or national origin..[xiii].

Four years later in 1965, Executive Order 11246 was issued by President Lyndon B. Johnson. It required that every government contract contain provisions such as the following:

> The contractor will not discriminate against employees or applicants because of race, color, religion or national origin.

The contractor will take affirmative action to insure that applicants are employed without regard to such factors[xiv].

The agency charged with the enforcement of President Johnson's Executive Order was the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) of the U.S. Department of Labor.

Through these two executive orders, "affirmative action became part of the federal vocabulary and legal weaponry which the executive branch of the U.S. government used to enforce equal treatment in employment. Despite the specific moral thrust behind these orders -- directed at redressing the historical wrongs done to Black Americans, the requirement for affirmative action imposed upon employers was also intended to protect those women and men who, because of their national origin, may have been victims of job discrimination.

The second step was the passage by Congress of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and most specifically Title VII. This declared that it was against the law for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin."[xv] For the first time in the twentieth century, Congress itself had passed legislation to insure equal employment opportunity and created an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to enforce the law. Furthermore, Title VII added to the employment actions forbidden by law, discrimination based on sex. Despite the fact that the congressional debate centered preponderantly on discrimination because of race or color, national origin was also included.[xvi]

The law omitted any reference to "affirmative action." In fact, it contained a special provision that:

Nothing contained in this title shall be interpreted to require any employer . . . to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number of percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin employed by any employer . . . in comparison with the total number of percentage of persons of such race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in any . . . area, or in the available work force . . . in any area[xvii].

EXPANDING THE FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS

With the passage of the Civil Rights Act, new powers became available to the government to fight employment discrimination. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) became one of the central agencies in the struggle. Its powers as they developed were stronger than a simple reading of the language of the Act indicated. EEOC, for example, could issue regulations determining what was discriminatory in employment. The EEOC also could require private companies to hire certain numbers of minorities and women, and to award back pay to those determined to be victims of discrimination by the threat to bring action which would demonstrate discrimination[xviii].

Another agency with considerable power was the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP). Operating under executive order the OFCCP had authority to use "affirmative action" to overcome occupational discrimination. It could require those receiving federal contracts to set goals for hiring and promotion of women and minority employees to overcome under representation of these classes[xix].

In addition to those agencies concerned with a direct attack on discrimination many other federal bodies could also take action against discrimination, either under statute or through the use of their own

regulations in the industries they regulated. The Federal Communications Commission, for example, could take action against discrimination on broadcasting through its regulation of the air waves[xx].

The major change in the enforcement of civil rights laws against overt direct discrimination because of race, was the increasing concentration on practices which had discriminatory impact upon protected groups of employees, particularly minorities and women. These new enforcement priorities went beyond consideration of single isolated acts of unlawful treatment of job applicants and employees to employment patterns and practices which had discriminatory impact upon hundreds of thousands of employees[xxi]. To establish such impact and to eliminate institutionalized discrimination, statistics were needed to prove that an employer's practice resulted in unfavorable treatment of groups protected by law. Statistical head counts which revealed under representation of a given group in the employer's work force became a first sign of discrimination which violated the law. Employment statistics required by the federal government became the basis of compliance reviews by OFCCP staff, the employer's self-analysis of non-discrimination in employment, and evaluation of the employer's performance with regard to goals and timetables. With the consistent support from the U.S. Supreme Court, statistical analysis came to be used routinely to establish a *prima facie* case of discrimination[xxii]. An affirmative action program by the employer came to be appropriate remedy for any discriminatory under representation or under-utilization revealed by the statistical data[xxiii]. In 1981, the U.S. Civil Rights Commission pointed to the critical importance of statistical analysis for the federal effort to ensure equal employment opportunity:

> In recent years, statistical procedures interpreting data based on race, sex, and national origin have been the dominant means for detecting the existence of discrimination. Their use is premised on the idea that the absence of minorities and women from the economic, political and social institutions of this country is an indicator that discrimination may exist[xxiv].

The Commission went on to note that:

> Gathering statistical data by race, sex and national origin, which is almost universally practiced and well established in the law, is a critical element in compliance efforts and program planning[xxv].

The key to the success of the federal agencies' new broader approach to the removal of employment discrimination were the reports which employers were ordered to complete periodically at the behest of federal agencies such as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs. These various reports required the counting of employees by their race (either Black or White), sex (either male or female), Hispanic (including Black and White), American Indian (including Native Alaskans, or Asian, including Pacific Islander)[xxvi]. Among these groups perhaps only Hispanics could be considered as a "national origin" group. Because information on discrimination against Americans of Southern and Eastern European ancestry was sparse, it was not deemed necessary to collect data on their employment status.

The Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs indicated the existence of discrimination against Americans of Southern and Eastern European ancestry and created affirmative action programs for them. However, this program was not as stringent as that for others protected groups.

To carry out Executive Order 11246, the OFCCP issued a set of regulations which required that each government contract contain the following clause:

> The contractor will not discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment

because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The contractor will take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees are treated during employment, without regard to their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin[xxvii].

In defining the purpose of an affirmative action program, the regulations specifically excluded "religion" and "national origin".

An acceptable affirmative action program must include an analysis of areas within which the contractor is deficient in the utilization of minority groups and women, and further, goals and timetables to which the contractor's good faith efforts must be directed to correct the deficiencies and, thus to achieve prompt and full utilization of minorities and women.[xxviii]..

Private employers with government contracts were obliged to complete Employer Information, EEO-1 or others, as part of their affirmative action compliance. The EEO form required "accurate and complete" information on several groups but only one European nationality group: Americans, the ultimate origins of whose culture was Spain. Accordingly, employers were not required to keep records of Americans of European origin, except those whose heritage can be traced to a part of the Iberian peninsula.

In a subsequent regulation titled *Guidelines on Discrimination because of Religion or National Origin*, OFCCP argued that:

Members of various religions and ethnic groups, primarily but not exclusively of Eastern, Middle and Southern European ancestry, such as Jews, Catholics, Italians, Greeks and Slavic groups, continue to be excluded from executive, middle management and other job levels because of discrimination based on religion and/or national origin. These guidelines are intended to remedy such unfair treatment[xxix].

The regulations provided that employers "must take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed and that employees are treated during employment without regard to their religion or national origin."[xxx]

The regulation went on to provide that if after a self review, especially at the occupational levels noted, the employer finds deficiencies he or she "shall undertake appropriate outreach and recruitment activities." Those suggested include better internal communications and procedures in regard to the employer's obligation, review of employment records to determine internal availability of members of various religious and ethnic groups, and special recruitment efforts including use of religious or ethnic groups, and special recruitment efforts including use of religious or ethnic press[xxxi]. The regulations did not provide for Federal review of the effort nor the systematic collection of data on the groups discriminated against.

In fact, the federal government explicitly barred the collection of data on any groups except the officially recognized minorities. As noted above regulations pertaining to the collection of data by the EEOC provide for the keeping of records only on the following: "Black (Negroes), American Indians (including Alaskan Natives), Asians (including Pacific Islanders), Hispanic (including persons of Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Central or South American or other Spanish origin or culture regardless of race) white other than Hispanic and totals."[xxxii] The regulations further provide that "only those categories of race and national origin prescribed by the Commission may be used."[xxxiii] In November, 1981 John Hope III, acting staff director of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights indicated that: "EEOC regulations do not require *or permit* the collection and maintenance of statistics that separately identify employees of Southern and Eastern

European origin"[xxxiv] (emphasis in original).

The non-collection of data on most European nationality groups effectively excluded them from consideration for most affirmative action programs. Similar approaches were also taken by state agencies charged with ensuring non-discrimination and equal employment opportunity. For example, the Illinois Department of Human Rights regulation stated forcefully and clearly that:

> No public contractor shall discriminate . . . against any applicant for employment, or in terms or conditions of employment of any employee . . . because of race, color, religion, sex, marital status, national origin or ancestry, age, physical or mental handicap unrelated to ability, or unfavorable discharge from the military service[xxxv].

In setting enforcement guidelines, however the department omitted "national origin," "ancestry"

and "religion," and confined affirmative action to minorities and women:

> Each public contractor . . . shall . . . determine if minority persons or women are underutilized . . . if underutilization exists . . ., the contractor . . . shall take appropriate affirmative action to rectify any such underutilization[xxxvi].

Thus in the 1970's the federal government itself became the major source of the data which was necessary to discover the existence of under representation or underutilization of women and protected minority groups. The failure of the government to collect comparable data on national origin groups such as Americans of Southern and Eastern European ancestry made it difficult to determine the existence of discrimination by the standards which the government sets for proof.

The decision to count only certain minorities and to exclude members of European ethnic groups helped concoct a "majority" group for the United States which lacks any of the cultural and social attributes that define the protected groups. All European ethnic groups, other than those from a part of the Iberian Peninsula, henceforth were counted as "white". Significantly, this statistical category created inadvertently by government policy was given currency when it was appropriated (sometimes in distorted form) by the national media as a description of everyday reality in America[xxxvii].

European ethnic groups which sought to muster the evidence needed to support a charge of adverse or disparate impact were forced to assemble the statistical data on their own, without the assistance of the federal government[xxxviii]. Attorney Rachel Rossoni Munafo pointed out that:

> The government's definition of a "minority" has created serious problems for the white ethnic groups. Since white ethnics are classified as non-minorities, no agency compiles official data concerning them. From a statistical standpoint, therefore, white ethnics are virtually invisible. As a result of this classification scheme, legislators and bureaucrats who rely on social statistics in shaping public policy inadvertently ignore the white ethnic groups. White ethnics who are victims of discrimination, therefore, must try to prove this without the benefit of group statistics. The burden is difficult, if not impossible to overcome[xxxix].

The burden of proving discrimination without the statistical data that is needed is a costly and difficult process that few plaintiffs have been willing to carry out or able to afford. In a review of federal court cases charging discrimination based on national origin, Joseph G. Allegretto noted that:

> The absence of necessary statistical information presents a nearly insurmountable barrier to a person of Polish, Irish, or Russian ancestry who wished to bring a disparate impact case.[xl]..

As a result, Oscar A. Ornate, an arbitrator and professor of manpower management at New York University's Graduate School of Business Administration concluded that "the issue of discrimination on the basis of national origin has thus far been subsidiary to the issues of race, color, and sex in court cases."[xli]

In his testimony before the U.S. Senate subcommittee, Leonard F. Walentynowicz, executive director of the Polish American Congress in Washington, D.C., called attention to another unintended consequence of the federal government's failure to assemble data with regard to the employment status of European ethnic groups. He noted that this neglect "creates unfair attitudes among those in power, including judges, as it gives them a convenient excuse to assert that those groups who are not being counted either have no problem or have no standing to assert their rights."[xlii] Walentynowicz cited a recent decision of the U.S. District Court in the District of Columbia in the case of Bachman v. Pertschuk (C.A. 76-0079), which excluded Polish Americans and other white ethnics from the benefits of a stipulation regarding the hiring 45 practices of the Federal Trade Commission[xliii]. Notwithstanding that the action was maintained only by Blacks as a class, the decision included all members of the designated minorities[xliv].

The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights highlighted the central importance of statistical data as evidence in cases of alleged discrimination. In a 1981 report on affirmative action the Commission noted:

> In recent years statistical procedures interpreting data on race, sex, and national origin have been the dominant means for detecting the existence of discrimination. Their use is premised on the idea that the absence of minorities and women from the economic, political and social institutions of this country is an indicator that discrimination may exist[xlv].

Unfortunately except for a few limited studies on academic institutions and government agencies and on "executive suites" representation in selected corporations in certain cities, few of the data available on the occupational status of Americans belonging to Southern and Eastern European groups were prepared for the purpose of ascertaining patterns of over- and under representation that would indicate discrimination[xlvi].The major obstacles researchers face in doing a comparative analysis of the occupational status of American ethnic groups and of assessing the impact of ethnicity and discrimination on that status over time can be summarized as follows:

1) There is no consistent way of identifying groups.

2) The Bureau of the Census does not ask a "religious" question in its collection of data because of constitutional limitation on such inquiries by the government.

For some students of race and ethnicity this represents a serious limitation of the usefulness of the information the Bureau of the Census provides on the income and occupational distribution of Americans of Southern and Eastern European ancestry. Perhaps the foremost critic of this limitation is Andrew M. Greeley who argued that the ethnic tabulations in *Current Population Reports*:

> combined Protestant and Catholic Irish, Protestant and Catholic and Jewish Germans, and Catholic and Jewish Poles. There is some reason to think that it is precisely the combination of religion and nationality that constitutes ethnic identification for a considerable number of

Americans.[xlvii]

Rosen agrees with Greeley's assessment of Census data when she writes that:

> the Census does not ask religious identification. This seriously limits the value of Census data. When certain ethnic groups have been differentiated by religion in other surveys, there have been significant differences between Catholics and Protestants in education, occupation, income and other variables[xlviii].

3) Information is not available for most groups of Americans of Southern and Eastern European ancestry. Most governmental and non-governmental studies deal only with the largest groups such as Poles and Italians.

In the absence of data to guide such policies, it would of course be difficult to prepare affirmative action plans that would remedy alleged discrimination against Americans of Southern and Eastern European ancestry. However, in certain cases individual agencies have begun the process of affirmative action for members

In Illinois the State Human Rights Act was amended effective July 1, 1982 to require that a national origin class be added to the listed protected classes subject to the affirmative action mandates of the Act.

For those specific nationality groups which, by rule of the Department of Human Rights, are to be covered by the Illinois Human Rights Act, state agencies will be required to undertake affirmative action programs and record-keeping such as a: "(1) comparison of the agencies' employment members in any national origin group with the proportions of that group in the available labor force; (2) measures for increasing employment of groups found to be under represented in the labor force; and (3) for agencies with over 1,000 employees, evaluation of the impacts of employee selection devices used by the agencies on the members of the same group."[xlix]

A few years earlier a more modest affirmative action program was instituted for Italian Americans at the City University of New York. Issued by Chancellor Robert Kibbee as a "voluntary affirmative action directive" to the CUNY Council of Presidents, it provided that in the face of a long history of discrimination against Italian Americans at the University, the institution was designating Italian Americans as an affirmative action category in addition to those so categorized under existing federal statutes and regulations. The University's affirmative action office was, in addition, instructed to include Italian Americans in the data collected for affirmative action programs.[l]

In the wake of the evidence from the executive suite studies[li] of Detroit, Chicago corporations and Buffalo banks, and the expressed concern of leaders of Southern and Eastern European Ethnic groups, the two most important federal agencies charged with the enforcement of federal laws and executive orders in the area of employment discrimination, the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission issued Guidelines which defined "national origin" discrimination. The EEOC Guidelines cited such discrimination as the:

> denial of equal opportunity because of an individual's or his or her ancestor's, place of origin; or because an individual has the physical, cultural or linguistic characteristics of a national origin group[lii].

These Guidelines specified further that individuals could not be denied equal employment opportunity:

> for reasons, such as (a) marriage to or association with persons of a national origin group; (b) membership in, or association with an organization identified with or seeking to promote the interests of national origin groups; (c) attendance or participation in schools, churches, temples or mosques, generally used by persons of a national origin group; and (d) because an individual's name or spouse's name is associated with a national origin group.[liii]

The EEOC Guidelines also singled out, among other examples, such practices as height and

weight requirements and fluency-in-English requirements which tend to exclude individuals on

the basis of national origin.

In spite of the new guidelines, however, leaders of Southern and Eastern European ethnic groups and others have continued to express a concern that federal agencies are currently inattentive to the employment discrimination experienced by Americans of Southern and Eastern European ancestry. Dr. Myron B. Kuropas an Illinois educator and former presidential special assistant, observed that various European "ethnic groups," following the lead of the visible minorities, began to demand a greater sensitivity and responsiveness from the federal government. He concluded that:

> After twenty years of attempting to sensitize the federal establishment . . ., the pleas of Euro-Ethnics to the government are either politely ignored or dismissed as racist in effect[liv].

There is of course, genuine cause for the concern that the struggle against national origin discrimination does not have as high a priority as the attempts to eliminate other forms of discrimination in occupation. In addition to the lack of effort in regard to data collection, federal agencies charged with enforcing equal employment opportunity, for all practical purposes, have not focused upon the issue of discrimination against European ethnic groups in their published reports. An interest in affirmative action and national enforcement has produced ambivalent conclusions.

The search for remedies has prompted some groups to adopt a legal strategy. The American Jewish Committee, American Jewish Congress, Hellenic Bar Association of Illinois, National Italian American Foundation, National Advocates Society, National Medical and Dental Association, Polish American Affairs Council, Polish American Congress, Polish American Educators Association, Ukrainian Congress Committee of America (Chicago Division) and UNICO International have joined in various *amicus curiae* briefs in scores of civil rights and affirmative action cases.

Though this approach has its proponents the overall satisfaction level with such strategies and the ambivalence regarding remedies indicate that such legal approaches really beg the central question. A variety of answers point to its nature. Andrew Greeley has argued against quotas and affirmative action along the following line:

> The basic difference between a racial quota and minority 'affirmative action' is that in the former it is easy to tell who the victim is, while in the latter it is harder to identify the one who is being discriminated against. Make no mistake about it, in 'affirmative action' programs there are victims. You cannot discriminate in favor of someone without

discriminating against someone else[lv].

Roman Pucinski, a former U.S. congressman, Chicago Alderman and longstanding leader of The Polish Americans in Chicago, denied publicly that Poles wanted to be included in any quotas established by a federal judge[lvi]. Michael Novak, chairman of the Slavic American National Council, in an interview published in *Perspectives*, a quarterly magazine of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Summer 1980, made his position clear: "I'm against quotas, but if society wants quotas then everyone should be included." Aloysius A. Mazewski, president of the Polish National Alliance And the Polish American Congress, criticized "so-called affirmative action program" and then said: "You are actually creating a quota system which is abhorrent to our democracy. If that is your goal, then include as part of affirmative action the national origin of our citizens. The Polish American community represents 21 percent of the city's population and pursuant to the theory of your program, we are entitled to 21 percent of police department, fire department and all city employees."[lvii] Businessman Jeno F. Palucci of Minnesota, chairman of the National Italian American Foundation based in Washington, the foremost coalition of Italian-Americans that includes Congressional leaders and a network of professionals in various fields, wrote: "A misconception about the Bakke case is that whites are against Blacks on the issue of affirmative action. For Italian-Americans and other white ethnics, at least, that simply is not true. In fact, we're more in favor of affirmative action than Blacks are -- because we are yet to benefit from it, and need it badly."[lviii]

Whether anyone has benefitted, however, is the genuine question.

If there is an agreement among leaders of Southern and Eastern European Ethnic groups that more federal attention must be paid to the problem of national origin discrimination, there is little consensus about the most appropriate remedies, particularly as they might be applied to the various city, state and federal mandates calling upon public and private employers to install affirmative action programs. A range of opinion, however, can be sorted out. Some, without qualification, oppose any affirmative action hiring quotas based on race, creed, color, sex, religion and national origin, or any combination thereof. Some who dislike affirmative action hiring ratios would support them for their group if the society insisted on having them for others. Some are in favor of affirmative action programs which would give preference to those who are socially, economically or educationally disadvantaged and which would drop the present goals and timetables that give a hiring advantage based solely upon some racial, ethnic or sex classification.

It is not likely that the problem of national origin discrimination will disappear in the future. In fact one may argue with confidence that national origin discrimination will, in the near future, surface as a major issue. The National Center for Urban Ethnic Affairs report entitled *The representation of Poles, Italians, Latinos and Blacks in the Executive Suites of Chicago's Largest Corporations*, indicates that neither of these protected nor the not-designated minorities groups have made minuscule steps toward inclusion into these corridors of power. This suggests that the entire process is tortuously slow as is the movement from margin to mainstream. The accompanying rhetoric and investment in public enforcement exacerbates group relations owing to perceptions that are not founded in the realties of aided or unaided economic and social integration. The magnitude of these disparities is clear: Despite the fact that 47 percent of the metropolitan area's population was Polish, Italian, Black or Hispanic, these groups account for 5% of the total directors. Poles make-up 11.2% of the population, but only 0.5% of the corporate directors are Poles; Italians who comprise 7.3% of the population have 2.2% of the directorships; Hispanics with 8.2% of the population hold 0.2% of the directorships and Blacks who comprise 20.15 of the population hold only 1.8% of the directorships[lix].

In view of the problem indicated by executive suite studies and statistical data pointing to serious under representation in some occupations as well as mobility barriers for Americans of Southern and Eastern European ancestry, it is imperative that the federal government agencies concerned with enforcement of Civil Rights Laws increase their efforts in this area. The most pressing problem remains, as this report shows, the systematic collection of data on the occupational status of Americans of Southern and Eastern European ancestry to determine the existence and patterns o discrimination. The question cannot be addressed until federal data collection policy is changed and those groups are included among the ethnic and racial groups for

whom data is collected, analyzed and monitored for evidence of discrimination. The assurance of equal opportunity for all Americans of Southern and Eastern European ancestry as well as the new immigrants that have settled in increasing numbers since 1965 in public and private employment must begin with their equal treatment in the collection of information by their government. Perhaps the judicial elaboration of these particularly the Supreme Courts unanimous decisions in *Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji* 9(1987, 85-2169) and *Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb* (1987, 85-2156) relying as they do on the Civil Rights Law of 1865 and Voting Rights Law of 1870 and the clear legislative intention to include all races in the protection of law and prohibitions against discrimination based on race, which most interestingly and ironically included the widest range of non-Anglo-Americans. Thus when Congress in the post civil war era spoke of race they in fact were addressing what today we would call ethnicities or nationalities. The Courts turn to this basis for non-exclusionary support for remedies derived from racial and ethnic discrimination has opened the door to action that has been bottled-up in the administrative and regulatory maze that has been in part reported in the forgoing account.

Thus the analysis of national level concerns regarding inclusive information on race and ethnicity has lead us toward the local level interactions that constitute the foundation of civility from which national governance must draw its authority. Law rest on the foundation of political consent. The record of top-down approaches and its efficacy leave much to be desired. The renewal of bonds of common citizenship may in fact be the current social invention of such bonds in various places and among various populations. A review to the American historical experience in search for a romantic, nostalgic bond of social, racial, ethnic solidarity would be a flight into imagination. The various periods of conflict and consensus indicate that the political formulation of shared values and fair procedures for the regulation and distribution of resources are the buildingblocks on which equitable race and ethnic policy must rest. Thus the local must drive the national agenda as the personal must enable the political, least the use of power and legality lose their potency which at bottom are derived from consent and not demanded by state coercion and enforcement.

At this level and from this fundamental perspective the resolution of race and ethnic issues reveals their essential character as political questions of values and resource allocation. For such choices to be deliberated and decided new metropolitan structures that are both regional in their scope and community-based neighborhood in their scale will be needed. A new architecture of governance is a necessary new dimension that must be addressed as were the prior questions of law and policy in this field. To fashion such mechanism and social/political/ governmental invention is the awesome challenge America faces, which is to say we must rethink federalism in light of American pluralism and the growing backlash to administrative and legal answers to political questions and problems that have driven us into distrust and isolation from the rich variety of race and ethnic traditions that our common citizenship can make accessible to all. Only regional consensus along such lines will be sufficient to carry a national agenda of fairness and non-exclusionary race and ethnic policy into its appropriate place in the American dream. The pursuit of liberty and justice for all -- the normative aspiration that is the fount of the American inspiration -- generated the American dream and the American reality.

The American reality is the garden that we must cultivate well lest it turn barren because the capacity to renew that spirit in our time has been lost. The letter of the law should not blind us or invite us to neglect of the political and governmental development that is needed to make law live in the persons and communities that need governance. Race and the law are so complexly woven into the texture of personal identity and groups processes that few generations have been forced to probe its dynamics. Looking at the past practice in this arena may enable us to avoid doing something singularly stupid. This post modern and minimalist advisory is but a code invitation to move past the crisis of the moment and to address the fundamental question. In the words of Georges Bernanos: The worst, the most corrupting of lies are problems poorly stated.

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[i]. See Charles A Kromkowski, *Recreating the America Republic: Rules of Apportionment, Constitutional Change and American Political Development-1870* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2002)

[ii].*Federal Register*, June 9, 1994. pp.1-5.

[iii]. See, e.g., James E. Jones, Jr., "The Transformation of Fair Employment Practices," in *Federal Policies and Worker Status Since the Thirties* (Madison, Wisc.: Industrial Relations Research Association, 1976).

[iv]. CFR., 1928-43, Comp., 957. The Fair Employment Practices Committee was described by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights as the "first government-wide administrative machinery designed to implement a national policy of non-discriminatory employment and training." See U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, *Report on Employment, 1961.*

For some of the background to Executive Order 8802, see A. Philip Randolph, "Why Should We March," *Survey Graphic*, November 1942.

[v]. Executive Order 9346, May 27, 1943.

[vi]. Jones, "The Transformation of Fair Employment Practices, pp. 170-171. See also Duane Lockhard, *Toward Equal Opportunity: A Study of State and Local Anti-discrimination Laws* (New York: MacMillan, 1968), pp. 21-24; and W. Brook Graves, *Fair Employment Practice Legislation in the United States, Federal - State - Municipal* (Washington, D.C.: Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress, 1951), pp. 15-48.

[vii]. As cited in Robert Senser, *Primer on Interracial Justice* (Baltimore: Helicon, 1962), p. 111.

[viii]. *Ibid.*, p. 111.

[ix]. *Ibid.*, p. 112.

[x]. *Ibid.*

[xi]. Over the years the scope of employment covered by law was extended to encompass "recruitment of potential employees; selection criteria in hiring, e.g., educational or experiential qualifications, application forms, interview procedures, testing; promotion and transfer procedures (e.g., career pathways, 'fast tracking,' seniority, training opportunities) wage and salary structure; employment benefits; layoff procedures; and disciplinary and grievance procedures." U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, *Affirmative Action in the 1980's: Dismantling the Process of Discrimination* (Washington, D.C., 1981), p. 46.

[xii]. N. Glazer and R. Ueda, "Policy Against Prejudice and Discrimination," *Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups*, p. 855.

[xiii]. Executive Order No. 10925, Sec. 312-14, 3 CFR, 1959-63 Comp., 448.

[xiv]. Executive Order No. 11234, CFR. 1964-65 Comp. 339. President's order followed passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

[xv]. Civil Rights Act, 78 Stat. 253 (1964), as amended 86 Stat. 103 (1972), hereafter cited as Civil Rights Act.

[xvi]. The Congressional debate on Title VII indicated the meaning which Congress intended to give to the phrase "national origin." Congressman James Roosevelt explained that "Anglo Saxon" was too broad a term to use to designate a specific national origin, said, "May I just make very clear that 'national origin' means national. It means the country from which you or your fore bearers came from. You may come from Poland, Czechoslovakia, England, France, or any other country. It has nothing to do with broad terms such as the gentleman has referred to." (110 Congressional Record 2548-9 91984). "It is apparent that Congress intended to include within the category of 'national origin' members of all national-groups and groups of persons of

common ancestry, heritage or background. This has been how the term has been interpreted by the EEOC and the courts." Barbara Lindemann Schlei and Paul Grossman, *Employment Discrimination Law* (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National Affairs, 1976), p. 246.

[xvii]. Civil Rights Act, Section 703 (j) of Title VII.

[xviii]. Glazer and Ueda "Policy Against Prejudice and Discrimination," p. 856.

[xix].*Ibid.*

[xx].*Ibid.*

[xxi].*Ibid*.,PP.856-857.

[xxii]. Schlei and Grossman, *Employment Discrimination Law*, p. 1161. "Perhaps the most significant development in employment discrimination has been the dominant role that statistics have come to play..yin some cases, statistical evidence alone has been found sufficient to establish the *prima facie* case. Such reliance on statistical proof is an extension of earlier decisions relying on statistical evidence to prove discrimination in jury selection cases, school systems, and voting rights. This focus on the *actual impact* of the employment practices normally requires a careful assessment of the race and ethnic composition of the persons who pass a given test, who satisfy a given prerequisite, who became hired in a given job, or who make up a given work force or general population. Such assessments and comparisons can best be

expressed in statistical terms." See also Arthur B. Smith, Jr., *Employment Discrimination Law* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1979), p. 463. Smith cites the phrase, "statistics... tell much and courts listen," from *Alabama v. United States*, 304 F 2d 583, 586 (5th Cir.) Aff'd, *per curium*, 371 U.S.

[xxiii]. Glazer and Ueda "Policy Against Prejudice and Discrimination," p. 856.

[xxiv]. Affirmative Action in the 1980s: Dismantling the Process of Discrimination, p. 31

[xxv].*Ibid.*

[xxvi]. See, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, *Employer* formation Report, EEO-l and others.

[xxvii]. 43 FR 49249, Part 60-1.4.

[xxviii].*Ibid*., Part 60-2,10.

[xxix].43 FR 49266, Part 60-5n.1.

[xxx].*Ibid*., Part 60-50.2.

[xxxi].*Ibid.*

[xxxii]. U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, Part 29, Section 1631,302 (c) (1).

[xxxiii].*Ibid*., Section 1607.4B.

[xxxiv]. John Hope III, Acting Staff Director, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, letter to Larry S. Pugel, Executive Board Member, Slavic American National Assn., Nov. 9, 1981.

[xxxv]. State of Illinois, Department of Human Rights, Rules and Regulations, Article VII, Section 7.1, effective March 3, 1981.

[xxxvi]. *Ibid.*

[xxxvii]. See for the example series of articles by Kathy Sawyer in the *Washington Post* (April 11-13, 1982), entitled: "Jobs: The Pursuit of Fairness." Ms. Sawyer claimed that "48 million able-bodied white Anglo males in the civilian work force" were not covered by the "federal affirmative action machinery."

The writer's use of "white Anglo" showed a basic, if common, confusion about national origin and the ethnic composition of American society. It is difficult to perceive Jews, Irish Turks, Iranians, Morrocans, Egyptians, Armenians, Greeks, French, Canadians, Poles, Algerians, Italians, Finns, Danes, Swiss, Ukrainians, and others as "white Anglos".

"Discrimination of this type involves employment practices that are neutral and objective on their face but that fall more harshly on one group, the plaintiff's, than on other groups." Joseph G. Allegretto, "National Origin Discrimination and The Ethnic Employee," *Employee Relations_Law Journal*, vow. VI, no. 4, pp. 545-546. Adverse impact results from policies or practices having disparate impact not justified by business necessity and assumes "a lack of intent to discriminate and that the practices complained of are neutral on their face." Schlei and Grossman, *Employment Discrimination Law*, p. 203.

[xxxviii]. "Discrimination of this type involves employment practices that are neutral and objective on their face but that fall more harshly on one group, the plaintiff's, than on other groups." Joseph G. Allegretto, "National Origin Discrimination and The Ethnic Employee," *Employee Relations Law Journal*, vol. VI, no. 4, pp. 545-546. Adverse impact results from policies or practices having disparate impact not justified by business necessity and assumes "a lack of intent to discriminate and that the practices complained of are neutral on their face." Schlei and Grossman, *Employment Discrimination Law*, p. 203.

[xxxix]. A. Munafo, "National Origin Discrimination Against Americans of Southern and Eastern

European Ancestry: A Review of the Legal History and Judicial Interpretations," *The Catholic*

Lawyer, Winter 1979, pp. 55-56.

[xl]. Allegretto, "National Origin Discrimination and the Ethnic Employee," pp. 546-547.

[xli]. "Arbitrators and National Origin Discrimination," *The Arbitration Journal*, June 1981, p. 34.

[xlii]. L. Walentynowicz, "Civil Rights Issues of Euro-Ethnic Americans, p. 437.

[xliii]. *Ibid.*, p. 437-438.

[xliv]. *Ibid.*, p. 438.

[xlv]. Affirmative Action in the 1980's: Dismantling the Process of Discrimination

[xlvi]. The paucity of data extends to the academic world. Americans of Southern and Eastern European ancestry are almost invisible to the scholars who educate government officials and provide the scholarship on which informed policy is based. One study that looked at the neglect of these groups by American sociologists was: Abraham D. Lavender and John M. Forsythe, "The Sociological Study of Minority Groups as Reflected by Leading Sociological Journals: Who Gets Studied and Who Gets Neglected?", *Ethnicity*, October 1976, pp. 388-398.

NCUEA's survey of the three journals generally recognized as the leading journals in American sociology (the *American Journal of Sociology*, the *American Sociological Review* and *Social Forces*) published 481 articles between 1900 and 1984 about U S. minorities. Only 19 of these articles studied ethnic groups whose ancestry could be traced to Southern and Eastern Europe. The 481 articles were distributed among these minorities: Asiatics (35), American Indians (22), Hispanics (21), Blacks (344), Jews (28), Southern and Eastern European groups (19) and other (12). The scholarly articles on these groups were: Czechoslovakian (1), Greek (2), Hungarian (2), Italian (4), Lithuanian (2), Polish (3), Russian (3), Serbian (1),

Slovak (l) and Yugoslavian (1). An article on Polish-Italian intermarriage was counted for each group.

In view of the small amount of attention given to non-Black ethnic groups in the sociological literature, it is no wonder that so little is known about ethnic-ethnic, ethnic Black, and ethnic-dominant society relations. To the extent that the purpose of sociology is to focus attention on problems in the society, it must be recognized that some non Black ethnic groups are oppressed in the United States. Most proponents of ethnic studies will agree that Blacks are understandably America's first priority because of degree of oppression and because of numbers, but that other groups should also be studied more.

[xlvii].Greeley, *Ethnicity in the United States*, p. 35. It is worth noting in this regard religion that was last asked in the 1957 Current Population Survey. Attempts were made to revive the question 20 years later, but it was not included because of non-response problems which ended up affecting all data.

[xlviii]. Rosen, "Employment and Ethnicity," p. 741.

[xlix]. State of Illinois Department of Human Rights, *Rules and Regulations* Article VII, Section 7.1. The new program is unique in the country. Joyce McKissick of the Illinois Department of Human Rights indicated that the Department has checked all state statutes; did mailings to all state agencies which were responsible for the enforcement of laws barring discrimination in employment; and checked with those attending a meeting on the International Association of Human Rights Organizations. This survey produced no information on the existence of any affirmative action program (collecting statistics, setting goals and timetables, etc.) involving nationality groups, other than Hispanics. *Chicago Tribune*, March 15, 1982.

[l]. Calandra, *A History of Italian American Discrimination at CUNY*, p. 35. Also See, Dominic R. Massaro, "Italian Americans as a Cognizable Racial Group", Italian Americans in A Multicultural Society, in *Race and Ethnic Relations Annual Editions, 1996/97.*

[li]. See NCUEA, *Minority Report: The Executive Suite, Blacks, Latinos, Poles and Italians*, (Washington, D.C.).

[lii]. 45 (FE) 65636 (1980).

[liii]. *Ibid.*

[liv]. "Intergovernmental Relations and Ethnicity," in *Civil Rights Issues of Euro-Ethnic Americans*, p. 542. Kuropas formerly was the Special Assistant to the President for Ethnic Affairs and serves as the Supreme Vice-President of the Ukrainian National Association.

As a result of that consultation the USCCR urged "appropriate federal agencies to explore ways of gathering appropriate employment data" on Americans of Southern and Eastern European ancestry. See United States Commission on Civil Rights, *Affirmative Action in the 1980's: Dismantling the Process of Discrimination*, November, 1981, p. 40, note 48.

[lv]. Andrew Greely, *Chicago Tribune*, July, 1978.

[lvi]. See *Chicago Defender*, January 29, 1976

[lvii]. See *Perspectives*, USCCR, Summer, 1980. Perspectives

[lviii]. See "For Affirmative Action for Some Whites," *New York Times*, Nov. 26, 1977. See also the statement by the Community Relations Committee of the Illinois Division of the Polish American Congress, to which Alderman Pucinski had taken exception. The Committee said

that "the Polish Community supports the affirmative action 'quota system' and believes that the only thing wrong with the quota system is that Polish Americans are not included," *Chicago Defender*, Jan. 29, 1976.

[lix].See *Minority Report: The Representation of Poles, Italians, Latinos and Blacks in the Executive Suites*

(Washington D.C.: NCUEA 1985).

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CHAPTER X

LOCALITY, NATIONALITY, GLOBALITY.

THE POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTION OF ITALICITY IN THE AGE OF GLOBALISATION

MAURO MAGATTI

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INTRODUCTION

This paper is composed of three main parts. The first is a brief theoretical introduction to the theme of globalisation in order to lay down the framework within which to place our current phase of history. The second takes a fresh look at some of the features of Italicity which are significant in the transition through which we are presently passing. The third is an attempt to link these together.

LIVING IN THE POST-SOCIETAL AGE

Globalisation is bringing about profound changes in the coordinates of social life[1]. We witness the collapse of the societal myth - the culmination of a century-long historical process – which aspired to recompose institutional order and subjective experience.

Society, understood as the complex cultural and institutional apparatus which overlapped institutional organisation and subjective experience within the framework of the nation state, was the key term of the twentieth century. From the very outset, this term was used in a vague and evocative sense, with no analytical precision whatsoever. Indeed throughout the nineteenth century in central Europe, the term *Gesellschaft* was used to describe a type of social organisation radically different from the traditional *Gemeinschaft*.

After a gestation period which lasted several centuries and which took place under the banner of national identity, the XX century finally realised – albeit for only a short season – the dream of previous generations. Between the end of the second world war and the fall of the Berlin Wall, we had a 50 year period during which society triumphed. National societies were able to provide a framework which made sense for individual life and an institutional framework within which that collectivity could come about. This was the golden age of society, that is when society was used commonsensically to indicate a social organisation which coincided with the nation state. It was within the conceptual framework that it was possible to speak of "American society", "English society", "Italian society". Globalisation, whatever it means, questions this representation.

In order to understand the ramifications of the breakdown of the societal model which is taking place in this historical phase, it is crucial to make an analytical distinction between the way in which this process is experienced by individuals and the collectivity and the transformation taking place on a structural level. We assume that "globalisation" may be better understood by simultaneously examining the subjective and the structural sides of the present transformation.

A large amount of the current debate on globalisation focuses on the macro or structural level. The argument is that the reorganisation in progress is driven by economic forces which are demolishing the

spatialisation of social life imposed by the nation state (Harvey, 1993).

Actually, from a systemic point of view, the situation is nowadays rather different from two decades ago. Even if we do listen to those who deny that all of this causes the evaporation of the nation state (Berger, Dore, 1998), the fact remains that the level of sovereignty of national political power over economic matters is less now than in the past, and that cannot but condition its logic of action.

However, it is not only the economic sphere: this reorganisation is also – and perhaps above all – taking place in the cultural sphere. The extraordinary growth in the flow of information and communication made possible by telematic technologies (Mattelart, 1991, Meyrowitz, 1993; Morley Robins, 1995) effectively constitutes an autonomous process whose implications must be adequately evaluated (Virilio, 2000): it is no longer only goods or capital that cross borders, but also ideas, information and, not least, human beings.

This brings us back to the ideas of society and culture (Geertz, 1999). Traditionally, the two terms were considered to be interchangeable: each society had its culture – which was relatively homogeneous – and each culture could live and reproduce itself within a given (spatially located) society. "Until a few years ago, countries were nations and cultures shared lifestyles. . . . Now however there are very few countries which at least in part coincide with culturally united societies . . . the illusion that the world is composed from one end to the other of entities of the same type, pieces of a jigsaw puzzle, originates from the iconographic conventions of our political atlases. And it is precisely that, an illusion." (Geertz, 1999:28-9). It is this very presupposition which becomes no longer valid once reality seems to suggest that cultures are possible without territory and that there may be a (problematic) coexistence of diverse cultures within each physical space (Hannerz, 1998).

As far as *politics* is concerned, troubles comes from the weakening of its power. Economic and cultural transactions daily cross national borders, pushing towards new forms of institutionalisation.

Thus, on the *structural level,* we have the first disconnection which involves the loss of coincidence over a territory between systemic spheres increasingly organised around an internal logic of their own. Economic, political and cultural fields tend to organise themselves autonomously and in spaces which are no longer perfectly overlapping. This explains why the institutional framework built after the second world war – characterised by the spatial correspondence between the (national) economy, (national) politics and (national) culture – can no longer fit the current situation. This does not mean that the nation states evaporate, but rather that they are driven to change their role and their internal organisation. (Mann, 1997; Sassen, 2000). To put it more simply, this implies the end of the coincidence between institutionalised environments and what we are used to calling society.

On a *subjective level*, restructuring our spatio-temporal experience, globalisation radicalises the experience of modernity which Simmel, at the turn of the century, conceptualised in terms of diversification and intersection of the social spheres. The point we wish to make is that this experience, which is typically modern, has been radicalized in the latter part of the 20th century. The reason is that individuals are no longer simply located at the intersection of different *social circles*; our subjective experience undergoes a drastic modification as soon as we begin to come into daily contact with multiple worlds which refer to levels of reality which are different from one another, autonomous from one another and even opposed to one another, although confusingly interwoven. This involves two main differences from the last century.

In the first place, systems for institutional regulation and cultural recomposition which were still operating in the 20th century are weakening. Subjective and collective life is becoming increasingly insecure, while the conviction that for each society there is a corresponding culture rooted in one place is collapsing: nowadays, every one of us is forced to live with other cultures and each cultural universe must take account of the Other and what is different.

In the second place, subjective experience moves within multiple and independent levels of reality – face-to-face relations, systemic relations, media communications, virtual reality – the recomposition of which no longer takes place on a collective level, but is left to individual initiative.

It is, therefore, our experience of the world that changes. According to J. Habermas, this triggers a qualitative transformation of the social integration which arises from the new modernising wave crashing on

our lifeworlds: the power of redefining and renegotiating the social space-time within which associative life takes place is no longer a privilege of the wealthier classes, but a (relatively) widespread condition, a way of being which changes the perception of reality and the very life of our times.

The different way in which we build relationships with our surrounding environment means that the space which physically surrounds us is increasingly less able to endow individual life and create a framework within which to develop collective languages and actions. This is because "the truth of experience no longer coincides with the place in which it takes place" (Jameson, 1988:349): the actual physical place is no longer a system of communication onto itself and consequently, the probability of having experiences and meanings in common with those around us tends to become less. In that which M. Albrow has called *disconnected contiguity*, (1996:157), the relation between individuals and the surrounding context is the contrary of the idea of a functionally integrated society. This gives rise to a whole series of social processes: what is near – i.e. known, familiar, comprehensible – and what is far – i.e. unpredictable, threatening, uncertain – is no longer exclusively defined by our direct experience or our spatial location, but becomes something to be continually negotiated (Bauman, 1999:17). It remains to be seen what sort of society all this will lead to.

Globalisation, therefore, is here conceptualised as the combination of two disconnections – the first at a structural level and the second at a subjective one – both of which are becoming more and more widespread and deep. As Bauman observed, "The endemic instability of the lifeworlds of the majority of the people in our times is the ultimate cause of the current crisis in public life, and thus the decline of good society as the objective and reason behind collective action in general and the objective of the resistance to the erosion of the private/public space, the only space within which human solidarity and the recognition of common causes can find fertile terrain to grow "(Bauman, 2000:181).

While refusing to resort to any kind of determinism (whether economic or technological) we may assume that the process of self-organisation of the great systemic and functional apparatus – themselves produced by human action – continuously upset the subjective as well as the collective daily experience. The phase we are going through – in which "the individuals' and small groups' lifeworlds are being spread through functionally interwoven networks around the world, instead of corresponding and overlapping through the channels of social integration into larger and more stratified political entities" (Habermas, 1999:69) – is characterised by a break which is far from having been repaired.

At this point, we can state that globalisation should not be seen as a trend or a state, but more modestly, as a break. Instead of setting up a new social or economic order, the breakage of the balances created after the second world war opens up a series of possible developments: the formation of new political entities on a regional level, clashes between civilizations, the formation of a global ecumene, the birth of the network society, the explosion of identity-based conflicts, the rise of new imperialisms and new centre-peripheral relations, the advent of new social actors and new levels of social conflictuality**,** the explosion of international terrorism causing dramatic political and economic consequences, to name but a few examples. There can be debate as to which of these outlets is most plausible. But the point is that the final outcome is still largely undetermined.

In a word, we are in a post-societal age, where the I-We relationship is undergoing a rapid restructuring. Since we are cruising on a sea whose maps are largely unknown, special care to sighting is needed.

A NEW SPATIALISATION OF SOCIAL LIFE

Modernity has coincided with individualisation. Society has extended the spaces of freedom removing the individual from community control. But this liberation has come up against a limit in those *imagined communities*, abstract and universalistic, represented by the nation state. This has led to the politicisation of social space: actually, the other side of individualisation is the spatialisation of social life through politics. The state and the individual make up the couple which, despite all the tensions – set the course for the 20th century. Now, at the moment when our society is falling apart, the issues which that project was trying to

answer - the origin of social bonds, the sources of solidarity, individual and collective identity – explode once again.

Globalisation marks a spatial rift similar to that of the discovery of America. As then, we have to revise our perception of reality, and with it the I-We relationship. As we have seen, the idea of society presupposed a political myth. That is, it imagined a social life entirely designed around and subject to political authority which was entrusted with the task of building a local and homogenising individualistic universalism. The thought that the categories of modernism could be spread around the entire world is not only contested, but also hardly attractive. As Hannah Arendt wrote, it is dictatorships and mass societies who claim that the world is identical.

Two opposite extremes need to be avoided. On the one hand, this is the desire to reconstruct the lost homogeneity. This solution has at least two variants: the neofundamentalist one, which thinks that it is possible to reconstruct complete, homogeneous and closed identities, and the panpolitical one, which thinks it is possible to extend the domain of politics on a planetary scale. On the other hand, there is the thesis of those who believe that identity is a relic of the past. These are the post-modern response which considers irrelevant issues which are highly controversial (such as identity and social bonds) – and the neoliberalist approach which believes that institutional regulation can be simply replaced by economic regulation.

We argue rather that in order to face the crises mentioned above we should destroy nothing that we have built, but rather rearticulate the social space. In actual fact, even in the past, the advent of society never managed to supplant the community: the former was built on the latter. Thus globalisation should be viewed as an opportunity (as well as a risk) for enriching social life, adding a new dimension to the societal and community dimensions, the *global* dimension. The problem we are faced with is how to recognise diversity without destroying the conditions for coexistence and individual freedom.

The process of despatialisation-respatialisation (Tomlison, 2000) is the core of the matter which is taking place makes it extremely difficult to pursue this objective. Societal modernity was by definition located within a physical space – defined by national frontiers – within which a homogenous reality was created that was also sufficiently separate from the outside world. In such a context, the subject could define himself and others with sufficient clarity, using the spatial parameter as a discriminator. On a more general level, we must underline that the phase which is behind us only made crossing space easier, but did not replace it. This can be seen clearly by observation of daily life which, in societal modernity still was centred around the distinction and separateness of physical places: home, factory, church and municipality.

 Today, however, these clear distinctions no longer exist. The crossing of boundaries by the flows of which our social life is composed (Appadurai, 1996) destroys that experience. There is no longer a space outside of or beyond something.

Take politics as an example. In an emblematic way, we can consider the attack of September 11 as the symbol of this transformation. Even the United States, which had made its physical isolation a central element of its identity, suddenly felt vulnerable. As everyone underlined in the months that followed, it would be hard to imagine a clash of Western civilization and Islam since the 'enemies,' i.e. the Muslims, are not only 'out there' but also 'in here', many now live on a permanent basis in western countries. The construction of the pair, friend/enemy, can no longer be superimposed on the spatial dimension near/far. In fact, to speak of the war on terrorism clearly indicates the despatialisation of conflicts.

But similar dynamics can be found in family life. Even the home space which for many (maybe for most people) continues to be a place of rootedness, is increasing ambiguous. This which above all to the increasing pervasiveness of communication technology, from the phone (land line or mobile) to the television (cable or satellite). If, on the one hand, as J. Meyrowitz (1993) has argued, television above all is responsible for the end to the segregation of the spheres (public and private, male and female, childhood and adult) and there is a restructuring of social stages, on the other hand, the domestic environment has more trouble configuring itself as an other place, separate from the outside and therefore a space for possible reflection, resistance and structural re-elaboration. In this context, it is no longer possible to preserve an intimacy of one's own, a space where there is an interruption in the uninterrupted flow of images and sensations.

The problem is that there is no longer a clear overlap between space and culture, nor between

institutional organisation and subjective experience: the condition of contemporary man is that of a pluralisation of worlds which M. Augé defines as (1993) spatial superabundance. The complexification of social worlds not only results in a quantative superabundance, but the impossibility of transferring experience from one world to another, from one area to another of the social experience. A. Giddens states that we are all partially dislocated, some of us tending to find ourselves elsewhere from the situations in which we actually are. We are never completely at home. For Z. Bauman, we are partially deprived; our experience is never total. There is always a part of us that adapts reluctantly, that does not really feel it belongs, that feels the need for some futher meaning, even to the experiences we ourselves freely choose.

In a world dominated by networks and the web, where the experience of space and time is fragmented and no longer creates a base for recognition and solidarity, politics can and must continue to play a crucial role. This is necessary so that social life not be dominated by pure systemic logics which tolerate only isolated individuals who are no more than cogs in megamachines of which they control neither the direction nor the functioning. In order to do this, however, politics must be able to recognise the richness of social life, its complexity and subjectivity, nurturing, as it were, what otherwise can never grow to maturity. Above all, it must come up with a new spatialisation compatible with the organisation of contemporary social life.

Present times, however, imply the capacity to go beyond a panpolitical vision of society. Politics is not above social subjects coordinating the various systemic spheres. Nor is it as T. Parsons thought, capable of indicating the ends which should be collectively pursued. On a more modest note, politics must be willing to make its essential contribution to a world sailing in stormy waters, resolving collective problems which otherwise would remain unresolved and offering its support to the complex process of the creation of individual and collective identities. As B. Badie wrote, "territoriality has not dissolved but rather has suffered a blow not only to its claim to defining a framework for sovereignty, but also to its tendency to exercise decisive control over social relations and actions" (Badie, 1996:125). Rather than imposing a hierarchy on social life, politics has the task of supporting systemic differentiation – always with the risk of being hindered by the return of new monopolistic trends – and recreating spaces of autonomy and freedom for social subjects and their lifeworlds. In this way, politics can recover one of its roles which is that of working towards the respatialisation and retemporalisation of social life.

INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESS AND THE CASE FOR ITALICITY

The thesis here is that in this framework the Italian case can tell us something which may help us in the search for a new social, cultural and political equilibrium.

Compared with other highly developed countries, Italy has undergone a particular development over the past few centuries. In a certain sense, it could be said that the Italian situation has remained largely outside the experience of societal modernity in its two main expressions, the American and the continental. With regard to the first, Italy never had the inviolability which characterised the USA and made a powerful internal cohesion possible. With regard to the second, Italy is weak in that it has never managed to furnish itself with solid institutional structures. These are not capable of creating conditions suited to the formation of a distinct and homogeneous social and cultural space. We may say that the Italian case cannot be traced to either of the models mentioned in the work of Toqueville.

To make a long story short, we may say that the most characteristic feature of the Italian experience has been its institutional weakness. In the opinion of many authors, this weakness is congenital and is the reason for negative judgments on the Italian case. There is ample evidence of such negative aspects as: a lack of respect for rules, inconsistency of the elites, widespread corruption and clientelism, the fragility of democratic institutions, and lack of a sense of civic duty (Banfield 1959; Almond Verba 1963; la Palombara 1969).

All of these points are justified to a great extent and highlight typical aspects of the Italian situation. Nonetheless, the Italian case is interesting because – contrary to the norm elsewhere – these weakness have not hampered economic and social development. This is not intended as some sort of formal defence of the

Italian specificity. The author is well aware of the ambiguity which characterises this country. But simply and seriously, there are good reasons for claiming that, in the present context, the Italian case, in all its peculiarity, may not be considered an example of delay where the traditional process of modernisation is concerned. Rather it is a heterodox experience from which we can learn some important lessons. It is in fact this very diversity which makes the Italian case so interesting in times like these. In an age in which many past certainties no longer hold true, it may be useful to take a fresh look at those historic processes which have peculiar traits.

The basic reason for this claim is that globalization generalises that very condition of institutional weakness upon which the Italian situation is founded. As we saw in the first part of the paper, if there is a trait that characterises the end of societal modernity it is that at the end of the day the individual nation state can hardly be considered the regulator of human relations. This institutional weakness characterises the era and probably that which is yet to come. This creates a whole series of problems which we are only now beginning to conceptualise. Let us see, therefore, what can be said about the Italian experience.

NATION STATE AND NATIONAL IDENTITY

From a historical point of view, Italy follows the model from nation to state, but with an important variation. Writers and historians, scientists and intellectuals drew up an Italian identity long before the nation state was thought up or created.

The Italian case is peculiar in so far as the national cultural identity was created while maintaining a clear autonomy from the political identity; also the national culture was unable to produce the effects hoped for at the moment when the nation state came into being. Italy is the prototype of a nation state which appeared from nowhere, unable fully to interpret the national sentiment which already existed among the Italians. Contrary to what happens elsewhere, the Italians have difficulty in identifying with their nation state.

Many historical reasons contribute to explain this feature. As far as this discussion is concerned, one element should be stressed: the Italian identity arose as a bridge between the productive centres of the north and the shores of Africa. With over 8,000 kilometres of coastline, stretched out in the middle of the Mediterranean, Italy is an open country, a crossroads between worlds and cultures. Moreover, it has a rich internal diversification which renders impossible any easy homologation. In fact, as a borderline country between Europe and Africa, throughout its history Italy has been characterised by its penetrability. Its borders have been violated on such a continuous basis that the Italians have had to get used to basing their identity on something other than the institutional order. I would underline here that this penetrability made the difference between other processes of national identity-building typical of the modern age: the laying down of borders and the consolidation of a sense of belonging. These are essential elements for the construction of that separate and homogeneous space which was the foundation for societal modernity, but they were achieved only partly in the history of our country. The weakness of political power, its fragmentation and unreliability, have led to a fundamentally sceptical and detached attitude towards the institutions which are considered incapable of solving the day-to-day problems of the individual. A mistrustful attitude which can be summed up in the proverb 'o Francia o Spagna, basta che si mangia,' 'Whether we're ruled by France or Spain, its enough that one eats.'

An understanding of this fact is essential too in order to explain the weaknesses of the nation state which, arising late, has always been characterised by extreme fragility. The nation's elites – while making a decisive contribution to the modernisation of the country – hardly dispelled the mistrust of Italians towards the institutional dimension which, throughout the 20th century constantly undermined Italian public life.

From this Italian case at least three lessons may be learned. The first is that the dimensions of the nation and the state need not necessarily coincide. Over the past few centuries there has been considerable emphasis on this combination to the point where, to a certain extent, they have been made to appear inseparable. Today however, we are attempting to make the tie between these two terms less binding[2]. The Italian case would appear to suggest that the state and nation are relatively independent of one another.

The second lesson comes from a realisation of the fact that in Italy this congenital weakness has not translated into the institutional anarchy to be found in many late comers. Probably, this difference can be traced to the fact that for many centuries – that is up to the creation of the united state – the Italian institutional framework was based on a complex, plural model, without a single centre or a single hierarchy, but within a common cultural framework. In reality, the weakness of Italian political institutions was able to perpetuate itself throughout the centuries without causing disasters in the social body. For it could count on a society with an extraordinary capacity for local self-organisation and guidance of individual behaviour based on tradition and social control. In the Italian experience, the multiplicity of political institutions has always been recomposed in terms of values and institutions by the great integrating force that was the Catholic Church; this had the power to lay down the boundaries within which social processes took place. Due to the presence of the Church, there has always been a clear distinction in the Italian experience between crime and sin, the jurisdiction of the church and that of the political institutions. In this dialectic we can understand the history of the evolution of Italy. The relationship between the social norm – which has its origin in the concrete nature of social relations – and the ethical evaluation of these relations generated an extraordinary capacity for intervention and transformation of society. In order to avoid institutional weakness sliding into anarchy, it is extremely important to work towards the construction of a shared social morality, which makes it possible to support the intended institutional apparatus.

The third lesson is that, lacking such a ethical-value framework, it is pointless to aim solely for institutional structures of a merely regulatory nature. This risks starting a vicious circle of one-dimensional norms, namely placing excessive expectations attributed socially to positive law, which they must regulate every sphere of social life – even down to the tinest details – without any moral support of a social nature*:* "The omnipresence and pervasiveness of positive law in every aspect of daily life results in the suicide of the law. In any case, there is an increasing lack of flexibility of every aspect of daily life as legislative and judicial regulation day by day spreads to areas which traditionally belonged to morality and judgement of sin. Here, justice watches over us and punishes us for our sexual customs, closes in on us with new prohibitions, makes ever more rigid family relationships, economic activity and work, health and school, and follows us every day from birth to death" (Prodi 2000:480-1). In the Italian situation, over the past decades this spiral has ended up producing the kind of *statalismo* which has contributed to draining the state institutions of any strength or content. As a result, they are unable to govern an overwhelming social situation, thereby contributing to the crisis of civil convolvent. The connection with what Z. Bauman said about the process of adiaphorization of contemporary society is clear: the more society – as we have understood it during the twentieth century – breaks down, the more difficult it becomes to control individual behaviour without recourse to formal criteria. But this is the start of a vicious circle: on the one hand, we have difficulty expressing new forms of social self-regulation – because the fragmentation of social reality cancels this out – and this forces us to turn to the judicial or legislative system to set limits for individual behaviour. But neither parliaments nor law courts can keep up with social change, and anyway there are no organisational and institutional resources for implementing such a form of regulation. This ends up in an overproduction of norms with the inevitable juridification of social life (Teubner 1999). The sole consequence is the alienation of the citizen from the institutions. From this viewpoint, it does indeed seem that we are living in another world, detached from the tradition which characterised the last millennium. With the advent of the one-dimensional norm, in fact, "there is no longer the normative 'breath' (in/out) between the internal but collective world (not private) of the moral norm and the external world of positive law. This characterised our lives and made liberal and democratic growth possible over all these centuries. It is the only way in which our collective identity can survive" (Prodi 2000:484). This is one of the typical problems of globalisation of which we can see signs in the Italian experience.

THE PLACE OF THE LOCAL

In the Italian situation, the weakness of national institutions has always gone hand in hand with the central role of the local dimension. The localism of the Italians was long seen as a sign of backwardness. As far back as the beginning of the 18th century, in his "Discourse on the Present State of the Customs of the Italians," Giacomo Leopardi made a sarcastic list of a series of defects of the Italian people, some of which may strike us as equally valid today: from the 'little or no national love which exists among us' to the 'intimate and closed society whose members become almost a family' (:12); from the 'peculiarity of our

opinions' to the 'lack of a centre which is also a lack of a society': 'each Italian city, but not only, each Italian, acts in accordance with their own precepts'! (:21). Other comments, too, seem extraordinarily pertinent and up to date, such as the lack of planning and the focus exclusively on the present, the tendency towards cynicism and ridicule of oneself and others, where low self-esteem, in the final analysis, means lack of morality (:37).

As far as national identity is concerned, Leopardi saw a proliferation of habits rather than recognisable customs: "Italians have usages and habits rather than customs. Few usages and habits can be described as national, but of these few and the many more which can only be described as provincial or municipal, it can only be said that they are followed for simple satisfaction rather than any kind of either provincial or national spirit" (:48).

This very localism was long considered a sign of the incapacity of Italian society to open up, remaining as a result slave to the worst particularist dynamics, within which clientelism and familism dominated to the detriment of any universal recognition (La Palombara, 1969). As already mentioned, Italian and international studies of the 60s focused particularly on this point, highlighting the weakness of Italian modernity. To mention just one, there is the amoral familism as coined by E. Banfield (1958), an element able to spoil Italian civil life. Namely, instead of bringing up its members to go out and take part in public life, the family offers them reassurance and protection, even at the price of overturning the rules of collective life.

Yet, the situation today seems even more complex. In fact, starting in the 70s when the crisis of the societal equilibrium created in the post-war period first became evident, the Italian experience helped demonstrate that the local dimension does not necessarily mean backwardness. Under certain conditions, it may prove to be an incubator of resources capable of boosting economic development and social involvement. In those years it became increasingly clear that Italy was unable to reproduce the dominant model of modernisation on a political, economic and social level. Yet the rediscovery of the local dimension constituted one of the central elements for a rethinking of the model of national development.

The development of the industrial districts, the Third Italy (Bagnasco, 1977), the model of flexible specialisation (Quadrio Curzio, Fortis, 2002), made possible a widespread capitalism deeply rooted in the local dimension. Within this the social capital based on an intense relational network and a shared identity constituted the central resource.

Within this school of thought, it is worth mentioning the work of Putnam (1993) who emphasised that the high institutional performance of certain Italian regions was the winning card of a development model based on a high level of social integration. Its economic system was founded on small and medium-sized businesses organised on the basis of the model of flexible specialisation. The central notion in Putnam's work is "social capital" defined as "features of social organization such as trust, norms and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions" (:167). Putnam says that in local contexts characterized by dense networks of social exchange and moral inclusion people could trust each other and information can be reliable[3]. In such contexts, the social ability to collaborate for shared interests is the central resource to integrate social life and sustain growth. Thus aspects which seemed irrelevant in societal modernity have come once again to constitute an important point of reference.

In the Italian tradition, *localism* has kept its strength and has managed to mobilise considerable economic and social forces. In the face of the weakness of the nation state in playing a role to integrate civic values, local society has played and continues to play a surrogate role, creating the foundations for a widespread sense of involvement and shared responsibility[5].

More recently, there has been renewed study of amoral familism. As everybody knows, the family is a strong feature of Italian society. In all the studies carried out over the past years, the family appears as that in which Italians most trust. After the drop in ratings during the 70s, the institution of the family shows an enviable tenacity: for Italians, the family generally remains the most important value. As noted in recent studies, the Italian family exhibits an extraordinary plasticity and capacity for transformation and it remains pivotal in the social life without any significant difference among different areas of the country, professions, social groups or age groups.

In this context, there has been mention, in a less negative light, of vital familism which "develops a

culture of indulgence of a particularly feminine kind, an indication of the pervasive presence of the mother in Italian culture. This tends to personalise all relations and leads to an excessive indulgence for the guilty, particularism, familism, but also to a concreteness which makes discipline difficult" (Cassano, 1998:19). According to Cassano "familism is not closing off the outside world but an attitude of indulgence, compassion, flexibility which has no place in the society of law, an attention to a different concreteness, the feeling that there is a common origin that can be translated into a rejection of any boundary to the community". According to this way of seeing things, the central position of personal relations (to go beyond its well known negative aspects) seems capable of generating symbolic and material resources. Under certain conditions, these can in an original way recompose the relationship between the individual and the surrounding context, according to a logic different to that of the societal model. The local dimension - basically founded on what is called personal trust - may constitute a resource which can even compensate for the deficit of institutional trust which has always been an important aspect of the Italian case. In this regard two aspects which deserve to be underlined.

The first is that the sense of national identity is not in counterpoint to, but rather is strengthened by the sense of belonging on a local level. Apart from the recent separatist tendencies which emerged in the 90s, in actual fact, Italian history is composed of a plurality of belongings which then come together in the common Italian matrix. Being Italian can remain somewhat of an abstraction, but Italianness is mediated by the local dimension, which is able to translate the abstract into the concrete. Therefore, even if the weakness of national identification emerges from its inability to connect with any moral dimension, that is to play the role of integrator for a set of civil values (Sciolla, 1997:87), it is also true that in this atavistic temptation, Italy possesses a surprising ability to anticipate current trends connected with globalisation. For the local dimension constitutes the place where the global becomes concrete and relates, there is an area of interaction in society which facilitates the diffusion rather than concentration of power. This is capable of creating horizontal solidarity instead of boundaries of vertical subordination, and of encouraging debate and autonomy instead of obedience and conformity.

The second aspect concerns the fact that Italian localism, rather than being the seed of closing off, contains traits which underline concrete involvement and the recognition of the other which meld in a local cosmopolitanism. In this regard research carried out in recent years demonstrates that Italian civic society does not so much express that sense of civicness – typical of Anglosaxon cultures – as that which M. Buber called "social principle" in contrast to political principle[4]. These studies highlight how, on the one hand, the infinite web of human relations, social ties and obligations is never reproduced in institutional life; on the other, associated life has an incessant relational production which is a durable source of social transformation. In this sense, it is direct experience, doing things in person, and measuring up to real problems that provides the drive towards adhesion, and the contribution to solving particular problems of concrete collective interest. These are the characteristic elements of Italian civic society. Within this situation, the dense network of social subjects expresses above all the importance of dealing with other concrete issues and takes real direct responsibility for the more fragile sectors of society. Together, these elements give rise to a widespread, if often hidden, situation which has considerable self-entrepreneurial qualities. These are not only of an acquisitive, but also of a solidaritarian nature, they have exceptional ability to move in the gaps and spaces left empty by administrative and economic apparata.

The crux of the matter is that within these realities, a powerful localistic orientation coexists with an equally clear universalistic orientation. It is among those who are most committed to the local level that we find the greatest openness to the other and the least preoccupation with defending their own identity.

A VOCATION FOR UNIVERSAL CODES

A third consideration deals with the relationship between Italianness and globality. The weakness of the Italian state identity not only has to do with the local dimension, but also with the universalist vocation of Italicity. This has two different aspects.

The first is that, since the time of the Renaissance, Italian culture has distinguished itself – both in its

most illustrious relations and in the organisation of daily life on an individual and collective level – by the centrality of the expressive dimension. If, following C. Taylor (1993), we wished to distinguish the two roots of modern individualism, then we could say that Italian culture is distinguished by the centrality attributed to the expressive dimensions rather than to scientific and technological rationality.

There is no need here to underline the fact that – above and beyond the issue of its political strength – Italy has constantly produced artists of the highest order. More recently, much of the economic reconversion which characterised the country involved sectors in which the added cultural value made the difference (the reference is, naturally, first and foremost to fashion). Made in Italy, more than a simple economic reference to quality, is an expression of an aesthetic sense which is capable of raising itself to the level of a universal language. Above and beyond its political inconsistency, Italian culture never ceased to project itself outside. It was never content to stay safe within the limited confines of its national boundaries, but was always trying to take part in the search for universal codes[5].

Despite its political controversies, Italy has always been one of the most lively cultures in the world, capable above all of expressing a quality of life that is envied in many places. It is this different form of individualism that makes Italy so attractive today in an age when the forced rationalism of the 20th century has revealed its limitations.

The second aspect deals with some features of the Italian diaspora. Two observations seem of interest.

The first is the sense of national pride of the many millions of Italians who live all over the world. Italianness has for many constituted an important motive for pride, exceeding any identification with the state and its actions. Perceiving themselves as a people of "saints and heroes," Italians tend to identify themselves with the deeds of famous Italians, above all sports champions, who through their actions legitimise that sense of belonging which is at the root of feeling Italian. Our compatriots who achieve success in some field or other express and reinforce this perception which continues to be widespread the world over. The Italian is proud of that creative way of doing and being which constitutes the most distinctive feature of being Italian and constitutes something absolutely distinctive.

The second aspect consists of building an identity which is not antagonistic to other loyalties of a political, religious or associative nature. As we have seen, the sense of commonness which characterises Italicity is not directly connected with nationalistic issues or problems regarding the demands of the nation state. Rather, above all, it is a vision of life – what journalists like to call: the Italian way of life. At the same time that these characteristics imply a sort of intrinsic weakness of this identity, they constitute its strong point and its most interesting aspect. In fact, Italicity can be considered a good example of an identitary network which is able to exist and function without conflicting with other identitary dimensions connected to territory and more generally, to politics. Accordingly, Italianness has been and continues to be a resource utilised mainly in order to find a balance between individualistic behaviour and the need for a continued sense of identity and belonging. This is decisive and the most interesting aspect of Italicity.

In conclusion, we can say that the Italian experience is of interest in so far as it recomposes in an original manner the dimensions of the national, the local and global, both on an institutional and cultural level. It is this which makes Italianness so intriguing in the age of globalization. In Italy, a cosmopolitan identification takes on non-conformist and anti-institutional connotations. Italianness would appear rather to be an essentially anthropological and cultural phenomenon which expresses itself mainly at the local level. This may explain why a national identity is maintained well beyond the state infrastructure, which is important, but not so essential[6]. Still Italiannes is able to give identity, as has been demonstrated by its role throughout the 20th century among the various Italian communities all over the world.

SPACES OF A MULTIDIMENSIONAL POLITICS

This brief analysis of the Italian experience brings us back, to the general themes connected to globalisation.

According to J. Habermas, the 20th century drew to a close marked by a second great transformation, reproducing the same dynamic that occurred between the 18th and 19th centuries, with a deregulation of world trade as a prelude to a new regulation: "From the viewpoint of K. Polanyi, the question arises of how it is possible to politically close – without any regression – a world society that is globally interconnected and highly interdependent" (Habermas, 1999:65). The objective of J. Habermas is doubtless laudable, but how realistic is it? How can one possibly think of such a goal nowadays, looking at the state in which we find the political institutions at our disposal?

In actual fact, what we do know today is that not only can politics no longer take for granted the spatial-institutional framework within which to place itself, but it is also strained by the complexification of social life. If in the past, the nation state with its boundaries and rites, managed to serve as the container within which this function of politics was able to express itself, today this is no longer the case. If globalisation – in the sense of a double disconnection – rearticulates social life over a plurality of spaces and times, then the political sphere must also be thought of on a multiplicity of planes. But what are these planes and what holds them together?

Above and beyond the particular solutions which can be proposed for this problem, we believe that it is possible to identify three levels which make up the field within which the new politics must attempt to position itself.

Only 30 years ago and 500 years after the discovery of America, for the very first time millions of television viewers saw the planet Earth as a sphere hanging in the space of the universe. The Earth appeared physically isolated, tiny, limited; the boundaries of our existence became evident and R. Robertson's (1999) position on awareness of globality becomes true. Only a few decades ago Western public opinion has learned of the existence of the Third World and that the majority of human beings live in poverty. At the beginning of the 70s there was the first oil crisis and great controversy over the Report of the Rome Club. Two so-called world wars belong to recent memory. The unexpected formation of a global telematic network created the conditions for communications without frontiers, except for those of the planet itself. All this enables us to recognise and participate in problems and issues which cannot be reduced to national dimensions.

A. Melucci grasped the essence of this process when he wrote that "there is no longer a space outside of society . . . society coincides with the planet and the planet socialises as a whole" (1998:328). Slowly and with great difficulty, contemporary humanity is also beginning to come to terms with the awareness not only of interdependence, but also of limits. M. Albrow (1996) rightly claims that here the global takes the place of the modern, and globality that of modernity. What we are looking at here is a crucial shift which profoundly changes the logic of social life: this starts with the fact that whereas modernity had an essential temporal perspective whose point of reference was progress, globality introduces a spatial framework which indicates the presence of a limit.

If we think of the age we are living in as the start of a global age, a more balanced reading of our times becomes possible. In the previous pages, it was claimed that the term globalisation is misleading. To speak instead of globality allows us to recognise the plurality of the social actors and the complexity of social dynamics. Within this field, the idea that each person should stay in his or her own place, according to a rigid concept of physical separation, no longer holds up. In such a situation, it becomes increasingly difficult to avoid stepping on the toes of others. On the contrary, the question of relations between different cultures and interests on a world scale appears daily on the national political agenda, often upsetting and disorienting it. We need to learn to control this situation in order not to be swept away by the conflicts which inevitably it can trigger. On this note we can speak of globalism which arises "when human beings undertake obligations towards the world as a whole, when they accept values which consider the globe as their point of reference" (Albrow 1996:83). The discovery of the limits and risks which surround us, just as the acknowledgement of issues concerning the dignity of human being, are at the basis of a new kind of universalism. This is different from that which we knew in the age of nation states. Only such universalism can form the basis for a coexistence which will not fall prey to the explosion of destructive local claims to identity.

It is crucial to underline the profound significance of this process. In fact we agree with R. Panikkar when he states that "when there is an absence of a transcending sphere recognising the governed and governors, democracy is endangered. . . . That is in the realisation that the recognition of a superior power

cannot be imposed, but must be identified and accepted" (2000:16). In the age of globalisation, the very idea of globality may be the path to this result, based on the conviction that there is a "we" composed of the entire human race (Held, Archibugi, Kohler, 1999). This idea then connects with the two great themes of human rights and protection of the environment, which are regarded by some as the foundation for a cosmopolitan democracy. They are necessary references for the construction of a new form of universalism within which all other political formation must take place. Rejecting the concept of a world state as an aberrant prospect from many points of view, this viewpoint suggests a new political level which would go towards defining the framework within which the institutions (on a national and non-national level) should be positioned. Only a politics capable of anchoring itself to this superior can take root in the age of globalisation.

The second constraint within which modern day politics can be defined requires an acknowledgement of the local dimension. In order better to explain this point, we can refer to the principle of subsidiarity, where the institution only intervenes when there is an absence or failure of autonomous action on the part of social subjects. This constraint must be recognised not only because the reticular organisation of society and the process of individualisation make it impossible to do otherwise, but also because politics can manage to avoid the mistakes of the past only if it is able to recognise, respect and optimise the vast resources of a human, social and cultural relational and civil nature built up thanks to developments over the past few centuries. Respect for the local and the particular is not only the condition for a globalised world capable of tolerating and appreciating diversity; it is also the prerequisite for a new recomposition as far as lifeworlds are concerned. As we have tried to demonstrate, it is in fact above all on this level that there can be a constructive recomposition of identity in the present age.

From this point of view, the local level acquires a new significance, which has yet to be understood and appreciated. Namely, it is capable of decentralised decision-making models for facing and resolving the concrete problems which affect the day-to-day life of people. This does not mean drawing up new boundaries or setting up little states which on a smaller scale reproduce the model of the nation state. If anything, the aim is to establish a different relationship between citizens and institutions where participation and co-responsibility can introduce new values and practices which make it possible to re-root the democratic bond and sense of political belonging. As U. Beck remarked somewhat controversially: "the sons of freedom hate the formalism of organisations and their model of commitment built on the imperative of the sacrifice of the individuality of each" (2000:7). One of the greatest difficulties of the traditional political structures centred around the idea of the bureaucratic-state institution derives from their incapacity to accept spaces of freedom, creativity and innovation for each individual actor or basic community. This goes some way towards explaining how in social contexts where the double disconnection produces its effects it is not uncommon to note extra-institutional processes of social recomposition which have their foundation in the active social subjects in local contexts. Social movements, voluntary organisations and the entire network of associations make a continuous contribution to the regeneration of a sense of common belonging and collective responsibility. In order for a rebirth of politics on new foundations to be possible, we must stop harping on the disappearance of values and believe rather in the potential which exists in social life. In actual fact, as Beck writes, we are not faced with a crisis of solidarity but rather its transformation: "Spontaneity, self-organisation, a rejection of formalism and hierarchies, rebellion, improvisation, determination to commit only where it is possible to remain subjects of one's actions, these are the new values which are being affirmed" (Beck,2000:11). The problem is how to create conditions whereby these values will no longer be marginal, but a constituent part of social life.

In any case, if we wish to avoid a degeneration of localism to the point of harming the social fabric, we must be able to firmly anchor the local to the higher levels, thus avoiding a slide towards the increasing trend of Balkanisation. For its part, globalisation always runs the risk of being too abstract, if not actually a vehicle of intolerance and unilaterality (Habermas, 1999:94).

The local or global level on its own cannot restructure and balance itself; it is vain to hope that it is possible to operate on the basis of the local-global pair alone[9]. There is need for intermediate levels as a bridge between the local and global dimensions. In the oscillation between universalism and particularism there is a risk that we will take the worst of both worlds. This is the reason why there remains crucial the state dimension, where the forms of modern democracy can continue to exist even though their survival today depends on the two levels mentioned above, the local and the global.

Clarification is essential on this point: although historically, the state dimension has been closely connected with national identity, it does not strictly depend on it. As G. Sartori said, "a state need not be

national in order to be a State: all it needs is a sovereign potestative structure backed up by adequate coercive forces . . . the fate of equal citizen does not depend on whether the state is national or otherwise, but rather on its being liberal-constitutional" (Sartori, 2000:88). Along the same lines J. Habermas maintains that democratic order is not linked to mental rootedness in a nation in the sense of a prepolitical community of destiny[10].

The strength of the democratic state is in its ability to fill the void of social integration starting from the political participation of the citizens. As long as it is within a liberal political culture, the democratic process can, in fact, play the role of a general guarantee in order to uphold a society which is differentiated on a social level. . . . In complex societies, it is the deliberative formation of opinions and civil will – based on the principles of popular sovereignty and the rights of man – which ultimately make up the adequate medium for a form of solidarity that is abstract, juridical, regenerated by political participation (Habermas, 1999:54).

It is clear, therefore, that the state sphere is at a crossroads: on the one hand, it could go down the road already travelled in an attempt to ensure the survival of the essential features of the national society and to protect its identity from the changes which are taking place. To a certain extent this means working to reconstruct a closed self-regulated universe. On the other hand, it could accept the complexity of social life on a subjective and systemic level, on an infrastate and superstate level, and consequently rethink the very basis of the legitimacy of power. This latter viewpoint attributes a task as essential as it is innovative to the institutional dimension which we are most familiar, namely, the state. In any case, it is the only one firmly anchored to the notion of democracy.

As a necessary (but now no longer sufficient) seat of democratic policy, the state dimension must undertake a dual role:

1. To contribute in such a way that the local and global dimensions can develop without falling prey to degenerative processes. The institution of the state acts as a valve which is essential for the other two levels. On the global level, states have a precise responsibility and task of democratising their external surroundings and creating the optimum conditions for resolving the conflicts and tensions which inevitably arise in such a context (Kohler 1999: 243): Defence of the environment and human rights requires institutional structures with the power to translate these principles into reality. These must be able to carry out the indispensable function of linkup with public opinion. On the local level, only the state sphere can constitute the framework of a civil society which does not yield to closedness and localism.

2. To provide those collective goods which guarantee the conditions of social, cultural and economic life, taking into account the fact that "many of the infrastructures of public and private life would collapse were they left to the regulatory forces of the market alone" (Habermas, 1999:55). This objective must be pursued on multiple levels of action: from the reproduction of the material and infrastructural conditions of individual action to the corrections of excessive gaps of inequality; from the creation of an arena where coexistence is possible to the mutual confrontation of different cultures as an ultimate guarantee of the resolution of conflicts.

As once upon a time newly formed nation states fought one another to set physical boundaries which defined them and to build a common memory and identity, in the same way today – in a totally new way – politics has the task of recreating orientation maps which are not merely individuals or an expression of isolated, closed groups. In this way, politics must work towards the respatialisation and retemporalisation of social life, trying to reconnect the reorganisation of systemic structures and the subjective experience of life.

An appreciation of the local level means combating the subjective disconnectedness which weakens the very foundations of civil life, exposing it to dangerous involutions. Only through the assumption of personal responsibility which this involves does it become possible for the global citizen to take possession once again of a history and a space, recreating the foundations for new rehumanising social bonds. On the other hand, the global level is inseparable: only now is humanity beginning to come to terms with this commonness of destiny. In this new space, a new history must be begun with new subjects, new values, new

conflicts. For its part, the space of the state cannot remain a prisoner of the past. The move beyond the traditional idea of national identity does not wipe out identities, but works so that the history of each may become compatible with that of the others. This requires awareness that in a world like ours there is no such thing as a closed space in which to safeguard the single identity. In practice, this means a politics capable of finding the new motives and modes of citizenship.

These three constraints must be made to operate conjointly since they complement one another. Only globality is able to offer a universalistic framework; only locality can guarantee that rootedness which enables the translation of these references into practice in a constructive manner; only the state can offer a strong enough institutional foundation to gather the best of these two levels. In any case, this is the condition for an attempt to rethink the idea of the state which in the present age seems to have been stripped of its main content, that is its universalistic value. Keeping these three constraints together is the prerequisite for the creation of a new politics capable of taking seriously the consequences of the double disconnection (structural and subjective). The risks which will have to be run are considerable: the abandonment of the classical concept of the sovereign state and national democracy in order to tread a path composed of a multitude of authorities at different levels of aggregation, territorial or functional, with ambiguous and partially overlapping competencies (Schmitter, 1990) means gambling all our history. As R. Williams wrote at the beginning of the '80s, "we must explore new forms of variable society in which, alongside the whole set of social aims, different dimensions of society are defined for different types of questions and decisions" (Williams, 1983:198-99).

We are a long way from doing this. But in any case, it is a risk which we cannot avoid taking: the double disconnection lays out a completely new field of action within which we have yet to find the equilibrium and structures on both an individual and collective level. If only we attempted to cross the complex field of the resources which are on the move today and the forms of collective action which are possible, it would become evident not only how ingenuous are the simplified representations at our disposal, but also what potential is opening up before humanity.

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[1] The theoretical part of this paper is largely based on C. Giaccardi, M. Magatti, *La globalizzazione non è un destino. Mutamenti strutturali e esperienza soggettiva nell'età contemporanea,* Laterza, Bari, 2001

[2] Note that Habermas' latest contribution goes exactly in this direction, and that the European

organization is trying to develop this idea.

[3] Putnam notes: "Reciprocity/trust efficency and dependence/exploitation can each hold society together, though at quite different levels of efficiency and institutional performance" :178)

[4] While in the final analysis, this is based on power, "it is the condition of mutual union or the decision to unite" that is the constituting element (Buber, 1996:30).

[5] The role of the Catholic Church is surely crucial in explaining this attitude

[6] C Geertz seems to share this outlook, distingushing between, on the one hand, "country which coincides with a delimited space constituted up to a point in an arbitrary manner, a common stage for public disagreements and debate , and (on the other hand) nation - as awareness of one's origin, affinity of thought and external appearance, language and food, religious faith and ways of beings which link individuals to one another and consequently for the bond of belonging irrespective of what may happen" (Geertz, 1999:41).

CHAPTER XI

CIVIC IDENTITY WITHOUT NATIONAL IDENTITY?

POLITICAL IDENTITY IN A NEW AND CHANGING GLOBAL CONTEXT

VITTORIO EMANUELE PARSI

Without a homeland, you have no name, no distinguishing mark, no vote, no rights, no christening of brothers between peoples. You are humanity's bastards. Soldiers without a flag, the Israelites of nations, you will obtain neither faith nor protection: you will not have guarantors. Do not deceive yourselves that you will be emancipated from unjust social conditions, if you do not first obtain a homeland; where there is no homeland, there is no common pact that binds you and to which you can refer: the egoism of private interests reigns supreme, and he who has predominance maintains it, as there is no common protection to protect oneself.

Giuseppe Mazzini[1]

DECOMPOSING NATIONAL IDENTITY

National identity is made by many things; it is a rich mix composed by many different elements, var from place to place, but also in terms of success. First, some definitions of these composnents.

Epos. The common tradition, based on either history or legend, traces the first perimeter of the nat identity.

Ethnos. A people thought essentially as a common culture, and its living heritage.

Topos. The place in which we live, whence ee came, where we hope to return. A physical place, or that is imagined or even just dreamed.

Ethos. The shared, common values and beliefs; our imagine of the world and of the place our pe occupy in it.

Nomos. A corpus of laws and rules that differs us from any other people, and of which we are proud.

Oikos. A web of wealth and interdependence, richness and poverty, that holds our attention and under the material meaning of our common destiny.

Demos. As a result of these different elements, the shared and deep feeling of belonging to one com sole people.

All these things contribute to form our national identity. But in modern democracies this identity has been gradually stuffed with civic elements, political meanings passed through the filter and reinforced by public institutions. In different places and times some of these support or substitute for civic identity, while others can undermining it, or constitutes objective obstacles to its full realization. In determining which public institutions play a critical role for they are the trustees of common and shared political values. Being shielded by public institutions, those values are removed from the political arena, from the battlefield of day by day political conflicts, and become the pillars of the temple of the community.

A NATION OF CITIZENS

What is a Nation?

This may seem an old, even rhetorical, question, but it is important as it was central in the words of R before World War I. It leads us to the other related question, raised by the Abbot Seyes at the beginning o institutionalisation of democracy in the 1789: "What is the Third State? It is the Nation; the Nation is the 7 State."

Nowadays, at the beginning of the postmodernist era, at the dawn of the global age, we wonder once i who we are as a nation. Once again the answer is hidden somewhere inside a territory where blood and his past and future, relations of production and kinship play a new game. State and nation have been building up special relationship for more than two centuries, each reinforcing and supporting the other. They have been li so tightly, that now it could be impossible to think of them politically as two separated realities.

Public institutions have linked State and Nation, and gave political meaning to national identity. Tha been true both where public institutions have moderated the political will, and where they added political fury. most successful form of the match between nation and State has been the "Civic Nation", either in its Jacobin ("every one who acted for the welfare of the Republic is French" as said by the French Jacobin Constitution) the Republican model, including that conceived by the American Founding Fathers.

It is not surprising that America represents the paramount model, the most successful case history Civic Nation. Following the ideal of "a State considered as a City", America realized the dream of a democ community based on a plurality of original belongings bound together, to build a new civic-national identity pluribus Unum": never have these words rung so true as in the dark days after September 11th. Throughout entire period, American society has shown the world how a democracy, based on a strong civic identity confident in its own institutions, could suffer almost any injury and come out strengthened.

To speak of civic identity and political identity in the face of globalization means being conscious globalization touches the significance and relevance of ethos and oikos, of topos and nomos. This means understanding "Who we are" should be "the" question, that defining the new Demos is the challenge for e people facing these difficult, interesting, amazing days.

In the Italian experience, we find that the weakness of the political dimension of Italian national identi mirrored in the weakness of its political institutions. The fragile process of Nation-building finds is rooted in fragility of its process of State-building. As the American experience shows, there is a link between building be common political arena (the State institutions in the modern European experience) and a common – but universalistic – brotherhood (the Nation, in the modern European experience). This does not mean that all po must be forcibly channelled back within the sphere of the State. But it is precisely the public institu themselves that have proved to be the most effective tool in *taming* politics, reining it in and regulating it. As has been the Western experience (particularly in Europe), it could be dangerous to imagine politics free from surveillance of State institutions. Without its institutionalisation, politics is everywhere and everything beco politics, with enormous risks for democracy and liberty.

The cases of Italy and the United States would seem custom-made to demonstrate two perfect opposit terms of the question of political identity and affiliation. The United States today still represents, despite al limitations, an extraordinary success in building political identity through public institutions. Civic identity national identity blend together almost as one, in the sense that the former built the latter. As we will see, ther sub-identities and sub-affiliations that can be defined in terms of ethnicity, race, member States of the Union, even class, interest or gender. Yet none of these sub-identities seems to have tarnished the political identity, up of loyalty to the Constitution and to the values to which the Founding Fathers' aspired in its writing.

This does not mean that the sub-identities are not politicized, at times even radically. From the race that explode in large American cities with a certain cyclical regularity, to the rise of extremist leaders in div

ethnic groups (from Malcom X to Farrakhan), to the highly compact voting by the Jewish or black segments o
population in presidential elections, to the true and proper "outing" of the conflict between interest groups and
representation, of which lobbying is only the most visible example: all the possible cleavages appear politic
within the multi-level circuit of American politics. Yet, precisely because of this explicit politicization o
multiple rifts within a composite society that is continually redefining itself, the political identity of the *Amer*
Nation seems to be continuously preserved.

Overseeing all this are, on one side, a solid framework of institutions and, on the other, a strong so
fully aware of its own strength. These are institutions that for over two hundred years have shown themselves
to fulfil their role, adapting to change without ever having to undergo even a formal transformation in
physiognomy. Unbroken history and unchanging morphology of the U.S. institutions closely resemble tho
ancient Rome, which underwent few explicit formal changes between the republican and principality stages.
American institutions, too, have accompanied, without patent discontinuity, the country's transition from
authentically "republican" to its "imperial", "Great Nation" stage.

Of course, the nation's growth and transition have not been painless for either institutions or societ
both were severely put to the test by the Civil War. Yet since the end of that war, any questioning of the nat
identity has been put to rest. With the Union victory, the federation commenced the transformation that would
the country and its institutions to make itself first into a Republic (and no longer a Union of Republics
Hastings, 1997: 79) and then into a new "Western empire" (Brzezinski, 1997; Johnson, 2000; Ital. trans. 2001).

THE (WEAK) ITALIAN PATH TO CITIZENRY

In the case of Italy, we can speak in terms of absences and unfinished processes – or processes that, fo
most part, have been reshuffled or reworked. That is, the weakness of the *Italian Nation* is mirrored in
weakness of the *Italian Institution* (and on the "ancient importance" of the "lack of substance and foundation o
State in Italian history", see Galasso, 1997: 14). Our intent here is not to question the existence o
"Italianity" (or perhaps an *"Italicity"**). In terms of behavior, customs, language and ethnic group, Italians do e
at least as much as the majority of other Western European peoples. And they exist even as a common heritag
trade and relations between the different parts of the peninsula (Galli della Loggia, 1998). But what is lacki
the *Nation-building* process, a lack that is inevitable, if we consider its fragile *State-building* process. Wha
advance then is the idea that the American process of building a political identity is only the "extreme" for
which this nexus or necessary link between the building process of the political arena (the State) and the cre
of a common (non-universalistic) fraternity is underscored. (From "Italic", referring to the populations residin
the Italian peninsula from the Bronze Age onwards, especially up to and including the Roman Empire.)

Must all politics, then, be channeled back within the sphere of the State? Clearly not. But it canno
denied that politics without its institutionalization is nothing; or worse, it is everything. Nor can it be denied
for a long period of time, the State has represented (and still represents) the most refined and efficient for
institutionalization that politics has ever known in its long history. Put another way, it is the path that has pr
best (and, as totalitarianism has shown, riskiest) at harnessing and taming political force or "absolute" politics
mentioned the totalitarian risk: yet it must not be forgotten that, in its purest essence, totalitarianism yields t
(temporary) necessity of using the State, which, however, totalitarians are quick to empty of its genui
institutional meaning. It is not by chance that, in carrying out its designs, and especially in order to gain "acces
the State/institution, totalitarianism must resort to inventing that strange figure of the (revolutionary) single par

What must be kept in mind is that totalitarianism and the totalitarian State are the expression of politi
absolute and the total negation of the State. That is, the totalitarian State is in no way the outcome o
nationalization process, but rather its betrayal. Indeed, the single party uses its own structures to dominate
institutions, which over time are reduced to empty window dressing. Today, in a world where the State's role
political territoriality are changing and taking on evolutionary/progressive (or involutionary/regressive) fo
which are not especially clear at the moment, we must ask ourselves: what organizational figure will replac
revolutionary single party, and storm which "Winter Palace"?

But let us return to our Italian analysis. The Italian case shows precisely how, when the institutionalization process is weak and uncertain, the result is to overburden our expectations vis-a-vis politics and thus vis-a-vis the State. Thus, the State risks being the sole institution people "bet on" in the end, and this, in turn, serves only to maximize the gulf between what the State should represent and the current reality. For this reason, whereas in reference to the United States we can speak of a State that is "weak" in its relationship with society, yet "solid" in structure (Evangelista, 2001), in the Italian case we can undoubtedly speak of a State "weak" in structure, yet almost "arrogant" in its relationship with society. The lack of a tradition or "culture" of institutions has been accompanied by an excess of ideology, in an atmosphere of little (or no) State and all politics. Even Italy's particular path to modernity has been marked, as the contemporary Italian identity has been profoundly shaped by the tormented, contradictory relationship between modernity, politics and the State.

> Indeed, modernity with a lot of politics and little State has necessarily been largely subordinated to society, forced to accept and, in some way, incorporate all the stickiness, delays, fears and contradictions in the social sphere . . . with the result that Italian modernity has become, with the utmost ease, corporatism, familism, tax evasion, mass unlawfulness, and so on. Thus modernity, devoid of State, paradoxically leads to the growth of so many singular aspects that, seen from outside, it would appear to be a living contradiction" (Galli della Loggia, 1998: 148).

Italian society, often portrayed as strong, in reality is as weak or weaker than the State in which mirrored (and the same weakness is to be found in the building of the market: see Petri, 1997). A society tha the end, "does not really exist" as a coherent national entity, but is rather the result of several societies (Orr and Parsi, 2001). It matters little that all national societies also are made up of local ones. What is lacking in Italian society (unlike American society) is an upper level (in terms of structure) that effectively brings into t an authentically national society. This lack of a national and public dimension could, in some way, be remedi it were not associated with the failure of another important dimension: the "civil" dimension. Its development long hindered in part, though not only (and above all, not directly), by the age-old presence of the Catholic Ch and its institutions. For the most part, though, it was hindered by the amoral familism that relegated to a min position any spirit of civil altruism that went beyond the family or did not set the universe as its horizon. Ir end, then, relations between State and society proved to be an (arrogant) clash between two weak bodies, in w political ideology replaced a sense of State and amoral familism replaced a sincere community spirit.

The lack of a national conscience can reasonably be blamed on the late date at which national territory unified under sole political sovereignty. As has been said (Cerroni, 2000: 19), the "combined problem of the of a unified national State and the lack of religious reform" had, among others, extremely significant conseque for Italian customs:

> a weak, incoherent political conscience and, as a result, the highly private nature of the relationships in their lives, which were and continued to be centered around the primary group and focused on family-based, individualistic horizons in life. The result of this was to delay forms of modern association, and to strongly root corporative institutions and relationships, which were more closely tied to family and work relationships than to the public interest.

Italian political identity, therefore, was not conveyed towards that national/State dimension which in the rest of Europe was seen as the key not only to the future democratic growth of its public institutions, but also to the modernization of society.

Italian political identity and affiliation, on the other hand, quickly wound up being held hostage by factions, political parties and their subculture. This had the enthusiastic complicity of social elites who were no

to the task of helping the country and its culture to make the great leap. They were victims in the end of a ce easy opulence, which raised the stakes for anyone who might think of risking any more difficult, yet also i noble, path (Ornaghi and Parsi, 1994; Galli della Loggia, 1998; Cerroni 2000; Rosati, 2000; Ornaghi and F 2001). On the other hand, divisiveness, splitting into factions, is ingrained in that peculiar form of amoral fami which, as theorized by Putnam in the 1970s, derives from a precise "hierarchy of values", identified as far bac 1443, when Leon Battista Alberti wrote his *Libri della familigia* (The Books of the Family), published by I Battista Alberti in 1443. In commenting on these values, Carlo Tullio-Altan said: "at the summit, the family, a absolute point of reference, followed by the company, and then by friends/customers. The city and politic taken into consideration solely in that they can be of use to this hierarchically ordered group of values" (Tu Altan, 1999: 157). The honour and social usefulness of public office is roundly mocked by Alberti himself (was an extremely refined and penetrating Italian Renaissance thinker, one of the most renowned cultural figur this, period when Italy was master of civilization throughout Europe): "Do you see any difference between t who exert themselves in the State offices and public servants? Here you are sitting in your office. What do have that's of any use, besides this: the power to steal and to compel with a certain licence?" (Alberti, 1974: 2 As a somewhat disheartened Tullio-Altan (1999: 158) once again concludes:

> The only reason, then, to take part in running the community is to be able to reach, through fraud or violence, a position that benefits you in running your family/company, the substitute for society. . . . The institution in which every value is concentrated, then, according to such a view of the world, is the extended family, with the purely instrumental – as opposed to affection-based – appendage of useful friendships. In this world view, society and the civic duties it infers are essentially "disqualified". All this helps to create a series of cultural behavioral models that are incompatible with any society that is not a society of factions, and makes any sense of shared social responsibility impossible.

This was the situation at Alberti's time and the two curators of his work, Alberto Tenenti and Rug Romeno, note that one finds, "absolutely never, in the entire body of Leon Battista's work, a 'cluster' of fam that come together and manage to form a *civitas*, a society. . . . The Albertian family is a sphere closed upon i it itself is a society, though one that is closed, isolated, impermeable" (Alberti, 1974: XX). Even one o elements typically part of any reconstruction of the Italian *epos* - the free Cities in central and northern Italy the splendor of the Renaissance - are actually rather far from, if not opposite to, that coveted oasis in whic "republican virtues" were supposed to have blossomed.

Rather, we see those virtues being invoked and described so forcefully by men like Machiavelli precisely because they were lacking in Italy. they had to emigrate (first across the Channel and then the ocean) and forge themselves in the Reformation. Only then were they finally able to establish shared instruments and principles of living together and governing the common weal. In terms of a national *ethos,* the Italian identity was still marked by the presence of two "negative values":   a lack of sensitivity and awareness regarding the imperatives demanded by any rational management of the State in the interests of the community, or a sense of State; a lack of respect for the whole system of laws and standards that embody the citizen's natural freedoms, or the rights of citizenship. All of which benefited a view of society clearly skewed in favor of individual, private, family and group interests (Altan, 1999: 217).   Not surprisingly, in the absence of any real sense of public service, any sense of community and public institutions, the political culture was heavily influenced by the joint action of two opposing extremes: traditionalism, at its most suffocating and immobilizing, and the irresponsible utopianism of Jacobean or anarchist and revolutionary avant-gardes.

The inability of many families to "cluster" endures to this day in the difficulty of many Italian societies to create one. This is similar to a weak State being unable to act against a society that is strong in its "social", though not precisely "public", principles. Thus, it is always ready to try new alliances with political factions that, one after another and always only temporarily, occupy the institutions. **GLOBALIZATION AS A POST-MODERN POLITICAL PHENOMENON**   Until now, national identity and political identity appear to be tightly intertwined as much in stories of success as in stories of failure. Indeed: National identity was that which, by bringing together *ethnos* (the people in its cultural definition) and *demos* (the people as subject of State life and holder of the *summa potestas*), made it possible – even amidst the suffering and the social struggles under early capitalism (Disraeli's "two nations") – for more and more men, and later women, to recognize themselves as members of the political society. In this way, it gave meaning to the

institution of popular sovereignty and to its promises to share power, and it allowed the inclusion of regional, religious and different cultural groups within the national group (Cerutti, 2000: 25).   At the heart of the interweaving between national identity and political identity, there is the relationship between society and politics that institutions have the task of mediating (Anderson 1991; Ital. transl. 2000; Thiesse 1999; Ital. transl. 2001). And the institution that until now has held the position of maximum importance is the State. Today, its legitimacy seems threatened where advancing globalization relativizes territorial sovereignty or heavily modifies it, by redesigning its functions and procedures. Especially the continental European State, which is the closest to the Weberian ideal type, today appears tired and in many ways "confused". For the most part, its abilities in terms of management and economic/financial control have been weak. This is a consequence of both technological progress, which makes even monitoring wealth flows difficult, and the success of an ultra-liberal concepts, which seem to have broken the dynamic balance between economy and politics, between State and market, that had been the keystone to Western modernity (Strange, 1986; Ital. transl. 1988 and 1996; Ital. transl. 1998). In this sense – even while it paradoxically realizes the liberal economic dream of a single market where a potentially infinite number of business people compete against each other - globalization can truly be defined as a "post-modern" phenomenon, with all the ambiguity that term carries. In fact, globalization is the final outcome of the process of co-building between State and market - whose origins we can trace back to the XIV century (Hintze, 1931; Gilpin, 1981; Ornaghi, 2001). Moreover, globalization, precisely in order to question the State's absolute sovereignty, makes a fiction of the division/opposition between domestic and foreign on which the modern State has built much of its legitimacy. It would be rather ambitious here to try to answer the question of whether it was the States that started the war, or whether the need to protect the borderlines around peaceful/pacified areas and communities made it necessary to "build" States. What is certain, though, is that the link between warring violence and territorial delimitation goes much farther back in time than the "invention" of the State. To be precise, it goes back to the very ancient stage when, with humanity having shifted from hunting and nomadic sheep-farming to agriculture and resident farming (that is, after it had created a territorial, resident economy), politics, too, had to become territorialized. Obviously we are speaking of a period that goes back thousands of years before Christ. In essence then, globalization is a new "nomadization of wealth", set against the lasting "territorial permanence of laws and rights" (Parsi, 1998). This risks even the possibility of legally regulating the new global economic space because the "*nomoi* of the earth, though deeper and indigenous, are unable to embrace the unlimited spaces of the tecno-economy." One result is the apparent paradox of the need to turn to the "virtue of artificiality", which is as common to technology as to law; "pure normativism is the only instrument available if one wants to regulate" (Irti, 2001: 67).   The so-called deterritorialization to which globalization leads (in reality, and more precisely, territorial and spatial redefinition: see Galli 2001) cannot then be seen as a specific point of attack on the modern State. Rather it is a phenomenon that has implications for the entire political sphere. Typical of the modern State, if anything, is its progressive construction of an exclusive sovereignty over a territory, as well as a non-duplicable relationship of political loyalty between State and subjects (first), and between State and citizens (later). In this sense, and because these two unique relationships were concretely created through specific institutions, we must look at the impact on the institution in order to identify the specific crisis areas for the State (and its connected political forms) created by globalization. In continental Europe (the qualification is necessary, and not inconsequential to our discussion), these institutions were represented by their monopoly on legitimate violence (for purposes of defense, both externally and internally), their monopoly on the production of laws and regulations, and their monopoly on the issuance of currency.   These are typical functions of the modern State in its continental European version (and, as such, very near to the Weberian ideal type); these functions become layered over time. Precisely for this reason, much more than a crisis for all States, that we ought to be speaking today of a crisis for that particular form of State that derives almost linearly from the archetype of the modern State. This was created on the continent by progressively centralizing and assuming the aforementioned functions. In other words, we are speaking of a crisis for the social and market democracies which, taking different paths, spread from France to Germany, from the Northern States to Italy. Over the course of the 20th century, in fact, these countries lost first their effective politico-military sovereignty (between 1919 and 1945), then their monetary sovereignty (both through the dollar taking a central position in the entire global economy, and with Europe's attempt to react to this monetary domination through the creation of the Euro), and finally their law-making sovereignty (through the progressive Americanization of international private law; see Dezalay, 1992; Ital. transl. 1997; Ferrarese, 2000).   All this creates tension in a territory that is no longer able to "recompose" its political and economic dimensions. Thus, while the identity of the people (the *demos*) and of the territory (*topos*) weaken, especially in terms of the value of its economic utility (*oikos*), the law (*nomos*) that governs territories and the exchanges and relations between individuals also seems increasingly to avoid or evade the monopoly of the public institutions.   This last point is the crucial one, because the possible spread of new political identities that transcend the national/State dimension seems to pass, in large part, through the refutation of laws that protect the property planning and the

transnational efficacy and force of trade.   In looking at the relationship between politics, economics and law, a key role is obviously played by laws protecting property. Indeed, in more than one sense, the body of these laws sets the tone for the entire system that public institutions are called upon to protect. A second dimension that is important because it can provide for multiple sources of law and parties involved in the process of law-making and law enforcement concerns those who, in a more or less exclusive manner, hold the right to make the laws. Indeed, it is clear that the end of the law-making monopoly can be a traumatically, significant event only for political systems where the monopoly exists: that is, in systems of civil law. Common law systems have an advantage in facing multiple sources competing amongst themselves. Operators coming from those systems find themselves with unrivalled knowledge, skills and experience for implementing law and standardizing private law in the transnational (or global) market.   This is important also for the purposes of our discussion because if (as is objectively happening) one legal tradition prevails over others (Wiener, 1991), it is obvious that one version of property rights, and one specific interpretation of the proper relationship between the economy and the rest of society, will also prevail. The almost sacred position property holds in American law is especially evident if we compare said position to the tendentially relative position property is given in many European legal systems. The reason for this difference is found in the fact that for Anglo-Saxon culture, and for the legal and political philosophy of systems based on common law, property rights are the foundation for all other rights and all other freedoms. It is the very continuity between Middle Ages and Modern World, unbroken in the Anglo-Saxon world, which ensures that the derivation/contiguity between property rights and civil and political freedoms is maintained in all its conspicuousness. Things are different on the European continent. It is precisely the building of the absolute State that marks a break with the Middle Ages (of which the law's codification/systematization is the most evident aspect). This forces those who want to affirm their civil and political rights to found them as original, as typifying the Modern World and as opposed to Medieval traditionalism.   The different protection given to property (and its different statute) can be traced to the same roots that lead to a differentiation between continental and Anglo-Saxon legal traditions. This is particularly well described by Maria Rosaria Ferrarese (2000: 185), when she observes, in reference to the unusual relationship between orality, law and writing in the American and European legal systems, how: "Europe, faced with the collapse of Medieval order, was forced to build a political order able to withstand disorder and war, and found in Hobbes its answer to the problem of social order. The European State, with its disciplinarian and authoritarian values, thus required a toughening of power's communicative grammar and a vertical communicative code". Vice-versa, the new world that "was born as an alternative to existing models of sovereignty" was able to reject such a grammar and, putting its trust in a "new civil ethic", a "different institutional organization, of a liberal type, the American nation immediately set out towards an opposite political project, of a community type" (*ibid*.). Political relations could thus become less oligarchic and less authoritarian. Political organization "blended into social organization itself", allowing "less costly social and political organization, which was entrusted to horizontal fiduciary ties." This, in turn, made it better able to absorb the groups of new immigration and "to build a low-cost power model that, in part, utilized the resources of civil society" (*ibid*.).   If the world of the XXI century is, to some extent, the New Middle Ages evoked by several different authors, a world marked by multiple, plural, cross-party affiliations and loyalties in respect to the State (Badie, 1995; Ital. transl. 1996), it should come as no surprise, then, that precisely those legal and institutional worlds whose modern origins are marked by continuity with, not a break from, the Medieval order, are today best equipped (from a conceptual point of view) to confront it. This is the second condition - alongside the neo-imperial aspects of American power - that explains the United States' role within the process of globalization. **THE PATH OF VIRTUE AND THE PATH OF INSTITUTIONS**A world in which property rights knows (almost) no limits (at least when compared to the European experience), is not necessarily a world that does not respect civil rights and freedoms. Indeed, precisely by virtue of the continuity of its institutional history (a continuity, it should be remembered, made possible also by the radical breaking of its ties with the mother country), the protection of those rights is set as the inalienable foundation of all other rights. The framework is essentially Lockian, which not coincidentally was never completely accepted in Europe, where liberty and democracy are implemented through the Jacobean model and its national, Romantic reaction. If anything, it is where liberty and rights come through a struggle against the State and its conquest by (first) liberal and (then) democratic forces, that the failure of the State monolith risks leaving rights and freedoms unprotected. Let us return now to the words that opened our discussion, Mazzini's epigraph from some 150 years ago: "where there is no homeland, there is no common pact that binds you and to which you can refer: the egoism of private interests reigns supreme, and he who has predominance maintains it, as there is no common protection to protect oneself". In Europe, where the impact of relativizing the State's authority has been strongest, to get out of the impasse into which the republican thinker has banished us today, two types of response to the problem identified by Mazzini have been worked out: neo-republicanism (*the path of virtue*), and constitutional patriotism (*the path of institutions*).   In the first case, we must ask ourselves if "patriotism without homeland" is possible; that is, how can the egoism of personal interests be defeated today,

even given the absence or weakness of national/State institutions. The republican version of patriotism was "intended as synonymous with civic virtue, love of law and the freedom for everyone that the law guarantees" (Rosati, 2000: 8; but see also Viroli, 1995). Can it truly be so strong as to allow us "to conceptually detach patriotism from its implied obligatory loyalty towards the nation State", thanks to the "link between patriotism and self-government in the republican political tradition" (idem: 12)? Let us say first off that such a possibility, a political identity both "warm" and yet detached from a territorially defined political affiliation, makes even "hard-core" cosmopolitanism seem reasonable. Arguments like those of Ronald Inglehart (1990) distinguish materialist and post-materialist political cultures and see in the latter the traditional forms of political representation and mediation (such as parties and unions) being replaced by single-issue movements (from environmentalism to pacifism, from anti-globalization to the anti-nuclear). This raises at least two types of problems. The first, despite what the author himself says, is the ultra-elitist character of the position, which in no way respects the "hard law of numbers" and which conflicts even with an elitist concept of democracy. The second is the total lack of sensitivity to the problem of institutions that – precisely in terms of representation – stands out as one of the most difficult to tackle and solve in the shift from post-modernity to globalization. It is so difficult that many simply, though pleasantly, pretend not to see the problem: they evade it so as not to be intellectually routed by it. But we shall return later to the danger for society and political participation as pure movement inasmuch as it is hard to understand how we can indefinitely prolong a "nascent State."   On the one hand, there is the "patriotism of the democrats". This is intended as "the love that virtuous citizens nourish for a community that preserves the equality of citizenship status between its members, and protects their freedom from depending on someone's power, thanks to the rule of law that is, in turn, the expression of self-government by the citizens themselves" (Rosati, 2000: 16). This frighteningly resembles that "perfect totalitarianism" (in the end freed from the "weight of the State") of which we spoke earlier.   On the other hand, the second well-known position, formulated primarily by Jürgen Habermas and said to be more balanced. This is the "patriotism of the Constitution", or a form of loyalty to the principles of freedom and democracy, which we consider universal, and which are embodied in the Western world's constitutions. Two points must be noted immediately in the Habermasian formulation. First of all, the State is not absolutely superseded in favor of some other form of non-territorially defined political organization or one with universal claims. Habermas develops his argument against the backdrop not only of the specific historical problem of whatever it is possible to be a patriot in Germany "after Auschwitz, but also of the problem of building a European identity and patriotism in which all the different national patriotisms should melded. Habermas's horizon is the concrete context of the European Union which, if not a State for all intents and purposes, closely resembles one. Even more certain is the likelihood that increasingly it will take on the features of a State should the individual member States gradually accept further reductions in their sovereignty. This points to the second important point in Habermas's analysis: loyalty to the principles we consider universal is concretely manifested in regards to very specific territorially-defined institutions: the constitutions of the democratic States for now, and the European constitution sooner or later (on the link between "constitution and European identity, see Parsi, ed., 2001). There is no room for any type of more or less vague or complacently elitist universalism in Habermas's constitutional patriotism. The back-and-forth between universality of principles and their constitutionally guaranteed (and territorially defined) protection is in fact what we might call the "classic" logic of modern liberal-democratic constitutions, beginning with how much we can find in the Preamble to the Declaration of Independence and in the Declaration of the Rights of the Citizen.

Thus we always return to the sore point in our search for political space and possible identities in time globalization: institutions and representation. Is it beyond the State; yes, maybe, but where? Saskia Sassen (1 Ital. transl. 1998: 53) has written a number of reflections on the fact that while citizenship is the "key government and political res eponsibility towards its subjects for the modern national State can also have a ro governing the global economy." She observes: "The social changes in the role of the nation-State, the globaliza of political issues, the relationship between dominant and subordinate groups have decisive implications al regards to personal identity and to individuals' sense of belonging. I wonder: is the concept of conventi citizenship useful in studying the problems that deal with belonging and identity in the modern world?" (Sa 1996; Ital. transl. 1998: 56).

Apparently, it could be said that in order to proceed with our analysis we should choose between Habermas and Sassen: that is, between one who considers citizenship (which is what connotes an affiliation and constitutional loyalty) an inalienable criterion, and one who questions its modernity. In reality, the two are not opposed, but rather take different paths to discuss the same question. A classically "cosmopolitan" solution is offered by Luigi Bonanate (2001), who reminds us that on the one hand, in the name of the principles of equality that are foundational the concept of people in a democratic State cannot be limited solely to the

citizens of that State, but must include "all those who obey the same laws (replacing the principle of identity with the principle of legality)." This is the "*formal* heart of the contemporary democratic State, which is made up not only of citizens, but also of *emigrants* and *immigrants*, which the State cannot forget".

Bonanate argues his theory through two key points. The first "detaches" the logic of voting and representation from the concept of citizenship (and thus of affiliation): "If it appears fair for emigrants (who no longer share anything with their people of origin, least of all the legal system) to retain the right to vote they once had, in that they were born and lived in a territory, why not also give the vote to those who, unlike emigrants, live permanently in a territory they were not born in, yet whose laws they obey?" (Bonanate, 2001).

Secondly, Bonanate (2001) sees the process of building (and politicizing) the European Union as a way in which the "*national* sense of affiliation will have lost another little bit of its strength, and the destiny of the European populations will be to blend together and form multi-ethnic societies increasingly similar to American society (to give the example of a successful precedent)". As we can see, this is another case of cosmopolitanism applied to the principles and rights that embody citizenship, the protection of which, though, remains solidly anchored to a body of institutions from that nation-State. It is a cosmopolitanism that "emanates", so to speak, from an institutional core that has to be so both strong and balanced in its relationship with the *nascent* governing society being formed where fundamental organizational elements are already operating to enable the system to function. This strength and balance must be sufficient that it manifests the effects of its influence even beyond its borders. It matters little whether they are the physical borders of the union or the "portable" borders of a people that is no longer limited solely to citizens.   The really crucial point of Bonanate's argument is that first we all are holders of rights and subjects of duties, and only then citizens of this or that part of the world. This highly cosmopolitan vision, which in more than one aspect is obviously excessive, is based upon a condition that is now accepted throughout the world, at least in theory. This is the fact that, before anything else, even before it concerns territorial roots, citizenship consists of the recognition of those Marshallian rights (civil, political, social) which practically translate the content of our fundamental rights. Expressed differently, the moment Marshallian rights were recognised as universal and universalistic, they began to "deterritorialize". This is so even though exercising them entails an "institutional refuge" that concretely protects them and which enables development of a civil society (like European and American society) that adopts them as its ends (see also Hedl 2000). This is the neo-Kantian federalist strategy which, while it assumes continuously evolving and spreading democratic institutions, firmly maintains them as the only way to prevent any drift towards totalitarian politics. **THREE REACTIONS TO GLOBALIZATIONS** Most of our discussion here has been carried out within Western political experience. In particular, the object of our reflections has been the consequences of a slackening in the "natural" unifying force of State institutions on political identity. This is not merely a form of ethnocentrism, but rather an awareness of our lack of knowledge of other cultures. The choice, though, was made with the deep conviction that globalization is not only a Western-born phenomenon (obviously). Rather its appearance has disrupted the very way the West has been building and creating its self-concept and organization from the XVIII century onwards. As we will see in concluding, globalization's truly devastating impact is that it rewrites the grammar and syntax of our being Western. It challenges the force of such concepts which are absolutely "ours" as those of institution, representation, civil liberties, and policies based on the essential equality of human beings. We will come back later to the question of how political identity is changing in times of globalization within which effectively had made globalization possible.   But at this point we must take a quick look at what is happening "outside" in a world which appears increasingly foreign, when not outright hostile, precisely at a time when we would like to bring it nearer to us. Essentially three distinct phenomena are emerging. They must be seen separately for our analysis, but interweave through these regions and for a variety of reasons.   The first of the three phenomena goes by the name of Islamic integralism. The second is an "ethnic revival", the title of a successful work by Anthony Smith. The third, finally, is made up of the anti-globalization reaction in the world's outskirts, where even the "old capitalism" had never managed to take root or be completely legitimized (to become hegemonic, in Gramsci's words): this we can define as a sort of "anti-imperialist revival".   Islamic integralism must not be seen as a fragmentation that is defensive towards Westernizing globalization. That is, it does not seek to mark out a "space/time" line in the sand to oppose and contrast globalization. Islamic integralism represents a form of alternative globalization, founded on values that are different and in many aspects opposite those of Western globalization (Barber, 1995; Ital. transl. 1998). If it contemplates some limit (temporary and to overcome in the long term) this must be seen within the rather gloomy picture by Samuel Huntington in his *Clash of Civlizations* (1996; Ital. transl. 1997). In opposing a type of globalization one detests, because one believes it impoverishes the human dimensions of mercy, brotherhood and tradition, Islam invokes another universal aspect. It can do so in much more radical forms than can (for instance) the Catholic Church, both because Christianity is as much a part of the common Western heritage as is globalization, and because Islam can consider the "lay" values of liberty and the market as foreign to its culture – something that Christianity obviously cannot and would not do.   Extremist,

violent Islamic integralism is only the epiphenomenon. It is the most easily execrable, but not the most dangerous, phenomenon of this other globalization, whose penetration is now spreading rapidly, from the westernmost part of the Arab world (Maghreb) to the easternmost part of Indonesia, from the northern steppes of ex-Soviet Central Asia to the southern offshoots of Muslim Africa.   The ethnic revival, on the other hand, can be defined as a true and proper reaction to globalization. It is the defense of a "particular" mythical claim, of a nature so precious as to demand any sacrifice to defend it. At its base there is a distorted, absolutist vision of what Anthony Smith has called the *mythomoteur* (1986; Ital. transl. 1992). This is the mythical activator of an identity, its unifying and motivating core of symbolic values. One can identify the makeup of a certain "symbolic unifying principle, born out of the symbolic transfiguration, into values, of certain constituent realities of its historical-social formation" (Tullio-Altan, 1999: 12). These elements are the *epos* (historical memory), *ethos* (rules for living together), *logos* (common language), *genos* (family relations and lineage) and *topos* or *oikos* (territory/usable familiarity) (Tullio-Altan, 1999: 12-13). All national identities are made up of these elements, varying only in how successfully they are mixed. What distinguishes identity ethnicism is that it distorts the internal dynamics of these elements to the point that individual contributions do not stop at creating the essence, the uniqueness of a people, but go on to legitimize their primacy, obtained by whatever means. The "other" is one who comes from outside, and who brings with him or her something that can destroy what we are, or better, what we have always been. What is lacking in this perception of "we" is any diachronic ability and the ability to change and to "become". What is sacred is solely that which we have always been. Betrayal is accepting the idea that, through outside contamination, the "we" could also be the fruit of what we will become. It is the head-on clash between the "we that we have always been" and the "we that we could become".   The third type of reaction, the anti-imperialist revival, stems from more typically socio-economic issues. Geographically, it is found in peripheral and semi-peripheral regions at globalization's western epicenter (Mittelman, 1996). These are areas where the effective framework of a capitalist, competitive market has probably been recently implemented, such as part of East Asia. They may also be situations in which the break-up of oligarchies or guaranteed monopolies – which perhaps coexisted with forms of collective small farm ownership – works to the detriment of a long-standing capitalist ownership framework, and constitutes a break or split, such as different parts of Latin America. To these regions, globalization means full admission into a particular form of capitalist market economy. And we have seen how these two concepts have been shaped through North American economic and legal tradition. Better still: it implies and imposes the shift to a mode of capitalism that has been defined as "turbo-capitalism", bypassing the intermediate stages of development that the center of the system, with several internal variations, has experienced.   With the significant exception of the first, due perhaps to Islamic culture's minority condition in the West, the other two phenomena of ethnic revival and anti-imperialist revival have two uniting features. The first is that they are often used as "flags" for anti-globalization movements within the West. They can be rolled into a rough, though media-effective, vision able to mobilize the many who are "discontent" with the globalization process. This happened, for instance, in Chiapas where "Sub-commander Marcos" rose up as mythicized leader of both the battle against "North American economic imperialism (and its accomplices in Mexico City)" and the struggle to protect the Indian culture (in reality, largely *mestizo*) of the Selva Lagadunia peoples. The image of the hooded leader and the red star, made popular by the media and the skilful use of Internet by Zapatista supporters, has by now become a gadget for young Western "revolutionaries", similar to the posters of the face of Che Guevara's face.   The second common aspect is that the two phenomena also appear in certain zones within the central area represented by the West, or at least in immediately outlying or border zones such as the ex-Yugoslavia.**A CLASH INSIDE THE WESTERN CIVILIZATION?**This leads us back within the West whose culture – we like or not – has contributed more than any other to drawing the blueprint of global political space through the dual movements of the process of colonization and decolonization. It has also provided the categories with which politics was imaginable "anywhere" at least, from the end of the 1800s onwards. We need only think of how such categories as State, nation, territorial sovereignty, political party, or division of power – and we could continue through a long series of institutions – have spread widely, globally. Now that "post-modernity" seems to be shaking these concepts and the very idea of politics as it has evolved through more than 2000-years, we must go back to the source in order to evaluate the consequences to the future of political identity. If the institutions to which we have assigned the immense task of "reining in" the fury of politics appear to be in trouble today, what should we expect from the future marching towards us if not a return to absolute politics?   Looking at the situation, especially at the anti-globalization movements that we could even say make up the first visible manifestation of a transnational political aggregation (and perhaps an identity), the aforementioned scenario may not be all that far-fetched. If there is one thing that immediately strikes the political scientist, it is to see how, in the name of a "new" or "other" politics, in reality they become the bearers of a *typically Schmittian concept of politics.* The *amicus-hostis* contraposition is especially evident in their language, in their actions and, first and foremost, in their vision of the world. Here, there lurks an absolute ethical enemy (globalist,

imperialist capitalism) that must be fought, even at the cost of resorting to violence. There is no trace of any "political amity" from which we might draw truly revolutionary categories in this political thinking.   With the growth of the no-global movements, we can now say that we have gone from the *Clash of civilizations* to the *Clash inside civilizations.* The anti-globalization movement is in fact essentially within the West. Not only is its make-up largely "domestic" in terms of Western countries, but the very presence of anti-imperialist themes and themes supporting minority identities is essentially "didactic and flag-waving." In other words, it is aimed at connoting the adversary, at describing the struggle's objectives in a simplified manner. It provides the icon of the struggle's global dimension, around which to rally its followers. Always in deference to Schmittian political categories, it seems that as the main political arena is gradually expanded and widened, the harshness of the clash is intensified. This is a fundamental (and worrying) implication of movement-based politics on a global scale, namely, that if the world is the stage for the political struggle, then we can have only friends or enemies, not competitors. The struggle will be *us* against *them,* where "us" and "them" are two separate, absolutely air-tight categories.   "Militant anti-globalization", then, can be said to constitute an initial form of transnational political identity, which sees the political arena not as being delineated by the borders of a State or a federation of States. Rather, one explanation for its refusal (perhaps because impossible) to take on an institutionalized form can be found in its desire to delegitimize the concept of political institution that until now had found its most refined manifestation in the State. Alongside and within this weakness, in terms of capacity to institutionalize such a political identity, there is considerable ambiguity in regards to the issue of representation. Though fully aware that we have always had (and probably will always have) non-territorial forms of representation, it must be said that political power control mechanisms (which rest upon its division) all provide for territorially-defined representation. Hence, any time a political entity calls for representation outside this framework, we should question and debate the (effective and verifiable) democratic methods and procedures of that entity in terms of responsiveness, accountability and representation.   As a movement in its nascent stage, it certainly is not institutions that it needs. But their failure and inability to at least create a "light" institutional structure for themselves does not seem to leave these types of movements a very rosy future. In the end, even the 1968 movement had to be shunted along two paths, so as to maintain its social productivity. The first was to institutionalize: to begin with, its leaders moved into the party structures they originally opposed, though they also moved into spontaneous collective bodies that had sprung up with the movement. The second was to influence society, beginning with sectors outside militant politics, such as culture, economics and volunteer work. On the other hand, those who tried to hypostasize, to perpetuate the movements' dynamics, wound up involved in absurd experiences, at times closely linked to (if not actually midwife to) terrorism, as Italy's experience in the Seventies and Eighties clearly attests.   The new social movements that are springing up in the West in opposition to globalization can be classified in part within the anti-imperialist revival, in part within integralism. Some are pure and simple opponents to the market economy and globalization; others would essentially like to make it more aware of human beings and their intrinsic value. The latter may be open to the idea of a neo-Kantian federalism which, given the seriousness of the problems that society and institutions face today, responds by "raising the stakes" with a bet even higher than the one which lead to the progressive construction of the Welfare State over the course of the 20th century.   From those who seize upon (and perhaps emphasize) the partial supersession of a nation-State perspective on political identity, we tend to get, within the West, two types of responses. The first is neo-Kantian federalism; the second is politics reduced to social movements (perhaps one-issue movements). Which of the two seems more utopian or more dangerous can, in part, be a question of viewpoint. But it is clear that only neo-Kantian federalism, in proposing to supersede the State, takes as its starting point the West's uninterrupted institutional history, which represents better than many others its mastery and uniqueness. Compared to the transnational movements, then, even neo-Kantian federalism seems a reasonable, reassuring hypothesis. By this concept, I refer not so much to the "theory of the federal State", as to a "method" and a "social and political doctrine" that "appears successfully to square the circle: to supersede borders and, at the same time, to protect diversity" (Carnevali, 2001: 15). One can look at the world as an *anarchic* arena, an accumulation of different political bodies, all born equally sovereign and now needing to find some form of union to respond to the today's global challenges. Or, one can see it as a *hierarchic* system, where the power of the world's leader, or *hegemon,* sets the direction in which the entire planet moves. Whatever way one sees the world, though, federalist thinking and method can be of help, in that: Federalism, among other things, is able to perform the two antithetical movements of assembling and disassembling. The former when it brings together in a single body (though which eschews the principle of indivisibility of sovereignty) a heterogeneous group of political entities. The latter when it transforms a monolithic body into a new, much more articulated body that is (once again) not subject to a sole sovereignty, and which is structurally able to ensure pluralism and to protect every specific peculiarity (Carnevali, 2001: 19).   Which prevailing form will political identity assume in the coming years: that exemplified by neo-Kantian federalism, or that expressed by the anti-globalization movements?

What room will there effectively be for multi-level political identity affiliations (local, national, supranational: as has already occurred, in part, with the different "security communities", like NATO; see Hampton, 1999)? Will the future international order feature the return to a "new Middle Ages", or will we have a partially territorialized re-edition of an "imperial" form? (Hardt and Negri, 2000)? In leaving the answers to these questions open, I would say that old and new public institutions (some of which, undoubtedly, are still to be invented) will play a vital role. Because even in the most plausible outlook regarding multiple affiliations, the form and manner that they might assume will depend essentially on the institutional setting in which they are created: supranational federal forms, new Middle Ages, or empire (Galli, 2001).

THE QUEST FOR A NORMATIVE DEMOCRACY

A way to think of the possible, desirable future of political identities is to do so against the backgroun of our worries about safeguarding democracy whose protection continues to be fundamental even in times of (p and emerging) globalization and transnationality. As has been observed:

The greater the pluralism and individualism on which society insists, the more essential becomes not only the role of the State in providing protection and reassurance, but also the idea of democracy, as both a creed and an organising principle. And democracy requires the rule of law which, in turn, assumes the existence and preservation of a legitimate law-giving entity. It is these operating principles which make possible not just civil cohesion but capitalism and the production of wealth and welfare (Gelber, 1997: 229).

Compared to what neo-Kantian federalism set forth, to imagine political identity as a hunting ground reserved almost exclusively for single-issue movements, appears both dangerous and defeatist. It is dangerous because it leaves politics in a wild, uncontrolled State (without the checks provided by institutions), with the risk of returning to forms of politics far too similar to those at the time of the 16th century religious wars. It was to end these that in 1576 Jean Bodin and the "Politiqes" (Gherardi, 2001: 219-221) invented the sovereignty of the State.   Recognizing that the State remains a key factor for the democratic politics of the future does not mean setting this in opposition to the groups of global civil society that are emerging. Indeed, the State itself can be a meeting ground between globalization-from-above and globalization-from-below. Already now, in many specific settings, coalitions between States and social movements are emergent, as is evident in relation to many questions of environment, development and human rights" (Falk, 2000: 176). What must be done, then, is to contribute to ensuring that the concept of normative democracy (based on: consent of citizenry, rule of law, human rights, participation, accountability, public goods, transparency and non-violence) increasingly becomes the common property of State institutions, social movements and even major transnational economic players. This will be so as long as the latter adopt a longer-term view of their own interests. This will mean altering the policy content of globalization-from-above to soften the contrast with the preferences of globalization-from-below (*ibid*.). Precisely by converging on the concept of "normative democracy" it will be possible to achieve a triple objective: a) to bring the institutions of representative democracy up-to-date, so as to ready them for the challenges facing us;   b) to bring social movements inside the Western tradition of rule of law and accountability, for if they remain outside it they run the risk of becoming tools of a new totalitarianism; and   c) to obtain greater "democratization" in capitalist economic relations, so as to re-attempt, on a global scale, something analogous to the extraordinary invention of the social and market economy.To succeed, though, we must first solve a problem that is both "conceptual and normative". We must recognize that even in a federalist concept, it is impossible to detach the protection of citizenship from the persistence of solid, legitimate State institutions (indeed, they are *guaranteed* by this very persistence). Yet we must learn to think that identity and affiliation can pass through multiple and varied political forms (different from the State) which at times even overlap. The question then becomes: "are we prepared to think of a world in which the procedural virtues of the modern legal bureaucratic State and the moral and cultural needs of human groups for all sorts of attachments, including what I have called full attachment, are not played out in isomorphic, mutually exclusive, spatial-political envelopes" (Appadurai, 2000: 141). **BACK TO SECURITY**

As have been probably noted, almost the whole of my reflections have been centred inside Western arena cultures, starting from the belief that the advent of the global age has been stressing the differences betwe Western and non Western Worlds. In conclusion I want to call attention t just three critical issues:

1)   As even the recent events suggest, from New York City to the West Bank, the security issue remai the hands of the State, and returns (maybe it has never ceased to be) as a crucial political issue. Its sur reminds us that the link "State-security-politics" is typical and constitutive of the same idea of politics. related to the monopoly of force or monopoly of legitimate violence, but it is related to the loy obedience link, on the one hand, and to protection-command on the other. The progressive expulsio war from the inner western political international community, which has become a reality consequence of World War II, paid the dangerous price of identifying war as an "option" typical o relationship outside the Western Community or between the West and the Rest.

2)   We have not found the working rule and corner stone for the political system born after 1989, with the of Soviet Empire. Since 1648 dynamic balancing and flexible and reversible alliances had beer working rules of a multipolar International Political System. Its basic principle was the sovereign States. Breaks in order and peace were normally caused by insufficient performances in these two it Since 1945 to 1989 rigid balancing and tight alliances were the working rules of a bipolar Internati Political System, based on ideological confrontation and blocked by nuclear weapons. What are, today working rules and the corner stone of an unipolar international political system, in which the imp power seems tired and uncertain about recognizing plural sovereignties as an effective role?

3)   In these passages is hidden the real nature of the problem that globalization moves to political ide There is a break, a cleavage between:
- the global dimension of the economic system (which anyway shows many pockets of resistance ar different profitability); and
- the growing segmentation of the political system, increasingly divided between the Western and Western worlds.

This cleavage or new phase displacement between political values, rules and belongings, on one hand economic behaviors and beliefs, on other, explains most of the return of violence on the World stage of the century.

In the real global scene, globalist and antiglobalist thought share a common limit. The first is based o prejudice of the natural harmony of (economic) interests; the second is founded on the belief of a sort of na harmony of (universal) rights. Both seem cooperate to hide the reality that the novelty of globalization is rath the intensification of free market economic rules and principles inside the West, than in the extension of t rules and principles to the Rest.

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CHAPTER XII

GLOBALIZATION, RELIGION AND CULTURE:

BEYOND CONFLICT, BEYOND SOVEREIGNTY

MARYANN CUSIMANO LOVE

If states cannot solve pressing global problems alone, who can? Can Italian and Italian-American institutions, such as the Roman Catholic church in the United States, play a constructive role in helping to address global problems? Greater attention to the role and resources of adaptive religious and cultural institutions may help to create effective public-private partnerships for managing global problems. In *ad hoc* attempts to manage global problems and bridge globalization's gaps, however, alternative ideas of authority and identity may evolve which over time challenge and change Westphalian sovereign norms. The state is not going away, but it is increasingly contracting out. As states downsize and decentralize in response to the pressures of globalization, and as states innovate in response to global problems, nonstate actors such as religious and cultural organizations perform functions previously performed by states and promote ideas with unintended consequences for sovereignty. Italian culture, as an ancient global culture, and the Italian-American experience, as an adaptive immigrant population reconciling old world and new world values, bring important contributions to bridging the gaps in globalization.

"Globalization Demands a New Culture, New Rules, and New Institutions at the World Level."
Pope John Paul II, May 1, 2000.

In Italy, the Roman Catholic bishops of Sicily and a movement of civil society took a courageous stand against corruption and the activities of international organized crime, with great effect. They are intent on curbing crime and corruption and creating a "Culture of Lawfulness," in Italy and beyond.[i] "In recent decades, the movement has mobilized all levels of society simultaneously and has attempted to reeducate citizens at the local level on the need for alternatives to the mafia. The primary objective of nearly all the antimafia associations is to educate children to know and respect the law and to prevent them from acquiring a 'mafia mentality' of distrust and antagonism towards public institutions which may lead to a life of crime."[ii] Such programs were introduced in the early 1980s by the first anti-mafia groups but obtained additional impetus in the early 1990s in response to the Anti-Mafia Commission and the pressures of the mass anti-mafia organizations of civil society. Libera, the umbrella of 800 nation-wide anti-mafia organizations works with urban communities, the school and the church to implement anti-mafia curriculum."[iii] The Sicilian bishops travel regularly, advising religious and civil society leaders in Georgia, Mexico, and elsewhere in ways that religious organizations and civil society can mobilize to create a "Culture of Lawfulness" to curb international organized crime and corruption.[iv]

In the United States, the Roman Catholic church mobilized with civil society organizations in the Jubilee Justice/ Drop the Debt campaign for international debt relief. Their efforts were pivotal in changing the U.S. government and international financial institutions' policies toward debt relief for the world's poorest. The U.S. government gave $434 million to the international financial institutions for debt relief toward highly indebted poor countries (HIPC), and credited Jubilee USA/ Drop the Debt for the policy switch. The IFIs initially forgave $34 billion in debt to 22 countries, and have pledged to raise that to $70 billion over time.[v]

When cultural and religious organizations are considered at all in the study of International Relations, they are generally viewed as a source of conflict, parties to ethnic and nationalist conflict, violent partisans of tradition and local particularity, opposed to globalization, change and modernity (Jihad vs. McWorld, the Clash of Civlizations).[vi] While theologians have considered the intersection of religion and globalization, [vii] too few political scientists have examined the nexus. Samuel Huntington predicts an inevitable clash of civilizations, of the West vs. the rest. This view has gained greater credibility since September 11th. But this view does not explain the previous examples, in which Italian and Italian-American religious and cultural institutions play constructive roles in managing global problems.

Why are religious and cultural organizations imagined to play only a reactionary role? Some religious and cultural groups feel threatened by globalization, and thus retrench to a more reactive, and sometimes violent fundamentalism as a way to preserve their culture, which they perceive as under siege.[viii] Other religious and cultural groups are able to adapt to globalization and modernity, and may play constructive roles in taming globalization, addressing global problems, and bridging globalization's institutional gaps.

If states cannot solve pressing global problems alone, who can? Can Italian and Italian-American institutions, such as the Roman Catholic church in the United States, play a constructive role in helping to address global problems? Greater attention to the role and resources of adaptive religious and cultural institutions may help to create effective public-private partnerships for managing global problems. In ad hoc attempts to manage global problems and bridge globalization's gaps, however, alternative ideas of authority and identity may evolve which over time challenge and change Westphalian sovereign norms.

WHY STATES CANNOT SOLVE PRESSING GLOBAL PROBLEMS ALONE

Globalization is the fast, interdependent spread of open society, open economy, and open technology infrastructures.[ix] From the first movements of migratory peoples across the continents, to colonization and the establishment of global trade routes, globalization is not new. But the speed, reach, intensity,[x] cost, and impact of the current period of globalization are new. Colonization and evangelization took decades during earlier periods of globalization. Today people and products cross borders in hours; ideas and capital move around the globe at the touch of a keystroke.

From terrorism to human smuggling to international crime to environmental degradation, globalization creates or exacerbates a host of problems which cross state borders, and which even the most powerful states cannot solve unilaterally. There are a number of reasons for this.

First, by design, state power has not grown as rapidly as private sector power in the modern period of globalization. Open economies, open societies, and open technologies have increased the power, reach, and resources of the private sector (both licit and illicit), while constraining the size and reach of the public sector. Market liberalization, the spread of capitalism, and economic privatization has expanded the resources and autonomy of the private sector, while state control over markets has receded (as evidenced by the Asian economic flu, for example). For the first time in history a majority of states are democracies. As democratization spreads globally, the power of civil society and the private sector grow, while state power is

placed under democratic constraints. The spread of cheap and readily available information technologies also facilitate the growth of the private sector (both licit and illicit). Public sector organizations often lag behind the private sector in adoption and effective use of information technologies. Also, the governments of a host of failed or failing, weak or quasi states do not have the ability to maintain law and order, to project public sector control over their legally delimited sovereign territories. These weak states are sovereign by international law, de jure, but in practice lack capacity to effectively govern their territories. Failing states or states in transition from authoritarian to liberal forms experience declining state capacity. But even in strong states, the size of the public sector has been trimmed in recent decades, or has not grown as much as the private sector.

Second, globalization creates a host of institutional gaps, as global problems move faster than the state's or multilateral institutions' abilities to manage these problems. Global economic and technological change is fast, while government, legal, and intergovernmental responses are slow. This creates institutional gaps between the problems of globalization and attempts to manage these problems. The problems move faster than institutional responses, so governments cannot manage these problems alone. For example, terrorists and tourists alike use the same global infrastructure. While the terrorist attacks of September 11th took an hour to conduct and news of the attacks spread instantly, even the strongest state in the world, the U.S. government, cannot combat the problem of global terrorism alone or instantly. Prior to September 11 U.S. governmental institutions were poorly equipped to respond to the problems of global terrorism.[xi] Even the strongest state in the system faces institutional gaps. There are several types of institutional gaps: capacity gaps, jurisdiction gaps, participation gaps, legitimacy gaps, and ethical gaps.

Third, nonstate actors are on the rise. The number, resources, reach, personnel, functions, and networks of multinational corporations and nongovernmental organizations are increasing exponentially. MNCs and NGOs have increasing standing, representation, and functions in international law and organizations, and increasingly perform functions once done by states. Not coincidentally, illicit organizations such as terrorist groups, drug trafficking organizations, international criminal cartels, and human smuggling networks are simultaneously on the rise. Illicit networks benefit from the same open economy, open society, and open technology dynamics which facilitate the growth of the legal private sector.

INSTITUTIONAL GAPS[xii]

The speed, reach, intensity, and interconnectedness of the current period of globalization create institutional crises, as existing institutions struggle to catch up with changing circumstances. Institutions range from "formal organizations, which have explicit rules and forms of administration and enforcement, to any stabilized pattern of human relationships and actions."[xiii] Existing states and international regimes are having difficulties coping with the challenges globalization brings, because globalization creates and exacerbates institutional gaps. These institutional gaps fall into several categories: capacity gaps; jurisdictional gaps; participation gaps; legitimacy gaps; and ethical/ values gaps. Capacity gaps are shortfalls either in organizations or organizational strength, resources, personnel, competence, or standard operating procedures, which hinder the ability effectively to respond to problems of globalization. Jurisdiction gaps are when the writ of the problem extends farther than the authority of the institutions charged with responding to the problems. Participation gaps are when people affected by globalization are excluded from partaking in the decision processes of managing or guiding globalization. Legitimacy gaps are when the institutions which manage or regulate globalization are not perceived by society as rightfully representing them. Ethical or values gaps are when globalization is perceived to have either no ethical base or to promulgate values at odds with societal values or the common good.

Comparatively speaking, developed democracies are best placed to adapt to the challenges of globalization, because they have adaptive and resourced political and economic institutions capable of responding to the dislocations, disruptions, and unintended consequences which globalization brings. States with adequate educational and public health systems, and access to technology and stable governance allow people access, an on-ramp to the globalization highway. But for newly democratizing states, and for many developing states, rule of law, political and economic institutions are weak and lack the capacity and

resources to respond to globalization's challenges. Weak and strong states both have capacity gaps; these are more severe for developing states, collapsing states or states undergoing transitions.

Yet even strong states cannot manage global problems alone since the issues cross jurisdictional and territorial boundaries. The terrorists who perpetrated the September 11 attacks hailed from many different countries. Bringing the conspirators to justice is complicated by these jurisdictional gaps. Additionally, the private sector often has better information and technology for containing global problems, while public sector capabilities lag behind, even in the strongest states. For example, the transportation and financial infrastructures that the September 11 terrorists exploited were all privately owned and operated, further complicating government's jurisdictional reach. Many of globalization's problems, such as drug trafficking or other illicit activities, take place in the economic and social spheres, where the arm of liberal, capitalist states reaches the least. As democratization and "the Washington Consensus" spread liberal political and economic systems globally, more states find themselves constitutionally limited in what interventions they may undertake in the private sphere. For example, regardless of U.S. power, terrorism crosses international and public/private jurisdictions, making the U.S. government's response to these problems necessary but insufficient to successful management of these problems. While intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) are also increasing in number, resources, functions, and power, IGOs and states alone cannot solve globalization problems, since many of the factors that constrain individual states also constrain collections of states. This again creates gaps, between what institutions can do and what they are needed to do.

Institutional gaps also exist between rich and poor. Generally, the wealthy have institutions capable of acting on their behalf, while the poor often do not. States without adequate educational, public health, and governance institutions (developing countries) are least able to access the globalization highway. The rural poor have less opportunity to access globalization's benefits. Poor countries and peoples face institutional gaps which fuel the increasing backlash against globalization. Lacking resources, the institutions of poor countries are disadvantaged when bargaining with more powerful countries' institutions over the rules and regimes that govern globalization. For example, while most of the planet's populations are poor people living in developing countries, a minority of rich countries led by the United States have prevailed in creating institutions (TRIPS and TRIMS) that protect the intellectual property rights and profits of pharmaceutical companies at the expense of the poor who cannot afford the cure. Western pharmaceutical companies use the populations of developing countries for human testing of potential medicines in the research and development phases, but these poor people and countries often do not share in the benefits of these medicines once approved.

Globalization creates a world of paradox. Global transportation, communication, and economic interdependence make possible the vision of a closer human family, as a million people cross an international border every day. However, terrorists, tourists, and dangerous microbes use the same global infrastructure. While capital flows of 2 trillion dollars crosses borders each day, most poor people and poor countries see little of that. Building global infrastructure of open economies, technologies, and societies creates great benefits, but globalization also carries significant costs that are often not equitably dispersed.[xiv] Some argue[xv] globalization is a means to bring peoples and cultures together, to route tyrannical governments, to easily and cheaply spread information, ideas, capital and commerce, and to transfer more power than ever before to civil society and networked individuals.[xvi] Others see globalization as merely neo-imperialism wearing Bill Gates' face and Mickey Mouse ears, extending the web of global capitalism's exploitation of women, minorities, the poor, and developing regions, fouling ecosystems, displacing local cultures and traditions, mandating worship at the altar of rampant consumer capitalism, and deepening the "digital divide" between global haves and have nots.[xvii]

The costs and benefits of globalization are not shared equally, but are asymmetrically distributed. Capitalism is criticized for disparities between rich and poor in terms of income, political power and participation, and opportunities. In parallel, the worldwide spread and intensification of capitalism that globalization represents is criticized for exacerbating the excesses of capitalism, and exporting these problems worldwide. For example, before the latest phase of globalization, the disparity between the richest and poorest quintiles of the earth's population was 30 to 1. In 1997, at the height of globalization, the richest 20% were 74 times richer than the world's poorest. The wealth of the world's three richest individuals surpasses the combined GDP of all the world's underdeveloped countries (with their 600 million inhabitants).[xviii] While certainly global population growth plays a part, 100 million more people now live in poverty than 10 years ago.[xix] Of the now 6 billion people on the planet, 3 billion live on less than $2 a day and 1.3

billion live on less than $1 per day.[xx]   60 countries are poorer than they were 20 years ago, and 80 countries are poorer than they were 10 years ago.[xxi]

Wealth is only one indicator of globalization's asymmetries. Decisions concerning globalization are made in corporate boardrooms and state capitals located generally in Western and economically developed states. Environmental degradation from global production facilities fall disproportionately on the world's poorest communities, as some corporations exploit regions where environmental legislation or enforcement is weakest. Yet most foreign direct investment and collaborative corporate alliances go to developed states. "Controlling for the opening of both China and the former Soviet bloc, which attracted almost no investment before 1985, the share of foreign direct investment going to the developing world actually dropped" from 1985-95.[xxii] Globalization's costs and benefits are unequally distributed, with poor people and poor countries too often not participating in the full benefits globalization may bring. Generally, the benefits of globalization accrue disproportionately to the world's rich, while the challenges of globalization (environmental damage, labor abuses, etc.) have a greater impact on the poor.   Maximizing the benefits of globalization while minimizing or managing the challenges is difficult, because the institution we generally task with managing global problems, the sovereign state, cannot do the job alone. Poor peoples and countries do not have adequate participation in the decision making processes which channel globalization, from corporate board rooms to the Davos economic summits to the G8 meetings. The participation gaps, capacity gaps, and the asymmetric distribution of costs and benefits intensifies dissatisfaction and backlash against globalization, [xxiii] from the violence and death in the protests at the WTO meetings in Genoa last summer, to the September 11 attacks.   Institutions which do not adequately protect developing countries, or which exclude them from participating in decision making processes, are increasingly seen as illegitimate. These various institutional gaps are reinforcing. Institutions must be perceived as legitimate to be effective; participation gaps exacerbate legitimacy gaps, which intensify capacity gaps.

The participation and legitimacy gaps also further the ethical and values gap. Many observers believe that corporations rule the world, and that globalization is thus driven by market values that put profits ahead of people. While powerful multinational corporations seek profits, states seek wealth and development in globalization. Many decry the degree to which rich states, particularly the United States, drive globalization, also putting the values of profits ahead of people (especially since many of the citizens exploited by globalization are not citizens in developed states, thus rich states have no jurisdictional or perceived ethical obligations to the world's dispossessed). Thus whether driven by powerful companies or powerful states, many observers decry the ethical basis of globalization, believing globalization is driven by an ethic of crass materialism and consumption, or western (especially U.S.) cultural imperialism.[xxiv] To the extent that these ethos pervade globalization, many suggest that violence and backlash against globalization will mount, producing a world in which the benefits of globalization reach too few people and countries, making the dynamics of globalization politically unsustainable.[xxv]

The ethical gaps are large and growing. Today over half of the world's population are not receiving the benefits of globalization, either because they are not plugged into the global economy, or because they do not have institutions which can advance or protect their interests as participants in the global economy. Human life is lost, human development unfulfilled, and sacred creation destroyed. This disparity between those benefiting from globalization and those left behind or vulnerable to the challenges of globalization is increasing. The world's poorest populations are growing, while the populations of developed countries are stable or slightly declining with the graying of the baby boomers. For example, world population is expected to grow from its current 6 billion to 7.2 billion in the next 15 years; 95% of that population growth will occur in developing countries and in already stressed urban areas (megacities)[xxvi] –think Lagos and Mexico City. So globalization's moral and ethical problems will only get larger. The values gap is exacerbated by the legitimacy, jurisdictional, and participation gaps. As Archbishop Diarmuid Martin, Former Secretary of the Vatican's Justice and Peace Council, put it, "What is needed is a network of structures, institutions, principles and elements of law to help manage in the best possible way the world's common good, which cannot be protected only by individual governments."

BRIDGING THE GAPS

Can religious institutions help to bridge these institutional gaps, helping to forge a more just and more peaceful globalization which is not driven by market values alone? Too often religious and cultural organizations are primarily seen as a source of conflict in international relations.

There are alternative views. Corporations and states are not the only engines of globalization, or its only beneficiaries. Millennia before the current period of rapid, modern globalization (or late globalization) [xxvii], religious organizations have long been globalizing forces, spreading ideas, institutions, flows of people and capital across international borders. Today religious organizations continue to play an active role in globalization, both as global actors themselves, and as mediating institutions, responding to the challenges of globalization, and offering alternative ethical visions of globalization (beyond market or consumer dynamics). Corporations see the world as market; in this vision people are all consumers, wealth creators or wealth spenders. States see globalization as a world to be governed; people are either governed or ungovernable, potential taxpayers or soldiers or those beyond government posing problems for government (illegal immigrants, refugees, terrorists, or criminals). Religious organizations, however, present alternative visions of globalization, seeing a world in which we are all people of God. In such visions, people are not merely soldiers or salesmen, but souls and spirits, evidence of and participants in the spirit of creation. Rather than mere opposition to globalization, as the clash of civilizations, Jihad vs. McWorld formulations suggest, religious organizations present more varied and constructive reactions to globalization. They may represent one of the best ways forward, for globalization to proceed "with a human face," [xxviii] unleashing greater human potential than mere materialism, for more of the planet than presently participate in the benefits of globalization.

While many believe the dynamics of globalization are antithetical to religion, or make religious institutions obsolete, the opposite may be true. Some worry that with globalization people will tune into BayWatch, MTV and other cultural messages and tune out traditional religious institutions. But the information explosion brings information overload, which increases the need for mediating institutions like the Catholic Church to help people find meaning and value amidst the avalanche of data. How many Americans flocked to churches in the aftermath of 911, looking not only for comfort and pastoral counseling, but also for a way to make sense out of trying and bewildering circumstances.

Religious organizations, as non governmental organizations, may have some advantages in responding to these institutional gaps, to help manage the problems of globalization. The academic literature on globalization suggests that non governmental groups are increasingly important actors in world politics. Globalization makes it easier for NGOs to form and operate. Globalization also creates challenges which sovereign states cannot solve or manage alone, so NGOs increasingly step into the breach to help manage global issues. [xxix] Some NGOs also help represent poor peoples and countries whose voices may otherwise be marginalized in international relations.   In 1909 there were 176 international NGOs. Today there are over 47, 098 international NGOs." [xxx]   NGOs have been growing as more states than ever before in history are transitioning to democracy, allowing grass roots activism in parts of the world (such as the former Soviet states) where civil society groups have never been able to effectively organize before. The advent of cheap information technologies now makes it easy for NGOs to mobilize. For example, if the price of an automobile had fallen in the last two decades as sharply as the price of a microchip, a car would cost us $5 dollars. NGOs are armed with information technologies which help them connect with members, with world wide needs, with other civil society groups across borders, and with the international media. With increased reach and effectiveness, NGOs are helping to manage global problems. Certainly the meeting of world religious leaders simultaneous with the Davos economic summit is one high profile means by which religious groups are trying to mediate the excesses of globalization.

Religious organizations trade in the currency of ideas, especially ideas of good and evil, right and wrong. The ideas compel, even when the organizations cannot. Religious organizations attract support more than they can enforce compliance. These groups aspire to be transnational moral entrepreneurs, agents who act as reformers or crusaders to change rules, out of an ethical concern to curtail a great evil. [xxxi]

While governments have legal authority, religious organizations rely on moral authority. Generally, while states have greater military power, and MNCs have greater economic power, religious organizations' strength lies in their idea power. They seek to occupy the only high ground available to them, the moral high

ground. If they can succeed in redefining a problem as a moral issue, they will have a greater chance of prevailing, because states and MNCs may not be able to speak credibly as bastions or brokers of morality. The Roman Catholic Church has well-developed ethics and rich institutions, resources which are useful to transnational advocacy networks. Morally, religious organizations have legitimacy speaking on moral issues and a treasure chest of well-developed ideas available for use by transnational advocacy networks. Tactically, religious organizations can pool their power with other religious and civil society groups, and use their direct pulpit access to citizens (who may be business or government decision makers) as well as their ability to attract media. While secular NGOs may not command as extensive institutional networks (schools, hospitals, etc.), they also develop and trade in moral ideas, as environmental transnational advocacy networks construct and promote environmental ethics.[xxxii]

Religious organizations and secular NGOs have information power. Especially when networked transnationally, these groups have access to grassroots information about how particular policies affect particular people, information that governments or IGOs overlook or do not have. As people gain greater and cheaper access to information technologies, this can force greater transparency. Transparency or sunshine politics are an important tool of NGOs. By expanding the information base of the public or elite discussion especially around previously closed matters, they often impose the "Dracula" test– will a particular policy or practice be able to survive in the daylight? Transparency alone can do much to shrink both government and corporate abuses. And discussions alone about opening the decision making process to greater transparency help to reframe issues as moral issues, again moving the issue to where NGOs have some home court advantage.

Some religious organizations and NGOs can use reputational power as a force multiplier to enhance their values, ideas, and information power. Reputational power may derive from important, well-known or respected figures who are members of the group. Or it may come from the NGO's own strong advocacy track record. Or, like MNCs, NGOs may build a "brand name" around the quality and reliability of their organization's information products.

NGOs use media and communications power as a force multiplier for their values, ideas, and information power. While NGOs vary in their skill and access to the global media, they do have some media advantages. Global media simplify issues to attract wider audiences, compete against ever-shorter sound bites, in order to sell their products. If NGOs often emphasize how policies or practices affect particular individuals or groups, or how global issues present clear moral choices, they may be able to attract media attention. NGOs can use the media as a megaphone for their message if they understand the care and feeding of the press, and deliver compelling stories with good pictures, and clear good guys and bad guys, in arenas where government, IGO, or corporate responses may either be slow or lack credibility. Since MNCs may have huge marketing investments in their brand names, and do not want these brands to be sullied or their reputations trashed, even the threat of negative media coverage can bring greater attention to NGO ideas. It is more difficult to wield this media power against naked, anonymous commodities and unknown, unbranded companies, however. Media and communications power are important to groups that trade in ideas. NGOs, like others who can persuade but not compel,[xxxiii] must be good salespeople as well as good preachers in order to mobilize their ideas.

INSTITUTIONAL INVENTORY: DEFICITS

What institutional deficits and benefits, do U.S. Catholic institutions have in trying to bridge the capacity, jurisdiction, participation, legitimacy, and ethical gaps which globalization presents?

There are some deficits in terms of capacity. The leadership of the U.S. Catholic Church is relatively small, and often already overwhelmed. Vocations have been steadily declining since the 1960's, leaving an older, smaller leadership cadre to deal with the emerging issues of globalization. The leaders of the U.S. Catholic Church are the 289 U.S. Bishops and their canonical organization, the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB). Additionally, the United States Catholic Conference (USCC) is a civil organization which

collaborates with the Bishops on matters of concern to the Church, including education, outreach, and advocacy.[xxxiv] The Bishops meet annually as a whole, but also have standing committees on specific issues, including the International Policy Committee (the outgoing chairman is Cardinal Law of Boston; the incoming chair is Bishop Ricard of Florida), the Domestic Policy Committee (chaired by Cardinal Mahoney of Los Angeles), the Committee on Migration (chaired by Bishop DiMarzio of Camden, NJ), etc. The USCC is located in Washington, D.C.. Its staff of 250 serve the Bishops as well as the ongoing USCC program activities (Diocesan outreach, creating educational materials for Parishes and Dioceses, running workshops for Diocesan and Parish ministers --both lay and clergy, communication of Catholic activities, etc.). Within the USCC, the Department of Social Development and World Peace is the national public policy agency of the U.S. Catholic Bishops. This department has two permanent offices: The International Justice and Peace and the Domestic Social Development offices. These staff members assemble research and background information for the Bishops' use in developing policy and advocacy positions. Staff also lobby Congress, the Administration, and intergovernmental bodies at the Bishops' request. Beyond advocacy, the (lay and clerical) staff of the international and domestic offices also work with other Bishops' conferences around the world, coordinate outreach and education to Catholic Dioceses and parishes in the U.S., create and print educational and advocacy materials, host workshops on Catholic Social Teaching and current issues, maintain a website, serve as a resource to visiting Bishops from around the world, and help to coordinate fact finding travels of U.S. Bishops abroad. Globalization is on the docket of both the Bishops' International Policy and the Domestic Policy Committees, who meet twice a year to discuss advocacy positions, action items, etc. for the U.S. Bishops. Can U.S. Catholic Bishops and their limited staff, already spread very thin, do much to help bridge the capacity gaps of globalization?

Due in part to their size, the demands on their time, tradition, and the conservative nature of the institutions, the USCCB can be very slow to act. For example, the USCCB issued a statement on June 15, 2001,[xxxv] decrying global warming and calling for more responsible stewardship of creation. The statement, while useful, had been in the works for several years, during which time ozone depletion worsened. Similarly, the Vatican, the Bishops Conferences of South Africa and Latin America have issued pastoral statements on globalization, issuing a call to solidarity with the world's poor to ensure that globalization does not proceed on the back's of the world's most vulnerable. As Pope John Paul II put it, "The globalization of finances, the economy, trade and work must never violate the centrality of the human person nor the freedom and democracy of peoples. . . . Globalization is a reality present in every area of human life, but it is a reality which must be managed wisely. Solidarity too must become globalized."

The U.S. Catholic bishops, however, have as yet issued no formal statements directly on globalization. They have been studying the issue. The Bishops' International and Domestic Policy Committees, in coordination with the International and Domestic Policy Committees of the USCC, are currently studying the moral and ethical challenges of global economic integration, in the Global Economies Project. While the Project has not adopted a specific definition of globalization, attention has focused on moral and ethical dimensions of economic globalization. USCC staff from the Domestic and International offices, as well as a working group of the Bishops' International and Domestic Policy Committees, undertook a series of "listening sessions" in 1999 and 2000, in between the twice a year meetings of the International and Domestic Policy Committees. These panel consultations with experts focused on the benefits and problems of economic globalization, the moral and ethical dimensions of the global economy, and the relevance of Catholic social teaching to these problems. At the joint sessions of the International and Domestic Policy Committees, committee members heard additional speakers on the topic, and continued to discuss and discern the issue. After some work on a preliminary draft statement on economic globalization, the committees decided to suspend work on the statement for now, since any possible public statement should flow from and after the listening process, rather than coming before the listening process was complete.

The Bishops and USCC, in coordination with the Bishops of Latin America and the Canadian Bishops Conference, held a conference on the moral dimensions of the global economy, January 28-30, 2002, at the Catholic University of America. The conference was envisioned as a follow-on to the successful conference on debt relief for heavily indebted poor countries, held at Seton Hall University in 1998 and also co-sponsored by the US, Latin American, and Canadian Bishops Conferences. The two day conference was a relatively small meeting of about 75 bishops selected from the three North American Bishops Conferences. The objectives were to provide an opportunity for church leaders in the Americas and elsewhere to dialogue with each other, with policy makers and leaders of governments and the multilateral organizations, with business and labor leaders, with academics, theologians, and leaders of civil society, from both developed and developing countries' perspectives. After the conference, the U.S. Bishops will determine what follow-on

activities are called for (a formal statement, specific policy initiatives, etc.). The U.S. Catholic Bishops are not built for speed. Thus they may not be well equipped to bridge the gaps created by global problems moving more quickly than established institutions.

Additionally, the hierarchy of the U.S. Catholic Church is all male, predominantly Caucasian, and currently under intense public scrutiny regarding its handling of sexual misconduct cases. Women and minorities have few opportunities to participate in decision making processes, making the U.S. Catholic Bishops Conference an unlikely candidate institutions to bridge the participation and legitimacy gaps of globalization. The recent sexual scandals and the improper handling of these cases of pedophilia and improper sexual behavior by priests has injured the Church's legitimacy and position as a moral leader. Reviewing and reforming policy, responding to legal charges, making amends to victims, and dialoguing with the community to increase transparency and accountability and decrease hostility has consumed the time and energy of the clergy.

Further, many in developing countries believe that globalization benefits the U.S. at their expense. The history of the Catholic church in many regions (the Crusades, complicity with colonialism) may undermine the Church's legitimacy as a mediating institution. Further, the Catholic Church benefits from globalization in many ways. Catholic theology, particularly the gospel message to "Go and teach all nations," and a theology of the universal church as the body of Christ, has driven the Catholic Church as a global institution from its inception. However, cheap and rapid global transportation, communication, and economic flows now make it easier to be a universal church. In Held's terms, relations among US Catholics and Catholics abroad are now more extensive, intensive, have greater speed and impact than in earlier periods of globalization. [xxxvi] Bishops abroad more easily and frequently communicate their needs and concerns to US Bishops, and US Catholics more easily and frequently travel to visit and stand in solidarity with Catholics around the world. Sister parishes and lay mission exchanges have blossomed. While there is a clergy shortage in the United States, the US Catholic Church is "contracting out," relying on the Religious Worker Visa Program to import priests and religious from abroad to minister to US parishes.[xxxvii]   As perceived beneficiaries of globalization with a mixed history in many developing countries, can U.S. bishops speak credibly regarding the needs of the dispossessed in developing countries?

INSTITUTIONAL INVENTORY: BENEFITS

What benefits do Roman Catholic institutions bring toward bridging globlazation's gaps? The Roman Catholic Church has over 2000 years' experience as a global institution. Unlike many NGOs, the Church has a rich, coherent, unifying theology and principles of Catholic Social Teaching that motivate and underlie its institutions. Globalization brings institutional gaps, but the Roman Catholic Church has rich, extensive networks and institutions, from schools and hospitals to parishes and social development agencies, which are not only service oriented but in it for the long haul. Coordination and conflicting missions are obstacles to many NGOs, but the gospel message and Catholic Social Teaching provide a unifying ethos that pervades Catholic institutions the world over. While outside observers notice the Roman Catholic Church's centralized, hierarchical organizational system for matters of church doctrine, outsiders often fail to notice the huge organizational pluralism in the Church as well.   There are over 62 million American Catholics in nearly 200 dioceses, over 19,000 parishes, 240 Catholic colleges and universities, over 7,000 elementary schools and over 1,300 high schools, over 600 Catholic hospitals and over 400 other health care centers, and over 700 Missionary groups.[xxxviii] Dioceses, parishes, schools, religious orders, etc. have social justice committees, sister parishes abroad, etc. These rich networks of institutions, unified by common norms, have capacity to help respond to the problems of globalization. Since many of these institutions operate transnationally, they may be less constrained by the jurisdiction gaps that limit state responses to global problems.

For example, Catholic Relief Services is active in over 85 countries. CRS has some 4,000 employees abroad and 300 employees in their Baltimore headquarters. Most of these employees are laypersons, non-US citizens, and a large number of CRS employees abroad are non-Catholics. CRS was founded by the US Catholic Bishops in 1943 to "assist the poor and disadvantaged outside the country."[xxxix] CRS still retains

close ties with the bishops; 12 bishops serve on the CRS Board of Directors.   While the Bishops set overall policy directives, CRS is an operational arm doing fieldwork abroad. CRS also brings issues to the attention of the Bishops as they arise in the field.

While CRS is well known for its relief and development work, CRS is also increasingly active on issues concerning globalization. After the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, CRS did a great deal of organizational soul-searching. CRS had been active in relief and development work in Rwanda for years, yet somehow had not anticipated the destruction and violence. CRS re-organized, placing greater emphasis on strategic planning, interconnections and interdependencies between issue areas, and reviewing all CRS activities through the "Justice Lens." The idea is that relief activities without adequate attention to structural injustices led to the problem of "the well fed dead" in Rwanda. The Office of Policy and Strategic Issues was created at CRS' Baltimore headquarters, with staff tasked to specific issue areas, including Globalization, Corporate Responsibility, Debt Relief, Foreign Aid, Refugees/Migration, Food Security, and Complex Humanitarian Emergencies. CRS' staff in the Office of Policy and Strategic Issues does advocacy and lobbying work, as well as public outreach. They represent CRS at UN, World Bank, and other international meetings on debt, WTO, TRIPS, reforming the international financial infrastructure, etc.

CRS has a number of interesting globalization projects. In India, CRS is working with other NGOs and USAID to alleviate child labor and prostitution. In the Philippines, CRS is working on a pilot project with the ILO on social re-insurance. Globalization allows capital and jobs to be mobile, but government social safety nets for unemployment are often weak, under funded, or non-existent as state revenues shrink relative to need. This pilot project looks to civil society to provide unemployment insurance, similar to civil society banking and micro finance initiatives.

The Religious Working Group on the World Bank and IMF is a coalition of over 40 organizations pushing for reforms in the international financial architecture. While non-Catholic groups are part of the coalition, most of the members are Catholic organizations, such as the Maryknoll Office of Global Concerns, the Africa Faith and Justice Network, Bread for the World, Franciscan Mission Service, Catholic Social Network, Pax Christi, the Center for Concern, U.S. Jesuit Conference, etc. The coalition has been very active on debt relief, and on reforming the IMF, World Bank, and emerging international economic organizations (such as the WTO) to put poverty reduction and the needs of poor countries first in international financial regulations and organizations.

While Catholic missionary groups, relief and development groups, labor groups, academics, and the Catholic leadership have been actively working on globalization issues, one sector stands out in their absence: Catholic business organizations. While Catholic businessmen have been part of the Catholic Bishops' listening sessions, Catholic business organizations have been notably low profile on Catholic efforts on debt reduction, environment, and reform of the international financial architecture. Catholic business organizations have come together in the past on health care issues, for example, writing an ethical code for Catholic health care. A similar effort is needed now.

The U.S. Catholic Church has some special capacities relative to the world wide Catholic Church on globalization issues. The U.S. government and U.S. corporations are primary drivers of globalization. Most of the primary multilateral institutions, the UN, IMF, World Bank, etc., are all headquartered in the United States. Thus the U.S. Catholic Church has proximity and access to important engines and agents of globalization. The jobs of lobbying, advocacy, consciousness raising, coalition building, and reform of these institutions may fall disproportionately to U.S. Catholic institutions that have better access and proximity to these levers of power. This creates another irony of globalization for the U.S. Catholic Church. Catholics abroad see more of the challenges of globalization, while Catholics in the U.S. see more of globalization's benefits (relative to their cohorts abroad). Yet it is US Catholics who have greater capacity and clearer jurisdiction to speak to the U.S. government, U.S. corporations, U.S. consumers, and multilateral organizations located in the U.S. regarding global problems and the needs of the worldwide church. The Catholic Church abroad frequently asks the U.S. Catholic Church for help in accessing and making their case to these agents of power regarding globalization. While the impacts of globalization are widely dispersed, many of the important agents of globalization are geographically concentrated in the United States, putting a special onus on the U.S. Catholic institutions.

For example, the U.S. Catholic Bishops, in concert with many other Catholic groups and other NGOs, intensively lobbied the U.S. government and multilateral organizations throughout 1998, 1999 and 2000 to

forgive the debts of heavily indebted poor countries. Legislators and government officials predicted the effort dead-on-arrival at first. They did not expect legislative priorities to change despite the efforts of the Bishops, Jubilee 2000, the Catholic Campaign on Debt, and other organizations. Intense lobbying included visits and letters from the Bishops personally as well as from staff of the Catholic Conference, editorials in major newspapers (including a *Washington Post* editorial by Cardinal Law),[xl] public marches and a well-attended rally on the Mall, letter writing campaigns, etc. On November 29, 2000, President Clinton signed legislation that forgave most bilateral debt to the United States, contributed $435 million dollars in funding for debt relief, and authorized the IMF to spend $800 million in gold investment earnings for debt relief. Treasury Secretary Summers wrote a letter to Cardinal Law of the Bishops' International Policy Committee, thanking him for the efforts of the Catholic Conference, which he characterized as "instrumental" in winning Congressional support.

The Bishops' program on Environmental Justice dates back to 1993. While many of the program's efforts are domestic, focusing on Brownfields clean up and children's health issues stemming from environmental harm, the Environmental Justice Program has also devoted considerable time and energy to global environmental issues. In 1994 the Bishops released a pastoral statement "Renewing the Earth," on Catholic social teaching regarding responsible environmental stewardship. They stated, "In moving toward an environmentally sustainable economy, we are obligated to work of a just economic system which equitably shares the bounty of the earth and of human enterprise with all peoples." The statement also noted that many of the gravest environmental problems are global, and these problems are disproportionately borne by the poor.[xli] The Bishops issued "Global Climate Change: A Plea for Dialogue, Prudence, and the Common Good," on June 15, 2001, which continued in that vein to urge for greater attention to global climate change, to the common good and to the needs of the poor. These statements are used by the USCC staff in their advocacy efforts with government and multilateral officials, and in the public outreach and education functions for dioceses and parishes. The Project maintains a database of 4,000 Catholic leaders and organizations involved in environmental justice activities. Nearly 30,000 environmental justice resource kits have been distributed to educators, Catholic parishes, and social action directors. The program also produces books and videos for educational outreach.

Additionally, the USCCB and USCC respond to requests for help from other Bishops conferences around the world, on a host of international issues including the Chad-Cameroon pipeline, trafficking in persons, migration (including migration and VISA status for religious workers), and other topics related to globalization. For example, USCC lobbying intensified last year as Congress passed legislation to ensure more effective prosecution of traffickers in humans, supplemented by Bishop Di Marzio's public statements on the issue.[xlii]

Outside of the USCCB and USCC, individual bishops have also taken the lead in speaking out about the ethical problems presented by globalization. Cardinal George of the Chicago Archdiocese gave a major address to the American Mission Congress on "Globalization: Challenges to the Church's Mission." Others, such as Bishop Murphy of Long Island (formerly of Boston), have published articles in Catholic newspapers on the pros and cons of globalization.

The previously discussed downsides of U.S. Catholic institutions in bridging global capacity gaps included the shrinking size and slowness of the church hierarchy. However, the U.S. Bishops can move more quickly on global issues when crises mount. During their November 12-15, 2001 meetings, the U.S. bishops released a statement on the September 11 attacks. For all the problems associated with hierarchy, at least the Catholic Church has a leadership structure capable of speaking on behalf of church members. Contrast that with the lack of any such leadership structure in Islam. Who speaks for Islam? The silence of Muslim clerics in speaking out against the September 11 attacks and bin Laden's jihad is deafening. While the capacity of U.S. Catholic institutions may be overtaxed and flawed, there is capacity that can help to bridge institutional gaps.

Catholic tradition provides many norms that help to bridge the ethical gaps of globalization. Catholic Social Teaching provides a clear ethical framework for addressing global problems and promise. The Catholic belief in the fundamental dignity of all human life, and the Church's moral obligation to speak truth to power, are key. The fundamental dignity of all human life encompasses concern for human rights and labor.

The preferential option for the poor signals the Catholic Church's obligation to the world's most vulnerable. The Catholic principle of solidarity reminds the Church that it must not be divided into haves and have nots, but the Church must stand together as a united force. This is particularly important for the U.S. Catholic Church, as the wealthiest population of the universal Catholic Church, and as the population of the world church receiving most of globalization's benefits. As the parable of the talents instructs, more is expected from those to whom more is given.

Authentic human development means that the Catholic Church's aim is not merely material gain, but encompasses health, education, spiritual and environmental concerns. The Church has a responsibility for responsible stewardship of all creation, including the environment. Working toward the common good also unites these principles.

Catholic social teachings, as well as Catholic institutions, provide rich ethics and institutions for addressing global problems. Other NGOs, corporations, and states attempt to construct corporate and NGO codes of conduct, and governmental standards for ethical behavior in a global era, from scratch. But the Catholic Church has ethical codes developed and tried over centuries, which are applicable to these pressing moral concerns of our day. The church has cadres of well-trained ethicists. Additionally, the Catholic Church has size and reach in both developed and developing states. Thus Catholic ethics and institutions are well poised to serve as guides and bridges across globalization's gaps.

Regarding legitimacy and participation gaps, Catholic lay institutions represent one sector of civil society. These groups vary in their records regarding participation in and transparency of decision making processes. Thus Catholic institutions vary in their abilities to bridge globalization's legitimacy and participation gaps, although theoretically at least they all can help to represent civil society and thus increase the legitimacy of global institutions. However, since U.S. citizens are well represented in international regimes weighing responses to global issues, some will receive the participation of even more U.S. institutions skeptically internationally.

Globalization needs mediating ethics and institutions to protect the world's vulnerable, the poor and future generations, so that the benefits of globalization may be shared more widely, and the problems of globalization curtailed. In the February 2001 meeting of the U.S. bishops with the Latin American and Canadian bishops on increased cooperation on migration issues, they noted the centrality of economic globalization to many of the problems they were considering. They endorsed the Pope's call for a "globalization of solidarity," "globalization without marginalization," to ensure that human rights and responsibilities remain at the center of concerns for economic development and global economic integration. [xliii] Other Catholic organizations are also working together on issues ranging from debt relief to reforming the international financial architecture to ensure that the needs of the poor and marginalized are represented. But since organizations and individuals learn by doing, it will take time before the US Catholic Church fully recognizes and acts upon the value added which Catholic ethics and institutions can provide, as guides and bridges across globalization's gaps. Catholic institutions have great resources they can provide to bridging globalization's ethical gaps; they have some resources for bridging capacity and jurisdiction gaps. Participation and legitimacy gaps may be the most challenging, for the US Catholic Church to speak for those who have no voice.

Too often the debates over globalization are portrayed as a choice between a globalization that puts profits over people, versus no globalization at all. Religious organizations, when they are considered at all, are generally depicted as reactionary forces opposed to globalization. In reality there are more choices than that. We do not have to choose between the present form of globalization, with its mix of benefits along with its excesses and problems, or a return to a more closed, isolated and less interdependent world. Even the harshest critics of globalization use the tools of globalization to broadcast their messages and solicit support for their anti-globalization causes. Instead of debating over false choices, we can build institutions which better represent important values, better distribute the benefits of globalization and better mitigate the problems of open economies, open societies, and open technologies, and better protect and promote the common good. Religious organizations, including the institutions of the U.S. Catholic Church, have valuable competencies they can bring to the task of taming globalization, of building global infrastructure that advance more authentic human development.

SOVEREIGNTY CHANGING[xliv]

As states increasingly turn to the private sector for help in managing global problems, what effect does this have on sovereignty over time?

It is instructive to remember Hendrik Spruyt's story of how fundamental change came ushering in the Westphalian sovereign state: the economy changed; new elites were created who benefitted from the new economic system and needed a new form of political organization to better accommodate them and their economic practices. Ideas changed, new organizational forms emerged and competed, and after centuries of flux the sovereign state eventually won out.[xlv]

There are a number of parallels today. The economy has changed. The new economic system is increasingly based on information, technology, and services, which is less dependent on the control of territory. The means of production, capital, and labor are mobile, not fixed. Players who make use of modern information, communication, transportation, and financial technologies reap the benefits of increasingly open borders and economies. Political systems that make room for the new economic system reap profits in foreign direct investment, and so regime types as distinct as the Chinese communist system, the Australian parliamentary system, and the Iranian theocracy are all simultaneously undertaking reforms to make themselves more attractive to investors' capital and technology flows.

New elites are emerging who profit from the new economic system. Typified by George Soros, Bill Gates, and Ted Turner, these "new imperialists" increasingly follow no flag. They are passionate about expanding technologies and markets, and they are frustrated by what they see as anachronistic state barriers to investment and trade flows. The international business classes attend the same schools, fly the same airlines, vacation at the same resorts, eat at the same restaurants, and watch the same movies and television shows. Independent of national identities, these elites mobilize to try to make states facilitate market dynamics. Some call it the "Davos culture,"[xlvi] after the annual World Economic Summit that meets in that Swiss luxury resort. Sociologist Peter Berger calls it the "yuppie internationale," typified by the scene in a Buddhist temple in Hong Kong of "a middle aged man wearing a dark business suit over stocking feet. He was burning incense and at the same time talking on his cellular phone." He believes these cultural ties have made peace talks in South Africa and Northern Ireland go more smoothly. "It may be that commonalities in taste make it easier to find common ground politically." Can it be that leaders who all shop at the Gap and Bennetton and eat at McDonald's find political antagonisms quaint and unnecessary? Thomas Friedman argues that no two countries with a McDonald's have ever gone to war with one another.[xlvii] Even though clearly there are many economically underprivileged around the world who do not partake of this lifestyle, the values of this new elite percolate into the rest of society as people mimic the behavior of the elites and as they strive to better their economic situations one day to rise into the wealthier classes.

Ideas are changing (including ideas of authority, identity, and organization), facilitated by the new information technologies and changes in the economy. Never before in human history have we been able to spread ideas so quickly and widely. Modern communication technologies allow an ever wider swath of the planet to be tuned in to the same advertisements, the same television shows, and thereby, to some of the same ideas about consumerism and personal freedoms. Identity is becoming less tied to territory. If identity and authority do not stem from geography, what is our new church, our new religion? In the Middle Ages identity came from Christendom, the church, while authority stemmed from spiritual connections. In the modern era identity was tied up with the nation-state; authority corresponded with geography.

Now authority and identity are increasingly contested. Susan strange believes we now have Pinocchio's problem: the strings of state control, authority, and identity have been cut, but no new strings have been fastened. States no longer are the supreme recipient of individual loyalties, especially as states no longer fulfil basic services and functions, and other actors step into the gap. Firms, professions, families, religions, social movements have all significantly challenged the state's territorial and security-based claim to individual loyalty. We are left to choose among competing sources of allegiance, authority and identity, with

no strings to bind us like puppets to one source of authority, and with more freedom to let our conscience be our guide. [xlviii]

Certainly the new economy would like identity to be formed around consumer productsCyou are what you wear, what you consume. Advertisers spend billions to imprint brand loyalty at an early age, and all the advertising of Planet Reebok, I'd-like-to-buy-the-world-a-Coke, and Microsoft's One World Internet Explorer icon share a common theme, that identity stems not from national borders but from consumer products. Identity is therefore just as mobile as the economy; you are not born with it. You can buy it. Alternatively, some see identity as increasingly flowing from professions and firmsCyou are what you do, and your commitment is to your profession rather than to a specific nation-state.

As Richard Rosecrance describes it, "Today and for the foreseeable future, the only international civilization worthy of the name is the governing economic culture of the world market."[xlix] Benjamin Barber refers to this popular, consumer market culture as "McWorld."[l] As market values permeate various cultures, certain ideas emerge as prized: the value of change, mobility, flexibility, adaptability, speed, and information. As capitalism becomes our creed, with technology as our guide, distinct national and religious cultures are becoming permeated with common market values.

There are alternatives to market values, however. Religious organizations and some NGOs promulgate alternative ethics to materialism, a globalization in which we are not merely consumers or a governance problem, but human beings each with irreducible sacred dignity. This vision of globalization prescribes putting people before profits, ethical values before market values. Religious organizations are increasingly using the tools of globalization to promote their views. The Internet has been a popular tool for organizing and proselytizing by many faith groups.

Ideas of organization are also changing and are based on models from the marketplace and technology: the computer, the Internet, and the market are diffuse, decentralized, loosely connected networks with a few central organizing parameters but strong ties to the activities of individual entrepreneurs. Foreign policy organizations are in some instances going beyond bureaucracy, creating flexible, innovative, coordinating networks.

Creative public-private partnerships are the wave of the future in solving global problems. Rather than trying to become draconian, "big brother" states (which would conflict with open society, open economy, open technology goals) it makes sense for governments to look toward civil society for help in managing global problems. But states must be aware of the costs of contracting out. In privatizing, not only do governments lose some control over policy, but additionally, private entities may present obstacles to the government's agenda as profit or other motives conflict with important public policy goals. Although privatization and moving beyond bureaucracy are popular buzzwords in today's budget-conscious political climate, changes in state architecture have consequences for how we think about political authority, identity, and organization.

Perhaps, as in Spruyt's analysis of the late Middle Ages, ideas drawn from the new economic system are helping to shape new ideas of political organization. A resurgence of IGOs simultaneous with increased attention to local governance may not seem at all strange to a civilization used to surfing the Net, using a system that is simultaneously globally connected but only as good as your local link.

James Rosenau believes that as individuals become more analytically skillful, the nature of authority shifts. People no longer uncritically accept traditional criteria of state authority based on historical, legal, or customary claims of legitimacy. Instead, authority and legitimacy are increasingly based upon how well government authorities perform.[li] While scholars disagree about the sources of identity and authority in the emerging era, they agree that these ideas are changing.

Finally, Spruyt acknowledges that new forms of political organization are beginning to emerge, as evidenced by the European Union and the increasing roles and profile of IGOs. Thus, even if, as Spruyt maintains, the sovereign state is still supreme, three out of four of his indicators of fundamental change are already here: change in economy, elites, and ideas are in evidence, and while no new form of political organization has unseated the sovereign state, new forms are beginning to emerge around the sovereign state

that are chipping away at functions previously performed by the state and changing the role of the state. In attempting to solve global problems, states partner with a variety of nonstate actors, including religious organizations such as the Roman Catholic Church. Over time, these public-private partnerships may have unintended consequences for Westphalian sovereign norms, changing the way that people think about and relate to sovereignty. As nonstate actors bridge globalization's gaps, people may identify more with nonsovereign institutions that work beyond geographic borders. Keck and Sikkink note, "If sovereignty is a shared set of understandings and expectations about state authority that is reinforced by practices, then changes in these practices and understandings should in turn transform sovereignty."[lii]

The state is not going away. Rather the state is increasingly contracting out. As states downsize and decentralize in response to the pressures of globalization, and as states innovate in response to global problems, nonstate actors such as religious and cultural organizations perform functions previously performed by states and promote ideas, with unintended consequences for sovereignty.[liii]   Italian culture, as an ancient global culture, and the Italian-American experience, as an adaptive immigrant population reconciling old world and new world values, bring important contributions to bridging globalization's gaps.

[i] Louise Shelley, John Picarelli, and Chris Corpora, "Global Crime, Inc.," in Maryann Cusimano Love, *Beyond Sovereignty: Issues for a Global Agenda. Second Edition* (New York: Wadsworth, forthcoming July 2002); Umberto Santino, *Storia del Movimento Antimafia* (Rome: Editori Riuniti), 2000.

[ii] Alison Jamieson, *The Antimafia: Italy's Fight Against Organized Crime* (London: Macmillan), 2000, 148.

[iii] Louise Shelley, John Picarelli, and Chris Corpora, "Global Crime, Inc.," in Maryann Cusimano Love, *Beyond Sovereignty: Issues for a Global Agenda. Second Edition* (New York: Wadsworth, forthcoming July 2002); Rita Borsellino, "In Spite of Everything, The Popular Anti-Mafia Commitment in Sicily," *Trends in Organized Crime* (5, no. 3, Spring 2000), pp. 58-63.

[iv] Special Issue: Furthering a Culture of Lawfulness. *Trends in Organized Crime*. Spring 2000. Volume 5, Number 3.

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